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Abstract 
!is thesis develops a new theory of natural kinds for the biological world, called ‘Kind 
Historicism’, and addresses the relationship between natural kind theorizing and scienti%c 
reasoning.  Applied to natural kinds and individuals in biology, Kind Historicism provides an 
ontology of the biological world.  Discussions of biological ontology have struggled to balance 
insights from scienti%c practice with tools from analytic philosophy, metaphysics, and 
ontology.  Ontological questions and practical/epistemic questions are o"en entangled.  !is 
thesis separates the two enquires, explaining why an ontological account of ‘what-there-is’ in 
biology should not straightforwardly dictate scienti%c categories, objects, or concepts.  More 
precisely this thesis provides, in two parts, the development of Kind Historicism in light of 
discussions of natural kinds, essentialism, and monism, followed by the application of Kind 
Historicism to the natural kind status of biochemicals and to the problem of biological 
individuality.  Finally, the success of Kind Historicism is measured against its ability to 
account for ‘intrinsic heterogeneity’ and ‘theoretical pluralism’, features of the biological world 
and science, respectively, believed to preclude biological natural kinds. 
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 Introduction: 
!e Problem of Biological Ontology 
Joey is sitting in his chair in my apartment, a foot or so from the edge of my desk.  He has 
been there more-or-less every day for four years.  He is a grey male and a spritely 17.5lbs.  He 
is a cat.  Normal people do not %nd themselves wondering about whether their cats exist, the 
manner in which they exist, or any other such things.  But I do.  Philosophers are not normal.  
Suppose a philosophical colleague of mine asked: ‘What is Joey?’; how should I respond?  Well 
he is a cat, of course—Felis catis, to be precise—but he is also a Chartreux1, a pet, a mammal, a 
carnivore, a male, a hunter, a (poor) guardian, and an adult.  Joey is also a collection of atoms, 
molecules, and %elds, arranged in a certain way all the way up to cells, tissues, organs, and 
systems.  !ere are many and more ways to describe Joey, many of them objective and, 
perhaps, many of them referring to real categories to which Joey belongs.  So how should I 
answer?  If my colleague were a breeder I would answer ‘He is a Chartreux’.  If my colleague 
were a taxonomist I would answer ‘Felis catis’.  If my colleague were a veterinarian I would 
answer ‘overweight adult male with an overactive thyroid’.  If my colleague were an ecologist I 
would answer ‘hunter, predator, and carnivore’.  If my colleague were a physicist I would 

1 A breed of cat from France, similar to the British Shorthair. 
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answer ‘%elds, particles, and the like’.  And if my colleague were merely being polite I would 
answer ‘he’s my pet’.2   
I can propose many categories to which Joey might belong.  Each is an appropriate and 
acceptable answer for some number of di#erent questions, asked in di#erent contexts by 
di#erent interested parties.  !e breeding, taxonomic, medical, ecological, physical, and idle 
questions have simple answers.  But my colleague is not a breeder, taxonomist, physicist, or 
any of these other things; she is a metaphysician and ontologist, and her question was neither 
innocent nor idle.  She knows that answering it to her satisfaction is a tall order.  She knows 
that, in the philosophy of biology, the ontological status of organisms is hotly contested.  For 
any category I propose, my ontologist colleague will ask why that category is fundamental, or 
privileged.  If I appeal to science, adopting whatever it tells us about Joey, she will point out 
that science fails to provide a univocal answer, since di#erent branches of biology classify and 
identify di#erently.  She might also ask why I look to biology; the sciences of chemistry and 
physics o#er di#erent conceptions of Joey, still.  Even if I propose that we accept many of 
these categories, she will ask for a theoretical account that justi%es the acceptance of certain 
but not all descriptions of Joey.  She is asking for a theory of biological kinds. 
My colleague also knows that the category to which Joey belongs is not the only relevant 
issue pertaining to his ontological status.  When she asked what Joey is, she was also asking 
about which things are parts of Joey and which are not.  Here too there are many answers.  
Perhaps Joey is everything inside of his fur, in which case the contents of his bowels are a part 
of him (until they’re not), as is the elastic band he just swallowed.  And what about the 
parasitic tick burrowed under his coat, or the symbiotic bacteria in his gut?  Perhaps Joey is all 
of these pieces that contribute to a physiological system, in which case changing physiology 
means an ever-changing cat.  My colleague will ask for a principled theory that answers these 
questions and answers them not just for Joey, but for all biological objects.  My colleague is 
asking for a theory of biological individuality.   
Taken together, a theory of biological natural kinds and a theory of biological individuality 
constitute a theory of biological ontology, for the purpose of this discussion.  !ey tell us what 
biological things are like—what it is that makes them whatever it is that they are.  !ey tell us 
what Joey is, if anything in particular.   
!ese accounts should, ideally, also make sense of the many non-ontological categories 
and individuations that people use.  If ‘overweight’ is not an ontological category to which 
Joey belongs, then we want to know why it works so well as a scienti%c category.  If Joey’s gut 
1ora are actually parts of him, then we want to know why scientists can successfully treat 

2 Jean Harvey once recommended to me the phrase ‘companion animal’ rather than ‘pet’.  While I 
support the moral message of this swap, I hesitate at the linguistic awkwardness.  See her (2008).   
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them as being separate.  So the primary questions of biological ontology here concern 
ontological categories and their nature, and these lead naturally to accounts of non-
ontological categories and their usefulness. 
In short, my colleague’s question is not one to be taken lightly.  Its answer is neither 
straightforward nor obvious.  Rephrasing it in a slightly more general fashion, the question is 
the primary question of biological ontology: 
Q1: What kinds of things populate the biological world? 
My answer to this question will unfold over the course of this thesis, %rst in the abstract in 
PART I, then more concretely in PART II.   
Q1 structures the thesis as a whole, which develops (PART I) and then examines the 
implications of (PART II) an account of biological ontology.  However even an adequate answer 
to Q1 would leave unanswered two further and equally important questions: 
Q2: What does the correct answer to Q1 entail for monism and pluralism? 
Q3: What role should this biological ontology have in scienti$c practice? 
An account of biological ontology should shed light on these issues, if it is to be helpful to 
philosophical and scienti%c debates.  My investigation into Q1 hinges on my account of 
natural kinds, developed in Chapters 1 and 2.  My investigation into Q2 begins by critically 
examining the concepts ‘monism’ and ‘pluralism’, in Chapter 3.  My answer to Q3 emerges 
gradually, over the course of the thesis, receiving direct attention at various points in Chapter 
3, 4, 5, and 6.3 
!ere are many uses of ‘ontology’, but the sense I am interested in concerns individuals 
and their kinds, whatever facts bear on individuality and kind membership, and whatever 
facts follow from individuality and kind membership.  !e sense of ‘ontology’ used here is 
thus selective.  Kinds and individuals; nothing more.  !ese two ontological categories are of 
interest for primarily historical reasons: many philosophers of biology have discussed these 
categories and a non-negligible sub-set of those philosophers have dismissed one or more of 
those categories as irrelevant or inapplicable to the biological world.  I will show that these 
dismissive attitudes are avoidable.   
!is project is much more narrow than a straightforward scienti%c realism.  Many things 
have bases in reality that are nevertheless not natural kinds or individuals.  Over the course of 

3 The relationship between metaphysics, philosophy of science, and science has, during the writing of 
this work, become a flashpoint of discussion.  The most notable work is Ladyman and Ross’ (2007) 
Everything Must Go.  While the topic of that book was how science (particularly fundamental physics) 
should guide certain ontological assumptions about objects in metaphysics, my concerns are 
different—nearly the inverse.  I am asking whether and how ontological facts from a scientifically-
informed metaphysics should feed into real-world scientific reasoning.  My concern with individuality 
and objecthood, which are more in line with Ladyman and Ross, emerges in Chapter 5.  On the topic of 
scientifically-informed metaphysics, see the volume edited by Ross, Ladyman, and Kincaid (2013). 
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the project I will at times digress to explain how realism and objectivity interact with the 
ontological categories I discuss, but realism and objectivity are not my prime targets.  On the 
account developed, ‘natural kinds’ and ‘individual’ mark two ontologically special statuses.  
Why they are special, what sorts of things have this status, and what this all entails for our 
metaphysics and our science are the topics of this thesis.  !e last question, concerning 
science, is particularly important.4 
My three core questions have, of course, been asked before, albeit o"en indirectly.  But 
philosophy and biology throw up some unique hurdles to these investigations and o"en these 
hurdles go unnoticed by unsuspecting philosophers of science.  I will now introduce the two 
largest such hurdles: intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism.  I will then brie1y 
explain how these challenges have tripped-up previous investigations into biological ontology.  
A"er an outline of the plan of this thesis, I will conclude with a brief postscript on ‘Stanford 
School’ pluralism. 
1. "e Challenges of Biological Ontology 
Di2culties for biological ontology start with the recognition that the biological world is 
messy—incredibly messy.  !is makes uni%ed ontological theories quite di2cult.  !ese 
di2culties are compounded twice over.  First, relying on established philosophical concepts is 
of no help, because accounts of scienti%c ontology developed with physics or chemistry in 
mind do not %t the biological world.  Second, appeals to science are of no use because 
biologists seem happy to use an array of di#erent taxonomic and individuation schemes. 
Biology is therefore messy in two relevant respects: biological things are heterogeneous in 
their intrinsic properties and the biological sciences are heterogeneous in their theories of 
classi%cation and individuation.  !e claim about biological objects is ‘intrinsic heterogeneity’, 
the claim about biological sciences is ‘theoretical pluralism’.  I will unpack both, below.  !e 
interesting questions of biological ontology emerge at the intersection of the two; but not 
everybody shares this view.  !e goal of this section is to introduce intrinsic heterogeneity, its 

4 Paul Humphries (2013), in a volume dedicated to exploring the emerging field of scientific 
metaphysics, distinguishes two types of ontology: Scientific and Speculative.  These correspond, 
roughly, to scientific metaphysics and analytic metaphysics.  Like most scientific metaphysicians, he is 
critical of the latter.  The difference between the two lies in the constraints placed on ontological 
claims.  Scientific approaches ensure that their claims do not conflict with certain core empirical 
findings (e.g. relativistic accounts of gravity or conservation principles for energy).  Speculative 
approaches ensure that their claims meet certain a priori ideals (e.g. those imposed by Humean 
supervenience).  Classically, natural kinds belong to speculative ontology, surrounded by various a 
priori criteria and constraints.  I critically examine these constraints, eliminating most (Chapter 2).  I 
then see how claims about kinds and individuals stack up against present scientific knowledge 
concerning biological groups, structures, histories, and individuals.  I might thus be viewed as taking 
subject matter traditionally examined within Speculative ontology, eliminating much of the a priori, 
and holding it accountable to scientific knowledge.  
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perplexing relationship with theoretical pluralism, and its hazy implications for metaphysical 
monism and pluralism.  In the next section, I will discuss examples from the recent history of 
philosophy of biology where philosophers saw the tools and goals of biological ontology 
somewhat di#erently.  
Intrinsic Heterogeneity and !eoretical Pluralism.  !e dominant view of the biological 
world is of a world characterized by heterogeneity and disunity.  !is can be seen quite easily 
at the level of organismal taxonomy, since biological things di#er greatly across taxonomic 
ranks.  Bacteria are very di#erent from Eukaryota, plants are very di#erent from animals, 
mammals are very di#erent from amphibians, and tigers are very di#erent from zebras.  Even 
more problematically, biological things also di#er greatly within taxonomic ranks.  !ere are 
many ways in which Joey is unlike other Felis catis; there are many ways in which one 
amphibian will di#er from the next.  Everything from outward appearance to behaviour to 
genetics may di#er from one particular to the next.  Robert. A. Wilson calls this ‘intrinsic 
heterogeneity’ (2005 Ch. 3).  By ‘intrinsic’ Wilson means to exclude the relational or extrinsic 
properties of organisms, focussing on features like morphology and genetics.  While Wilson 
meant the term only to apply to organisms, I extend the concept to cover all biological 
particulars.  Wilson would not object; he recognises that heterogeneity is ‘a cornerstone of the 
idea of evolution by natural selection’ (2005, p.100).  
Intrinsic heterogeneity has implications for biological science.5  Studying one group of Felis 
catis will not reveal features common to all cats, just as learning to individuate algae will not 
tell me much about individuating vertebrates and classifying plankton will not help classify 
da#odils.  Biological things share many properties, but only imperfectly.  Exceptions are to be 
expected in biology.  Heterogeneity is the norm.  As a result, there exist a plethora of 
taxonomic methods and individuation schemes, each suited to di#erent realms of enquiry, 
di#erent investigative interests, or di#erent samples.  Bacteria may be individuated one way 
and vertebrates another.  Evolutionary biologists may taxonomise organisms di#erently than 
population ecologists.  Borrowing a term from John Beatty (1994, 1995), I will call this 
‘theoretical pluralism’.  Beatty recognizes that biologists require multiple theories or 
mechanisms to account for or represent a particular domain of phenomena.  For Beatty, 

5 I will toggle between discussions of ontology and discussions of scientific practice.  It is easy to get 
lost.  For clarity, terms such as ‘biology’ and ‘chemistry’ will be used to refer to sets of phenomena in 
the world; ‘biological practice’ and ‘chemical practice’ refer to the sciences that investigate those 
phenomena.  Likewise, while ‘natural kinds’ will refer principally to human-independent classes in 
nature, ‘classifications’ will refer to scientists’ attempts to categorize.  Whether or not classifications 
ought to approximate the natural kinds is a central question of this work.   
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theoretical pluralism should not be viewed as an accident.  It is a necessary response to the 
heterogeneity of the biological world.6 
!eoretical pluralism means that seekers of biological ontology cannot look to biological 
science for answers.  !e biological sciences feature heterogeneous representations of 
biological taxonomy and individuation, each developed with speci%c questions and subject 
matters in mind.  !is theoretical pluralism may re1ect an underlying disunity to the 
biological world, it may re1ect the limitations of current science, it may reveal gross error in 
biological science, it may reveal the poverty of metaphysics and ontology, or it may be 
something else entirely—and perhaps a mix of all four.  Regardless, the state of lay-ontology in 
biological science complicates rather than ameliorates the problem.   
Intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism are particularly interesting when 
contrasted with kinds and classi%cation in physics.  Where physical things are homogeneous, 
biological things are heterogeneous.  !is is not a new observation.  At the mid-point of the 
20th century, following great progress in both molecular biology and quantum mechanics, the 
disconnect between the objects of physics and those of biology became a central focus for 
scientists speculating about quantum mechanical explanations in biology (e.g. Bohr 1937, 
1958, Elsasser 1958, 1966). Geologist-turned-theoretical-biologist Walter Elsasser7 wrote,  
Modern physics, or much of it, deals not so much with objects as it does with 
homogenous classes, where one member of the class is completely substitutable for 
the next.  We think that much of the gulf that still yawns between the physics of 
biomolecules and biology proper results from the conceptual di2culties which arise 
when observational material as inhomogenous as that of biology is forced into the 
mold of a conceptual scheme which is too narrow for it. (Elsasser 1966, p.14) 
In that last sentence Elsasser was speaking about the conceptual scheme within which 
scientists form generalisations; but his claim applies equally well to theories of natural kinds.  
!ose theories of kinds that we receive from physics and chemistry require far more 
uniformity than the biological world can provide.  Chemicals in the periodic table, for 
instance, are uniform in that all members of a kind share a physical microstructure and the 
requisite microstructure for membership in any such kind will be the same yesterday, today, 

6 Beatty applies theoretical pluralism to more biological theory than just classification and 
individuation.  I discuss theoretical pluralism in relation to laws and generalisations in the conclusion.  
See footnote 22 in (Beatty 1995) for other uses of ‘theoretical pluralism’ in the literature. 
7 Elsasser made his name with the (still-accepted) ‘dynamo’ theory of the Earth’s polarization.  Though 
known to the world for geophysics, he later became interested in theoretical biology (specifically what 
we now call ‘systems’ biology).  His work on the fundamental disconnect between physics (and its 
reliance on statistical quantum mechanics) and biology (and its need for individualized (non-
statistical) representations) is an excellent work, largely overlooked by contemporary philosophers of 
biology.  See (Elsasser 1966).   
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and a hundred centuries in the future.8  Nothing in biology is so uniform or unchanging.  
Elsasser continues,  
Radical inhomogeneity is by universal consent an outstanding and altogether basic 
property of all the phenomena of life.  !e proposition ‘no two cells are ever exactly 
alike,’ o"en enunciated by observing biologists, summarizes a vast amount of 
empirical evidence.  It is not the expression of some vague poetic feeling about 
Nature but the condensation of the result of innumerable sharp-eyed observations.  
Moreover, it is a property to be found at all levels of biological organisation. (p.14) 
!ose who look to the periodic table and believe that natural kinds are perfectly uniform, 
share an essential physical structure, and are unchanging will be disappointed when they 
examine biological kinds.  Intrinsic heterogeneity means that seekers of biological ontology 
cannot look to ontological theories developed with only physics or chemistry in mind.   
Monism & Pluralism.  On a certain naïve traditional account, the world might be thought 
to contain a uniquely delimited set of biological objects with a uniquely correct ordering, akin 
perhaps to the periodic table of elements.  Intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism 
challenge this simpli%ed view.  At %rst glance, these features of biology and its science appear 
to suggest that neither can we sort biological objects uniquely nor can we %nd a single 
conception of individuality to suit all.  !is suggests that there is no single answer to questions 
about the ontological status of biological objects; at best there are answers.  !is has led to 
calls for the abandonment of ‘monism’, o"en associated with traditional views on ontology, 
and for the adoption of either ‘pluralism’ or ‘conventionalism’, metaphysical views seen as 
better suited to a heterogeneous biological reality.  I will brie1y survey these responses. 
Contemporary discussions of biological ontology vary in content and application; however 
two stances undergird most.  First is the belief that, though nature may make things ‘what-
they-are’, she does not do so uniquely.  !ere are multiple facts of the matter about biological 
things’ ontological standings.  Second is the belief that human convention makes things 
‘what-they-are’.  !e facts of the matter about ontological standing in biology come only from 
humans, not nature.  Less-common in contemporary discussions is a third option: the belief 
that biological objects admit of singular natural identities.9  !ese options are o"en called 
‘realist pluralism’, ‘conventionalism’, and ‘monism’, respectively.10 
!e realist pluralist believes that, for any given biological object, there are multiple things 
that it naturally is.  According to the pluralist, two philosophers who disagree about the nature 
of a particular object may both be right.  Joey is Felis catis, but also a predator, a carnivore, a 

8 Throughout this work I adopt the received view physico-chemical natural kinds as a foil for my own 
account of biological kinds.  Since my focus is on biology, I cannot delve into criticisms of the physico-
chemical kinds account.  I will acknowledge shortcomings in the view where possible, often in 
footnotes, and will discuss one serious limitation to the view at the end of Chapter 5. 
9 Monists still exist, but they are unpopular.  See (Devitt 2008, 2010, Lewens 2012). 
10 These labels will be refined considerably over the course of this thesis, particularly in Chapter 3.   
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pet, a mammal, and obese.  !ere are many and more ways to describe Joey, many of them 
objective and, perhaps, many of them referring to real categories to which Joey belongs.  
Similarly, there are many ways to delimit the boundaries of Joey.  From an evolutionary 
perspective certain of Joey’s symbiotic bacteria are not parts of him, while on a physical 
perspective they are all parts of him, so long as they are inside of him, and on a physiological 
perspective any functional bacteria are parts of Joey and any non-functional bacteria are not.  
!e realist pluralist belief is that there is indeed a fact of the matter as to what a given 
biological thing is, whether qua kind or qua individual, but that this fact is a long conjunctive 
sentence.  Versions of pluralism vary in the length of that conjunction. 
Conventionalism holds that human convention makes things ‘what-they-are’.  !e groups 
into which we classify biological objects are not real features of the world but mind-dependent 
features of human scienti%c reasoning.  Holders of this view are not just sceptical about our 
ability to know the identities of things; they are sceptical about that there are any identities in 
the %rst place.  !e same holds true for claims of individuality.  A conventionalist will 
maintain that there are many ways to draw boundaries around biological objects, and that all 
are merely re1ections of di#erent research agendas or perspectives. 
Monistic realism, the foil against which the %rst two options are o"en presented, is the 
belief that there is a single ‘what-it-is’ for any given biological object.  Applied to natural 
kinds, this is the claim that, in spite of the many properties possessed by biological objects and 
in spite of the many ways in which we classify them, there is one single category to which any 
given biological object belongs.  Applied to individuation, this is the claim that there is exactly 
one composite of atoms, cells, organs, and tissues that constitute a given thing. 
Pluralism and conventionalism represent two distinct reactions to monism in the face of 
intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism.  While pluralists take these problems to 
motivate scepticism about the monist’s ontological programme, conventionalists take it to 
motivate scepticism in ontological programmes altogether.  !e main focus of this thesis will 
be the two realist options: monism and pluralism.11  
Any account of biological ontology must reckon with the problem of biological 
heterogeneity.  Pluralism is a good %t for a heterogeneous biological world, but many 
questions remain concerning the precise form that pluralism should take and which virtues of 
monism can be retained.  !us my second guiding question: 
Q2: What does the correct answer to Q1 entail for monism and pluralism? 
Answering this question requires careful consideration of the challenge from heterogeneity as 
well as analysis of monism, pluralism, and their implications. 

11 I view conventionalism as a live option only in case monism and pluralism are eliminated. 
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In this thesis, the account of biological ontology on o#er is Kind Historicism12.  !is is the 
claim that biological kinds are what-they-are in virtue of historical essences.  Kind 
Historicism in turn supports an account of biological individuality.  It also entails a sort of 
metaphysical pluralism about natural kinds, but also a sort of monism about biological natural 
kinds.  !e claim is that all biological kinds are historical kinds, but that non-biological kinds 
are not; they are physico-chemical (microstructural) kinds.  !ere are thus two types of kinds 
and this is the sense in which my position entails a metaphysical pluralism.  I will di#erentiate 
this from another sense in which positions can be pluralist: taxonomic pluralism.  My account 
is a form of category pluralism, by contrast, a feature that better navigates the hurdles just 
outlined.13  
2. Other Perspectives on the Problem of Biological Ontology 
!ere are two problems of biological ontology that are not my own.  !e %rst is the 
dra"ing of manifest ontologies; the second is the collection of enquiries known as !e Species 
Problem, which include the Species as Individuals thesis.  !ese problems overlap 
occasionally with the questions I pursue; however if progress is to be made, some distance 
must be gained from them. 
For some, an ontology is an account of all of the things that are referenced in science, 
where ‘thing’ is understood very broadly.  Call these ‘manifest ontologies’. 14   Manifest 
ontologies might name all possible things, relations, processes, properties, and so on in a 
given realm of enquiry.  Philosophers of science examine manifest ontologies because they 
help understand the conceptual tools and representations used in successful science.  !ough 
interesting, this is not the sort of ontology I have in mind.  I stay much closer to the 
traditional philosophical understanding of natural kinds ontology, which will come out in the 
%rst half of this thesis.  
Philosophical work on natural kinds in biology has been dominated by discussions 
surrounding biological species.  !e literature is so large as to have acquired its own name: 
!e Species Problem.  But the Species Problem is ill de%ned.  It is actually a collection of 
problems, which are interesting in their own right and overlap in interesting ways with the 
problems pursued here.  Ultimately, however, if progress is to be made on the issue of 

12 Not to be confused with Ian Hacking’s Historical Ontology (2004), which articulates a constructivist 
position. 
13 David Hull is said to have remarked that pluralism is ‘the council of despair’ (in Kitcher 1989, p.205).  
That captures my view of certain highly-permissive taxonomic and categorical pluralisms, which strike 
me as a reaction to intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism that shed no light on these hurdles, 
merely failing to conflict with them.  I discuss this in the conclusion. 
14 My understanding is that this use of the word ‘ontology’ is found primarily in information 
technology and biomedical science (as in the journal Applied Ontology). 
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biological ontology—if an acceptable theory of biological ontology can be given to my 
colleague—then it must be developed at arms length from the Species Problem(s) and certain 
entrenched modes of enquiry. 
Species Problems include: 
• Whether species are real 
• Whether species are collections, individuals, or particulars 
• Whether species or their members have essences, and what those might be 
• What biologists think species are 
• Whether biologists should agree upon at a single conception of species 
• Whether there ‘really’ is a single thing that is a species 
• Whether biologists’ species pluralism entails (a) nominalism (b) metaphysical 
pluralism or (c) something else entirely 
Many more Species Problems may exist. 15   From this collection and the surrounding 
literatures, a striking methodological feature is of note: Much of the literature on species is 
informed by actual scienti%c practices of classi%cation.  !ese practices are pluralistic16, many 
of them fail to meet certain proposed metaphysical ideas for natural kinds, and no single 
practice is fundamental or primary.  !ese facts lead many to favour nominalism, natural kind 
pluralism, or an alternative to the claim that species are natural kinds.  !is philosophical 
methodology stands in need of justi%cation—thus Q3. 
!e main alternative to species as natural kinds is the ‘radical’ ontological thesis that 
species are individuals.  Over a series of papers in the mid-1970s, biologist Michael Ghiselin 
(1974) and philosopher of biology David Hull (1978) o#ered the ‘Species as Individuals’ 
thesis.  Based on the role that ‘species’ plays in evolutionary biology, they claimed that species, 
entire collections of organisms spread over time and space, are single individuals, not natural 
kinds.  Species are enormous individuals composed of pieces, not large groups composed of 
individuals.  For many, this is now the default ontological view of biological species.   
Historically, this move followed widespread dissatisfaction with failed attempts to 
reconcile natural kinds with New Synthesis evolutionary theory.  !e problem is intrinsic 
heterogeneity.  Natural kinds were thought to be grounded in unchanging physical essences, 
but New Synthesis evolutionary theory taught that even at the genetic level species were 
heterogeneous. Ghiselin and Hull’s proposals may also be understood as reactions to the state 
of the natural kind debate, which had come to revolve around the belief that natural kinds 
were abstract entities.  As an abstract entity, the ‘species’ would be an independently-existing 

15 Detailed analyses of Species Problems include: (Ereshefsky 2007, 2010b, Wilson 1999b).  De Queiroz 
(2005) articulates three scientific versions of the Species Problem. 
16 Hey (2001) counts at least 20 definitions of ‘species’.  Mishler and Donoghue (1982), early in the 
debate, remains one of the scientifically-detailed arguments for pluralism, explaining how 
heterogeneity in the biological world necessitates plurality in biological practices. 
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thing in the world.17  !is would guarantee some realism about the species, rather than just 
about the particulars, but it is extraordinarily di2cult to establish the existence of an abstract 
entity.  Abstruse questions over whether that entity ‘contains’ the organisms that are parts of 
it, whether it is a special type of set, or the sense in which it exists only add to frustration 
about species as natural kinds.18 
!ere are three main arguments for the Species as Individuals View.  First are claims that 
biological discourse talks about species (or at least populations) as though they were 
individual things, not collections; second is the belief that the view explains various curious 
facts about species and their taxonomy; third is the claim that species are a lot like other 
common-sense individual things in the world.  !ere are criticisms of all of these views, while 
additional accounts highlight further problems with the view.19  Slater (2013) questions the 
putative explanatory virtues of the account.  Kitcher (1984) claims that the individuality thesis 
is too restrictive to be of use to biologists, while Reydon (2003) doubts that the pluralistic use 
of ‘species’ in biology supports the thesis.20  Kitcher (1989) and Ruse (1987) deny the analogy 
between species and common-sense individuals.21  Ruse (1987) also points out that the thesis 
must deny the possibility of organism-level selection.  Crane (2004) claims that the thesis 
faces an insurmountable problem in the indeterminacy of species membership.22  My own 
criticism, which comes in Chapter 5, will appeal to discussions of mereology, pointing out 
that putative biological individuals lack strong arguments for composition.23   
Quite independently of these criticisms, the Species as Individuals view is altogether 
avoidable.  It is motivated by failures to identify species as natural kinds and by the attendant 

17 To say that it exists ‘in the world’ is confusing.  Abstract entities are thought to exist in a number of 
ways, like Platonic ideals.  They may supervene on their members or they may participate in each 
member.  These sorts of scholastic worry are what led to frustration with natural kind talk in the first 
place.  Fortunately, as I will argue in PART I, these worries are altogether unnecessary.   
18 Ghiselin (1974) viewed abstract classes as mental constructs, but claimed that species were not such 
things.  Rather, they were concrete individuals, stretched through space and time.  This salvaged 
realism about species.  A token organism is not a member in a class, but a part of a whole.  That whole 
comes into existence with a speciation event, goes out of existence with extinction, and in between 
contains many parts (the organisms), connected genealogically.  The individuality thesis therefore 
secured some realism about species while sidestepping issues of natural kinds and abstract entities. 
19 Slater (2013, ch. 4), discusses much more of the relevant critical literature than I have space for, here. 
20 This is a response to Coleman and Wiley’s (2001) study of biological discourse.  Those authors 
claimed that biological discourse ‘contains an ineliminable reference to individual things called species’ 
(p.516).  Reydon doubts that the discourse of such a broad discipline privileges any single ontological 
stance (while I doubt that ontology is helpful or appropriate in such discussions). 
21 Though Kitts and Kitts (1979) use that same analogical argument to undermine Hull and Ghiselen’s 
theory. 
22 Crane, however, appealing to pluralism in taxonomic practice, ultimately supports the individuality 
thesis on the grounds that species terms are rigid designators.  The point about indeterminacy also 
appears in Slater (2013).   
23 My target is not the species as individual thesis specifically, but rather the more general claim that 
any biological composites are individuals.  It will be clear how the criticism covers populations/species, 
as well. 
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claim that species exist as abstract entities.  First, regarding natural kinds, the view of natural 
kinds o"en considered as inapplicable to species is a straw person.  Hull (1976) assumes that 
natural kinds, as classes not wholes, are groups of perfectly similar organisms.  Intrinsic 
heterogeneity would therefore preclude species as natural kinds.  Not only is this not 
necessarily true of natural kinds, a theory of biological kinds must abandon this assumption 
in order to represent the diversity of the biological world.24  Second, the belief that natural 
kinds theory is committed to the existence of abstract entities is simply false.  Platonist 
worries such as these need not arise.  I discuss both of these misinterpretations of natural kind 
theory in Chapters 1 and 2.  !ird, for both advocates and detractors of the Species as 
Individuals thesis, there is an intimate connection between the ontology of species and their 
practical classi%cation.  !is assumption plays a big role in arguments on both sides.  If the 
Individuals thesis is a claim about how scientists do or should conceive of species, then it 
would be appropriate to look at present taxonomic practice and attempt to provide a concept 
that better %ts with that practice (however individuality theorists have failed to do that (Dupré 
2001)).25  If the Individuals thesis is a claim about the ontological status of species, however, 
then the pragmatic practices of scientists or the discourses they have developed should matter 
little.  Questions about how species exist, behave, change, and so on are appropriate; questions 
about how scientists label, talk about, or work with those changes are not.  We must step back 
from this approach, separate the scienti%c and ontological issues, and re-visit the questions.  
!is is the motivation for Q3.  !ese two errors—attacking a straw-person natural kind 
theory and assuming a normative role for scienti%c practice in natural kinds theorizing—are 
common to much of the Species Problem literature. 
!e lesson of !e Species Problems is not that species are or are not natural kinds.  It is not 
that species are or are not individuals.  !e lesson is that answers to questions of biological 
ontology require an approach that navigates scienti%c practice and ontology such that neither 
practice nor ontology dominates.  If headway is to be made on the issue of biological kinds, 
some distance must be gained from !e Species Problem.  !e literature is too vast and lacks a 
common purpose.  Some philosophers are interested in classi%catory practice, some in 
ontology, and some in a curious mix of the two.  A discussion of biological ontology would do 
well to avoid the common examples and entrenched views that come with discussions of 
species, since so many carry baggage from tangentially related research projects.  I do not 
mean to suggest that recent work on the problem is not worth pursuing; however one helpful 

24 See discussion in Chapter 2, especially section 2.3.   
25 Dupré claims that the aims of scientific classification are far more pluralistic than the individuality 
thesis allows.  Species, the units of classification, are not individuals, he claims.  But, according to 
Dupré, the units of evolution are.  The mistake, according to Dupré, is to assume that biologists are 
attempting to capture the units of evolution with species classifications. 
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way of moving forward is to %rst develop a framework for thinking about natural kinds 
independently of scienti%c taxonomy and secondly to consider other cases of biological kinds.  
I develop my framework in PART I and consider other biological kinds (biochemicals) in PART 
II. 
3. Plan of the "esis 
!is thesis is divided into two parts, each with three chapters.  PART I provides conceptual 
background and the development of Kind Historicism, covering natural kinds, essentialism, 
and monism.  PART II is the application of Kind Historicism to biochemical kinds and 
biological individuality, and a discussion of the role of natural kinds in two scienti%c disputes: 
the case of race and the nature of cognitive modules. 
PART I.  In order to develop Kind Historicism I must %rst discuss natural kinds and 
essentialism, and clarify the monism/pluralism distinction.  Also note that this %rst part of the 
thesis focuses largely on natural kinds, not individuals, because my account of individuality 
ultimately piggybacks on my account of natural kinds.   
!e %rst steps toward a division of labour between metaphysics and scienti%c practice are 
made in Chapter 1.  !ere I seek a theory of natural kinds suited to the task of answering 
questions about the identities of biological objects, settling on a minimalist brand of neo-
Aristotelian essentialism.  !is is distinguished from a second view of natural kinds, which 
seeks to characterize groups of things that are objectively similar, such that they will support 
inductions.  I reserve the term ‘natural kind’ for the former group, and call the latter 
‘induction-supporting kinds’.  I selectively survey natural kind literature from ancient to 
present, showing how the realist worries of the induction-supporting camp are not the same 
as the ontological worries of the natural kinds camp. 
Chapter 2 is a brief defence of essentialism.  Neo-Aristotelian essentialism may seem 
strange to philosophers of biology, for whom essentialism is taboo.  For this reason Chapter 2 
seeks to counter a number of objections to essentialism, claiming that they attack non-
essential (!) features of that view.  Philosophers of biology frequently attack a straw person of 
essentialism, claiming that essences must be intrinsic physical properties, that essences must 
explain the characteristic properties of their kinds, and that essentialism requires belief in 
Platonic forms or Parmenedian cosmology.  To the extent that any of these have been 
advocated by essentialists, they are accidental features of the view, not necessary ones.  
Abandoning these claims reveals essentialism to be a metaphysically-light doctrine, which 
many philosophers should %nd less-objectionable. 
Chapter 3 begins with a conceptual analysis of the monism/pluralism distinction, before 
introducing Kind Historicism relative to that analysis.  I examine the varieties of metaphysical 
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monism and pluralism about natural kinds, distinguishing two.  ‘Taxonomic monism’ is a 
claim about the uniqueness of kind membership, focusing on the number of taxonomic 
arrangements of particulars into kinds.  ‘Category monism’ is a claim about variation within 
the category ‘kind’, focusing on the number of types of kind category in the world.  Most 
o"en, philosophical attention is focussed on taxonomic claims; but categories are the more 
interesting target if we are to understand intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism.  
!e di#erence between the physical and biological worlds, I claim, is one of kind categories.  
Physico-chemical things are united into kinds in virtue of shared physical structures.  
Biological things are united into kinds in virtue of shared histories.  Understanding the 
di#erences between the two kinds explains the di#erences between the world studied by 
biology and that studied by physics and chemistry.  Understanding the peculiar features of 
historical kinds explains intrinsic heterogeneity.  
!ese three analytical tools, natural kinds, essentialism, and monism/pluralism situate my 
approach to natural kinds, which is conciliatory to the pluralist but at the same time preserves 
the virtues of taxonomic monism.  Pluralism comes in the admission that there are two ways 
in which a thing can be ‘what-it-is’: in terms of its physical structure, or in terms of its 
biological history.  !e preserved virtue of taxonomic monism is the de%niteness of the type-
identity of token particulars.  For any given biological object there will be a single kind to 
which it belongs.  So too for chemical objects.  No single object is subject to kinds of two 
di#erent categories.  !ere is one world, it has an order, but the world is heterogeneous insofar 
as it contains two fundamentally di#erent kinds of kinds of things.  In PART II, I unpack the 
implications of this view.  I address a problem involving natural kinds, examine the related 
issue of biological individuality, and look at two cases that help explicate the role of kinds 
(natural or induction-supporting) in science. 
 
PART II.  A"er PART I, three tasks remain.  First, the duality of kind categories introduced 
in PART I leaves an obvious complication: historical biological particulars are, ultimately, 
masses of physical things.  I am a pile of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and many other elements 
before, a"er, and in-between.  Addressing this complication requires an account of the real-
world relationship between historical and structural kinds.  Second, the topic of biological 
individuality must be addressed.  !ird, answering Q3 requires an explanation of the roles of 
natural kinds versus induction-supporting kinds in actual scienti%c investigations.  Chapter 4 
addresses the %rst task.  Chapter 5 addresses the second.  !e third is addressed gradually 
across Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
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In chapter 4, I examine biochemical kinds, focussing on protein molecules.  Proteins are 
biochemical macromolecules; that is, they are big chemical molecules that occur inside 
biological systems and perform physiological functions.  !is dual identity means that 
proteins are an ideal case to test the structural kind/historical kind distinction.  !ey are at 
once chemical molecules and biological species.  Biological kinds are formed from masses of 
individual chemical molecules, which are formed of aggregates of atoms.  All of these are 
natural kinds.  Most biological kinds will not, as wholes, be chemical kinds.  !ere is no sense 
in which there is a single chemical molecule that is me, which is liable to be both a historical 
and structural kind.  But cases like proteins are more di2cult.  Here we have singular 
molecules that are at once structural and historical.  A number of pluralists have examined the 
case of protein molecules, claiming that natural kinds are at best pluralistic and at worst non-
existent (Slater 2009, Tobin 2010, Goodwin 2011).  Natural kinds of protein are di2cult to 
describe because there is a radical disconnect between proteins’ amino acid sequence, their 
%nal folded structure, and their biological functions.  A protein with one function can have 
multiple structures and sequences.  A protein with one sequence can fold into entirely 
di#erent shapes, carrying out di#erent functions.  Structural kinds err when it comes to the 
biology.  Historical kinds err when it comes to the chemistry.  I use the protein case as an 
opportunity to sharpen the theory of biological kinds developed in PART I.  It also sets up a 
discussion of the real-world relationship between the two kind categories.  I describe chemical 
kinds as pieces or parts that get picked up, ordered, re-ordered, and used by selection and 
chance.  It is from this process that historical kinds emerge.   
In Chapter 5, I use my theory of kinds and discussion of biochemicals to address the 
problem of individuality.  !e relationship between one chemical kind and another is one of 
nesting.  !e relationship between the aggregate chemical kinds and the biological whole they 
form is one of composition.  Nesting is easy to explain; composition is not.  It is no easy feat to 
explicate the conditions under which some set of smaller things compose a larger one.  In 
metaphysics the problem is called ‘composition’, in the philosophy of biology it is called ‘the 
problem of biological individuality’.  But the issue is the same.  In referring to composite 
wholes, a theory of biological kinds seems to require a theory of composition.  We must know 
which chemical particulars form parts of biological particulars, and whether there is 
something to the biological whole that is greater than its chemical parts.  
!e problem of biological individuality is a speci%c instance of a larger problem in 
mereology, known as the problem of composition, or the Special Composition Question.  But 
there is nothing particularly special about the biological cases.  !ere are two main types of 
solution to the problem.  !e %rst ties individuality to some metaphysical facts about the 
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world.  !e second ties individuality to evolution. I examine one attempt from the %rst camp, 
which attempts to tie individuality to causal agency.  !is attempt fails because it will not 
secure the sorts of individuals that biologists and philosophers need, and would populate the 
biological world with many unwanted gerrymandered individuals.  !e second approach is 
more plausible and ties individuality into my account of biological kinds.  Individuals just are 
whatever things are members of biological kinds. Philosophers and biologists expect 
individuality to tell them whether a 1ock of birds is one thing or dozens, whether a forest of 
cloned trees is one thing or many, and whether a pile of symbiotic organisms are one thing or 
many.  Whatever the answers to these questions are, they will be supplied by evolutionary and 
selective histories, not physical or metaphysical (e.g. causal) facts about the objects 
themselves.  !e answers biologists and philosophers expect out of a theory of individuality 
will actually come from a Darwinian theory of natural kinds.  !e individuals are whatever 
clusters of matter are members of natural kinds.  
In Chapter 6, I address directly the tendency among philosophers and scientists to ask 
what certain categories in science are, in a metaphysically-loaded sense.  By looking at two 
separate cases, that of race and that of cognitive modules, I show how worries about 
ontological status can mislead investigation.  Building on my discussion from Chapter 3, in 
which I explained how the metaphysics of natural kinds should be divorced from scienti%c 
classi%cation, I explore the limited implications of %nding that a scienti%c class does or does 
not manage to obtain some special status.  In the case of race, debate has recently moved on 
from questions of natural kinds.  However the new focus is on ‘biological meaningfulness’, 
which I claim is merely a stand-in for more overtly ontological statuses.  Critics of racial 
classi%cation claim that races lack ‘biological meaningfulness’ and use this fact to argue 
against the use of racial classi%cation in science.  Since there is no link between 
‘meaningfulness’ and utility, I suggest ways in which the debate might productively move 
forward, focussing on induction-supporting kinds.  In the case of cognitive modules, 
proponents of Evolutionary Psychology have claimed that the utility of their approach comes 
from an ability to carve nature at its joints, yielding cognitive modules.  I criticise the 
evolutionary arguments in favour of this position.  I then explore the presumed link between 
natural kinds and scienti%c utility, arguing that cognitive psychology, with its focus on 
induction-supporting kinds, o#ers a perfectly acceptable science of classi%cation without any 
need for Evolutionary Psychology or its ‘natural kinds’. 
In the Conclusion, I re-visit the whole of the thesis from the standpoint of ‘biological 
exceptionalism’.  A"er identifying exceptionalism with intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical 
pluralism, I re-trace the ways in which Kind Historicism and the general account of natural 
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kinds developed in this thesis provide an account of biological exceptionalism.  I sketch an 
argument whereby this account might be extended to cover the problem of laws in biology 
before concluding with some meta-philosophical re1ections on scienti%c metaphysics. 
4. A Note on Promiscuity and the ‘Stanford School’ 
!ere exist a set of pluralist works on biological natural kinds that appear quite similar to 
my own, but support di#erent conclusions.  What I have in mind here are various realist 
pluralisms, of the sort o"en associated with so-called ‘Stanford School’ philosophy of science, 
particularly Hacking, and Dupré.26  A reader of this thesis familiar with these works would be 
hard-pressed not to notice %rst their in1uence but second the ways in which my own account 
di#ers—at times radically.  !e di#erences between these views and my own will develop 
slowly, but it is worth highlighting the main sources of disagreement at the outset.   
First, these views o#er a brand of scienti%c realism true to the realist remit of belief in the 
content of successful scienti%c theorizing.  Since biological taxonomy and individuation are 
successful, we should accordingly view the categories of biological practice as real categories.27  
Dupré (1993) o#ers a book full of reasons to think that many categories in biological practice 
map on to real, useful, objective, non-arbitrary facts in the world.  You will %nd no opposition 
to that point, here.  !e pluralistic taxonomic practices of biology are in use because they 
work, and they work because they utilize objective non-arbitrary handles for classi%cation.  
Where I diverge from Dupré and similar scholars is in the belief that a realist interpretation of 
these pluralistic practices amounts to pluralism about natural kinds.28  !us the second major 
disagreement between us is the true source of divergence: our stance on natural kinds.   
I develop two accounts of kinds.  One is an essentialist natural kind; the other is a 
pragmatically tailored induction-supporting kind.  !e ‘natural kinds’ of realist pluralists are 
induction-supporting kinds that utilize objective properties.  I prefer my own essentialist 
natural kinds, believing that these are more in line with a strict investigation into metaphysics 
and ontology.  When possible, throughout the thesis, I answer the principle objections that a 
realist pluralist might level against my conception of natural kinds.  I do not explicitly criticise 
their conception except to say that induction-supporting kinds o#er a weaker sense of 

26 The motivations and dealings of this school are far greater than my own.  And I should make it clear 
at the outset that I do not disagree with the general anti-unity-of-science stance at the core of Stanford 
School world.  It is certainly the case that treating actual scientific investigations as aiming at unity is a 
foolish misrepresentation of what scientists are attempting to do.  I do no such thing.  A more recent 
articulation of this broader pluralist project, ‘The Pluralist Stance’, can be found in Kellert, Longino, 
and Waters’ introduction to their edited volume on the topic (2006). 
27 Chakravartty (2011), offers the most recent and succinct articulation of this problem of scientific 
realism.  See also (Nanay 2011) in that same volume. 
28 This point is developed in Chapter 1 section 3.  See also Chapter 3 section 4.  
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ontology, one that I believe is more helpfully viewed under banners of ‘realism’ and 
‘epistemology’, rather than ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’. 
I view positions like these, particularly Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ (1993), as helpful 
attempts to articulate an account of what-there-is in biology in such a way that makes sense of 
theoretical pluralism.  My debt to these works is huge.  !ese pluralists and I di#er in our 
views on natural kinds and, as a result, di#er in our views on pluralism and on the role of 
ontology in scienti%c practice (Q3).  I believe that the account I o#er does a better job of 
explaining intrinsic heterogeneity and theoretical pluralism, while articulating a robust 
ontology that helps situate the metaphysics and ontology of biology relative to those of physics 
and chemistry.29  But the proof is in the details, which now follow. 

29 In the conclusion, I make this claim about Kind Historicism relative to a family of broadly pluralist 
approaches to biological kinds. 
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Two Traditions of Natural Kinds 
Ontological investigations take many forms.  Here, ontology is pursued in the traditional 
Aristotelian sense of being qua being.  %is is not an ontology that dra&s lists of existing 
things, but rather an ontology that asks how things are whatever it is that they are.30  %e issue 
is not what things exist, but the nature and features of that existence.  Investigations of this 
sort are most closely associated with natural kinds.  Questions about whether certain objects 
have natural identities and the whether those identities are uniquely determinate can be re-
phrased as questions about whether things belong to natural kinds and whether they belong 
to those kinds uniquely.  In this chapter, I search for a theory of natural kinds that is 't for this 
type of investigation.   
Ian Hacking (2007) recently declared that natural kind talk should be abolished.  Perhaps 
this comes as a surprise to those who know Hacking as, himself, a noted contributor to the 
philosophical discussion of natural kinds.  But during his career he became increasingly 
convinced that there were too many incompatible theories of natural kinds, that this 
incompatibility re)ected an increasingly diverse range of unrelated research projects, and that 
the research programme (if the de'nite article is even appropriate) was degenerative.  
According to Hacking, the topic has now descended into ‘scholastic twilight’: debates 
surrounding ‘an inbred set of degenerating problems that have increasingly little to do with 
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30 A wonderful recent revival of Aristotelian ontology, running far deeper than my interest in natural 
kinds, can be found in Schaffer (2009). 
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issues that arise in a larger context’ (2007, p.229).  I am somewhat sympathetic to Hacking’s 
diagnosis, but disagree with his remedy. 
%e problem with natural kind theory is that there is no theory of natural kinds—there are 
many.  %e concept has acquired far too many meanings to be of any use.  Natural kinds are 
assumed in some way real, juxtaposed with the nominal kinds of human convenience.  On 
this everyone agrees.  But kinds are also supposed to play important roles in human language.  
%ey are supposed to support important rules of human inference.  %ey are supposed to be 
unchanging, and eternal.  Di*erences between them are supposed to be stark, not fuzzy.  
Reference to them is supposed to be grounded in reference to an ‘essence’.  Few philosophers 
hold all of these assumptions, but most will hold some.  Many of these assumptions are part of 
contemporary discussions not because they play any motivated philosophical role, but 
because they are part of the baggage of natural kind talk.  An overarching goal of this chapter 
and the next is to unpack this baggage.   
%is chapter explores the history of natural kinds.  I begin with Aristotle, then examine 
empiricists Mill, Whewell, and Locke, before moving on to 20th century discussions featuring 
Goodman, Quine, and Boyd.  Two distinct traditions emerge.  %e 'rst tradition, which I 
associate most closely with Aristotle, is comprised of theories of kinds aimed at classifying 
things according to natural identity.  %e second tradition, which begins in earnest with the 
empiricists and reaches its zenith in the present day, is comprised of theories aimed at 
providing classi'cations suited to scienti'c reasoning, particularly induction.  %e latter 
tradition dominates talk of natural kinds in philosophy of science today.  It is also dominant 
in scienti'c classi'cation.  For this reason much of this chapter concerns induction-focussed 
kinds.  %ough better suited to the needs to science, this tradition is in fact poorly suited to 
the ontological enquiry in which I am interested.   
Induction-supporting kinds require robust similarity.  %is presents two problems for an 
ontological application.  First, the kinds suitable for this tradition range from the natural to 
the human.  Many things can exhibit reliable clusters of properties, such that they are good 
candidates for induction.  %e induction tradition possesses no mechanism to limit the scope 
of its kinds to natural objects.  A second and more serious problem for this tradition is the 
interest-relevance of its kind groupings.  Similarity is a notoriously tough notion (see Quine 
1969).  Similarity comes in degrees.  Similarity comes in types.  %e degree and type of 
similarity required of a kind is determined by the types of inductions in which that kind will 
feature.  %us proponents of induction views will speak of things being natural kinds for 
geology or natural kinds for mineral collectors (e.g. Boyd 1999a, p.160), determining the grain 
of classi'cation.  %ere are no natural kinds simpliciter.  %e induction kinds tradition cannot 
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investigate ontological questions because it takes a stance on those questions: %ings do have 
identities, but they have as many identities as there are ways to group their properties, or 
inductive roles they might play.  Induction kinds presume a sort of pluralism.  %ey tell us 
more about epistemic features of science and less about the mind-independent organisation of 
things in the world. 
Many recent discussions of natural kinds in biology are best understood within the 
induction tradition.  Philosophers are chie)y concerned with the relationship between kind 
classi'cations, the characteristic properties of a kind, and the ability of classi'cations to 
feature in inferences, explanations, and predictions.  Yet philosophers are prone to drawing 
conclusions about monism, pluralism, realism, anti-realism, nominalism, and nihilism, issues 
better suited to the ontological tradition of natural kinds.  %ese mis-targeted claims are 
perhaps invited by the realism of recent induction-focussed approaches, such as the 
Homeostatic Property Cluster account.  However the realism on o*er concerns either the 
causal processes that support the grouping of kinds or the objectivity of the properties used in 
grouping; it is not realism about the independent groupings of kinds themselves. Since 
induction kinds are incapable of investigating ontological questions, we cannot rely on any 
such conclusions.  Nevertheless, that such questions are being asked at all demonstrates some 
interest in the ontological investigation I pursue.  I conclude by brie)y considering claims of 
this sort.   
Two clari'cations are in order: First, in this chapter I endorse no speci'c account of 
natural kinds, biological or otherwise.  I speak broadly of two traditions of natural kinds.  
Within each there exist many accounts of what makes something a natural kind and what 
follows from membership in a kind.  I evaluate speci'c accounts sparingly and endorse none.  
My own account of natural kinds will emerge in Chapter 3.  Second, in this chapter the 
ontological tradition I endorse is an essentialist tradition, of the sort o&en called ‘neo-
Aristotelian’.  Neo-Aristotelian essentialism has a very, very bad reputation in philosophy of 
biology, but to defend essentialism here would detract from my main argument about natural 
kinds, and so I ask the reader to provisionally bracket the standard objections to my view.  I 
defend essentialism by clarifying the commitments and entailments of the position in Chapter 
2. 
1. Into the Scholastic Twilight 
It should be clear to anyone wading into the literature on natural kinds that the waters are 
murky.  %ere are as many conceptions of natural kinds as there are natural kind theorists.  A 
survey of philosophers on the meaning of ‘natural kind’ would reveal an alarming lack of 
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consensus.  Hacking is not the only philosopher to notice this diversity.  In the introduction to 
a recent monograph on natural kinds, P.D. Magnus (2012) writes,  
‘natural kind’ is a term of philosophical jargon.  We cannot start from a 
pretheoretical concept of natural kind and provide an analysis of it.  A modern 
Socrates would learn nothing by asking some unsuspecting fellow in the agora what 
a natural kind is… We might instead ask what philosophers mean when they use 
‘natural kinds’ … but there is no univocal answer to this either. (p.5) 
Standard entries for natural kinds in our 'eld do not even attempt to give a consensus 
de'nition.31  %ey proceed as surveys of possible meanings, o*ering lists of frequently used 
criteria or desiderata.  It is certainly not possible (or at any rate advisable) to deliver a paper 
on kinds without specifying at the outset what conception of kinds you have in mind. 
%e variety of meanings for ‘natural kind’ is mirrored in the wide range of uses to which 
kinds are put.  Natural kinds are invoked in discussions of laws, causation, inductions and 
generalizations, scienti'c methodology, the nature of reference, modal metaphysics, scienti'c 
realism, and inference.  Kinds appear not just multi-faceted but also multi-talented.  Or 
perhaps people are just confused.  Because ‘natural kind’ does not have a clear meaning, and 
because philosophers have as yet found no conception of natural kind that does not re)ect the 
particular questions they are addressing, Hacking (2007) claims that natural kinds have 
nothing to o*er science.  When we label something a natural kind, he claims, we have 
achieved nothing: 
Take any discussion that helps advance our understanding of nature or any science.  
Delete every mention of natural kinds.  I conjecture that as a result the work will be 
simpli'ed, clari'ed, and be a greater contribution to understanding or knowledge.  
Try it. (p.229) 
Knowing that species are, or are not, natural kinds, Hacking suggests, does not help biologists 
understand species, taxonomy, or Darwinism any better.  %e same is presumably true of cell 
types, chemical molecules, or any other scienti'c categories discussed by natural kind 
theorists. 
Hacking’s point here is a bit puzzling, connected as it is to the point about a proliferation 
of theories of natural kinds.  But perhaps the claim is that the addition of the label ‘natural 
kind’ does not do anything to advance our understanding in the way that the addition of other 
predicates might.  When we discover that some skeleton is a ‘vertebrate’, for instance, this tells 
us a lot of other facts about the animal to whom the skeleton belonged.  It allows us to make 
predictions and forward explanations that follow on our knowledge of the class vertebrates.  
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31 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry ‘Natural Kinds’ (Tobin & Bird 2008) lists six basic 
properties of natural kinds.  The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry focuses only on the 
existence of a shared property that is ‘theoretically interesting’ (Daly 1998).  The glossary definition in 
Sterelny and Griffiths’ (1999) standard text on philosophy of biology focuses only on the non-
arbitrariness of natural kinds.   
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When we discover that a classi'cation system represents natural kinds, by contrast, no 
comparable predictions or explanations are licensed.  Suppose I prove that the class 
vertebrates is not just a convenient group but is in fact a natural kind.  Does this help me 
identify vertebrates better?  Does it permit new or stronger inferences ranging over the class? 
Does it tell me something new about the properties of the members of the class? Probably not.   
If this is what Hacking means then he is correct but misguided.  Identifying natural kinds 
is not helpful in the way that identifying other predicates can be.  But Hacking has attacked a 
straw person.  Even among those traditions of natural kinds that are interested in helping 
science, they would not claim that the label ‘natural kind’ helps us understand the groups or 
objects of which it is predicated.  As I will soon explain, the tradition of kinds focussed on 
scienti'c explanation aids science by helping in the formation of classes better suited to 
induction.  %e tradition of kinds focussed on ontology operates at a level of abstraction from 
everyday scienti'c practice.  %e target of Hacking’s criticism is a theory of natural kinds that 
does not exist. 
A parallel argument was introduced by John Dupré (1993), which is far easier to motivate.  
Just as Hacking sees the abundance of philosophical views about kinds as indicative of a 
problem, so too has Dupré, among others, used the plethora of scienti'c practices of 
classi'cation as a motivation for re-examining the meaningfulness of the natural kind project, 
particularly the traditional presumption of natural kind monism. 
Scientists identify all sorts of kinds.  Take the common example of species.  %ere are at 
least four main taxonomic methods, relying on interbreeding, morphology, phylogeny, and 
genetic similarity.  Each of these yields a classi'cation system that plays important theoretical 
and practical roles in biology, yet none of these systems classify organisms the same.  A 
number of philosophers have rejected traditional (monistic) approaches to natural kinds on 
these grounds (e.g. Kitcher 1984, Ereshefsky 1992, cf. Ruse 1987).  %e general and very 
practical problem is well-described by Alan Love (2009), who demonstrates how a natural 
kind theorist’s traditional assumption that there is just one way to represent a diverse group 
like species neglects the nuances of particular questions in biology, which might require 
alternative classi'cation systems.  %ese philosophers will argue that the natural kind project, 
insofar as it is focussed on 'nding a monistic select group of natural kinds, is too far removed 
from scienti'c investigation and all its diversity. 
%is challenge is more complicated than Hacking’s.  On the face of it, it is tempting to 
dismiss this point as misguided: Natural Kind theorists are either making claims about the 
structure of the world (and thus not about scienti'c practice), or they are making normative 
rather than descriptive claims about scienti'c practice (perhaps all of the scientists are using 
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the wrong classi'cations, or perhaps only one is correct).  I think that the 'rst of these initial 
reactions is on the right track, but need not be viewed as a dismissal of the challenge.  
However this response will need greater attention in the face of arguments from the induction 
tradition, which describe inferences that should be drawn from predictive success in science 
to realism about the kinds used in those predictions.  I will return to this challenge later.32 
Scepticism about kinds is helpful, for it forces caution.  %ere is no consensus about what 
natural kinds are, or what they do.  But the mere existence of sloppy philosophy, equivocation 
on the term ‘natural kind’ across camps, or the pragmatic deployment of pluralistic 
classi'cation schemes by scientists is not evidence enough to abandon natural kind talk 
altogether.  It just means we should think about it a little more carefully.   
Attempts have been made to construct grand narratives about natural kinds and science, 
construing the project from Locke and Mill to Russell, Quine, Putnam and Kripke, and on to 
contemporary usage (see Hacking 1991, 2007, McOuat 2009).  Some extend the history 
further, to Aristotle (Ayers 1981, Reydon 2010).  I will construct no such single narrative, 
here.  %ere likely is no single narrative to be told.  %e projects of these philosophers were as 
di*erent as their conceptions of kinds.  Recent bibliographic scholarship and history of 
philosophy suggests that we should view talk about natural kinds in a series of episodes, 
rather than a coherent narrative (Magnus 2013).  Some episodes have parallels with others, 
but few follow perfectly in the footsteps of another.   
2. Early Discussions of Natural Kinds 
My story of natural kinds begins with Aristotle, leaps forward to British Empiricists Mill, 
Whewell, and Locke, and then takes a 'nal (small) step to Goodman, Quine, and Boyd.  %e 
empiricist interest in kinds began by borrowing an essentialist notion of kinds from Aristotle, 
but eventually moved on to a new account, focussing more squarely on induction.  In the 20th 
century, talk of induction continued.  And there are large gaps in the bibliographic record 
between British empiricist discussions of natural kinds and mid-20th century concerns, despite 
certain similarities between these two projects (Magnus 2013).  A&er each period of inactivity, 
talk of natural kinds was not so much resurrected as introduced anew, with slightly new 
conceptions of kinds 't for new philosophical problems.  %is episodic and disjoint history 
explains the patchwork that is the modern conception of kinds.  To try to connect all of these 
episodes is folly, but to understand how each set of problems shaped its own theory of kinds is 
to understand how the contemporary conception became so muddled.   
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32 This is discussed at the end of the chapter.  Over the course of the thesis, my answer to Q3 bears on 
this issue.  My claim is that we should view theoretical pluralism as a reflection of induction-
supporting kinds, and that this should be kept separate from worries about natural kinds.  My view 
thus aligns with that of Dupré, but differs substantially in its premises. 
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%ese three episodes are used to illustrate two very di*erent types of project.  Rather than 
attempt to cover the totality of Aristotle’s complex views on kinds, I focus simply on his 
ontological project and his use of essentialism.  In contrast with this Aristotelian project and 
its interest in the ontological structure of the world, I present the much more practical project 
of the British empiricists.  %eir aim was to erect categories of objects that would make good 
tools for scienti'c reasoning.  Many have followed in their footsteps, fewer in Aristotle’s.  In 
the past century philosophers once connected kinds to scienti'c inquiry, lately combining it 
with a form of scienti'c realism, seemingly uniting the practical epistemic roles of natural 
kinds with ontological investigations.  In section 3 I will claim that this scienti'c realism is not 
equivalent to the ontological and metaphysical interests extracted from the Aristotelian 
project. 
2.1 Aristotle 
Confusion about Aristotle on kinds abounds, because he moved from epistemology to 
metaphysics and through philosophy of language.  For this reason I will abstract a theory of 
kinds from the rest of Aristotelian epistemology, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, 
separating the three strands where possible.  %e stripped-down result is a theory of kinds 
aimed at understanding not what kinds exist, but how they do so.  I am interested in the 
speci'c concept of essence and the analytic ontological role it plays.33  Within Aristotle’s 
thought this theory applied to many kinds of objects that few would recognize as natural 
kinds.  On its own, however, the stripped-down theory of kinds provides an excellent tool for 
asking a&er the ontological standing of certain classes of object. Aristotle did not use the 
phrase ‘natural kinds’, which is one reason why it is di0cult to form a uni'ed account of his 
views.  However his work on the nature of substances has informed many modern discussions, 
and so this is where we begin.   
Aristotle was concerned with the types of things in the world.  Speci'cally, he was 
interested in the most natural or basic things in the world.  Aristotle called these things 
‘substances’.  Substances are ‘that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not 
predicated of anything else’ (1028b36).  In other words, substances are things, not properties.  
At one point Aristotle took living creatures as the prototypical substances, later he appears to 
have moved toward smaller and more abstract objects.  Aristotle’s Categories gives the 
examples of ‘horse’ and ‘man’, while in the Metaphysics he provides examples ranging from the 
chemical elements to mathematical objects.  At the same time Aristotle was working with the 
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33 This is to be distinguished from the very different epistemic role, which is incompatible with its 
ontological role unless it were the case that essences guaranteed perfect similarity among kind 
members.  See Chapter 2. 
 28 
notion of essence.  It, too, changed as time passed.  Interpreters have struggled to regiment 
these discussions (Ayers 1981, Cohen 2012, Makin 2009, MacLeod 2010). 
What is it to be a substance?  %is is not the question of what sorts of things are substances, 
but what it is that makes a substance the substance it is.  What is it that makes one lump of 
matter a cat and another lump a man?  For Aristotle, substances are what they are in virtue of 
their to ti ên einai (literally ‘the what it was to be’).  He sometimes used the shorter phrase, to 
ti esti (the ‘what it is’) but this is not much more informative.  When translated from Greek to 
Latin these phrases became essentia, which gives us the modern term, ‘essence’.    %e essence 
of a substance is that which makes something what it is.  %e essence is thus something a 
thing cannot lose without ceasing to be what it is. 
Essences are analytic.  A distinguishing feature of substances, especially living beings, is 
that they are complex.  A living creature is a developing network of complex and integrated 
parts.  Aristotle worries that this observation drives the intuition that these parts are more 
basic than the whole, or that the whole is merely a network of parts, not a uni'ed singular 
thing (Metaphysics 7.17).  To address this worry, Aristotle reckoned that something had to 
unify the componential complexity.  Whatever that unifying feature is, it cannot be merely 
another part of the whole; otherwise we would need to know what uni'es it with everything it 
uni'es.  %is unifying thing must be a ‘principle’, says Aristotle, rather than another element.  
%at principle is the ‘what-it-is-to-be’.  It is the essence.  Aristotle suggests that when 
substances are ‘formed by nature’, as opposed to arti'cially, then their essence ‘would seem to 
be this nature, which is … a principle’ (Metaphysics, 7.17).  %ese essences are something de 
re, rather than de dicto.  %ey are in the substance, not predicated of it.  
Appeal to essences in turn permits a discussion of types, as in Categories and De 
Interpretatione.  Objects can be viewed as di*ering in matter but the same in substantial form, 
or essence.  Two individual people occupy di*erent and di*erent looking bodies, but are both 
still humans.  %e essence is what makes any given person a ‘human’; sharing the same 
essence makes the two people of the same kind.34  %e theory of substance and essence grew 
complicated as Aristotle noticed that one thing can belong to di*erent types.  An apple is an 
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34 It is here that great controversy enters.  Some wonder whether Aristotle meant to claim that co-
typical individuals share the same essence, or whether each individual has a separate essence of the 
same type.  We might wonder further as to the ontological status of essences on either picture.  If they 
are universals, do they exist independently ‘out there’, or do they exist imminently in the particulars 
that instantiate them?  The same questions can be asked of the secondary substances themselves.  Are 
we to expect that the type ‘Human’ is floating somewhere in the ether, as a Platonic form?  Cohen 
(2012) refers to this collection of problems as ‘perhaps the largest, and most disputed, single 
interpretative issue concerning Aristotle’s Metaphysics’.  It is present in ancient Aristotelian-Platonist 
debates, was picked up in medieval times by Boethius and Ibn Senna, and continues to the modern day.  
Fortunately I need not weigh in.  What matters for present purposes is the general notion of essence 
and its relation to what we would now call a theory of kinds. 
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apple, but is also fruit, round, red, and so on.  To correct for this, Aristotle introduced a 
hierarchy of substances.  To translate this into the present investigation, natural kinds are the 
‘primary’ or most fundamental substance.35 
It is tempting to think of essences as intrinsic physical properties, but Aristotle had a much 
more liberal view.  %ough he never explicitly details the sorts of things that can serve as 
essences, his use of ‘rationality’ for humans suggests that materiality is unimportant.  Rather 
than speaking of essences as stu*, he talks about essences being somehow in the stu* from 
which a thing is made.  You are a person, he claims, because the essence of person is present 
in the meat that comprises you.  Aristotelian essences are ‘occult’, to quote Ayers (1981), 
‘consisting in powers or functions such as, in the case of man, rationality.  We have to 
conceive of them … as the law or tendency governing the behavior of the kind’ (p. 254).36  
Essences are the property that makes a thing what it is, and that a thing cannot lose without 
ceasing to be what it is.  An essentialist is not necessarily committed to any speci'c stance 
concerning the types of properties that can serve as essences. 
Before moving forward, I would like to acknowledge the confusing relationship between 
Aristotle’s discussions of ontology and his discussions of scienti'c methodology.  My 
intention in this section is simply to introduce the notion of essence as a tool for ontological 
theorizing.  %at much Aristotle provides.  However, Aristotelian essences have been put to 
many more uses, some (perhaps) by Aristotle himself.  O&en, Aristotelian essences are given 
epistemic roles in science.  Whether this is advisable depends on features of the world being 
investigated (as discussed in Chapter 3).  Whether this is what Aristotle intended is unclear, 
but, for present purposes, unimportant.  %e following should provide some sense of the 
complicated relationship.   
On a simple reading, it might be thought that, for Aristotle, the epistemic role of essence 
)ows from its ontological one: To know an essence is to know the substance, in a way, and so 
scienti'c understanding should aim at knowledge of essences.  Similarly, essences might be 
thought epistemically useful for picking out kinds because they divide kinds at a 
corresponding ontological level.  On this interpretation, epistemic and metaphysical essences 
are one and the same.  However this is di0cult to square with many of Aristotle’s writings on 
classi'cation, which o&en do not mention essence and which generally advocate a pragmatic 
pluralism.  Pellegrin (1982) claims that Aristotle treats classi'cation as a pragmatic exercise, 
tailored to the needs of the investigation.  In contrast, Henry (2011) reads Aristotle as a realist 
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35 The primary substance is thought to ‘ground’ the higher substances (properties).  Thus apple 
grounds red and round.  This tradition has recently witnessed a modern revival in analytic metaphysics 
and ontology. See (Schaffer 2009). 
36 Chapter 2 will explore some of the ways in which modern appeals to essence have shied away from 
the occult, tending to stick much more closely to intrinsic material essences. 
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pluralist, sampling a variety of non-interchangeable but nevertheless real classi'cation 
schemes.  It is also possible that Aristotle held one privileged class of natural kinds (called 
‘Great Kinds’, ‘megista genê’) but recognized that pragmatic classi'cation must occasionally 
deviate from the privileged class.37  
It is also within this talk of epistemology that we get a discussion of the relationship 
between essence and the proprieties of a kind.  For Aristotle, a full scienti'c account of a thing 
includes not only the essence but also the characteristic properties.  Modern versions of 
essentialism sometimes assume a causal relationship between essences and properties, but 
that is not consistent with Aristotle’s view in the Categories.  He presents a contrast between 
what a substance is, its essence, versus what it is like.  A person is human but is like pale or 
short.  %e latter can change, ruling out a causal relation.38 
%e interpretation of Aristotle’s claims about substance, essence, properties, and kind are a 
matter of considerable academic debate.  Even the most charitable treatments have trouble re-
constructing the entire account across the Metaphysics, Categories, Posterior Analytics, and 
Logic.  His discussion of (what we now call) kinds is problematically tied up with his theories 
of language, reference, scienti'c inquiry, metaphysics, and ontology.  For present purposes, 
consider just the type of question he asked and the tools he developed to help answer it.  
Aristotle wondered whether some of the things we 'nd in the world form kinds, and what it 
might mean for objects to be members of kinds naturally.  He gave an a0rmative answer to 
the 'rst question and provided the theory of essence to 'll in the details. 
2.2 #ree Empiricists on Kinds: Locke, Mill, and Whewell 
%e empiricist engagement with kinds began with Locke’s discussion of Aristotelian 
substances and essences.  As an empiricist and mechanist, Locke’s focus shi&ed away from 
ontology and metaphysics, and toward epistemology.  %is shi& came full circle with Whewell, 
who sought to connect epistemology and ontology by positing a realist method for verifying 
scienti'c kind classi'cations. 
Locke introduced a nominalist approach to kinds (1689).  He was, among other things, 
attempting to reconcile an Aristotelian ontology and scienti'c epistemology with the 17th 
century mechanist worldview.  %e emerging ontology of the day did not allow the 
Aristotelian ‘occult’ essences needed to bestow kind membership.  Instead, Locke argued, 
what makes things members of a kind must be physical sub-microscopic essences.  His 
conception of essence otherwise mirrored that of Aristotle: ‘Essence may be taken for the very 
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37 In this case, Henry (2011) can be read as an argument for the claim that Aristotle’s deviant pragmatic 
classifications were still objective, and thus real, rather than natural kinds. 
38 I discuss this at length in Chapter 2 (section 2.2) 
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being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is’ (II.iii.15).  Yet these sub-microscopic essences are 
beyond our ken, according to Locke.  In an attempt to map the unknowable essential structure 
of things, humans rely on our subjective grasp of the similarity among visible properties, since 
this provides the best available epistemic handle for classi'cation (see Ayers 1981, Jones 
2014).   
Lockean kinds are nominal, grouped by humans using properties as ‘nominal essences’.  
Humans group objects into kinds using widely-shared properties as epistemic handles.  Locke 
called these ‘nominal essences’.  We should not, Locke claimed, believe that nominal essences 
carry any metaphysical weight; they are purely matters of convenience and utility.39  %ough it 
is nature that makes things members of kinds, it is human understanding that classi'es.   
%ere is a tension between Locke’s empiricist nominalism about kinds and the similarly 
empiricist project of characterizing rational principals for induction.  It is a fact about kinds 
that they are or are not suitable for use in inductions.  %is is a fact about the kinds, not about 
the way that we happen to sort them.  If we are to use kinds in inductions, we are only 
justi'ed in doing so if we have some knowledge of this suitability.  But we cannot hope to have 
this justi'cation, since we cannot know anything about nature’s kinds.  We know only facts 
about how we happen to sort things in attempts to re)ect nature’s kinds.  Locke’s empiricist 
embargo on metaphysical knowledge dictates scepticism about the possibility of scienti'c 
knowledge.40 
Over a century and half later, Mill was less sceptical about scienti'c knowledge than his 
predecessor.  He never used the phrase natural kind, though he is frequently cited as having 
done so.41  Mill’s theory of ‘Kinds’ (Mill used a capital ‘K’), simpliciter, was presented in A 
System of Logic.  Kinds distinguish classes of things that are well suited to scienti'c inquiry 
from those classes that are ill suited.   
Mill’s focus was on induction—projective inferences from examined to unexamined cases.  
Since this type of inference requires uniformity in nature, Kinds must be groups with the 
relevant type of uniformity. 
We must 'rst observe, that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what 
Induction is; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the 
universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what 
happens once, will, under a su0cient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen 
again, and not only again, but as o&en as the same circumstances recur. %is, I say, is 
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39 From this point onward, ‘essences’ in the induction-focused tradition are purely epistemic (handles 
for classification) not metaphysical (properties that bestow identity). 
40 For Locke, we have real knowledge when our grasp of nominal essences happens to correspond to 
real essence.  In the case of material objects we can never verify such correspondence.  He believed, 
however, that nominal essences in math and morality (!) corresponded to real essences, permitting 
mathematical and moral knowledge. 
41 As in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry (Tobin & Bird 2008). 
 32 
an assumption, involved in every case of induction. And, if we consult the actual 
course of nature, we 'nd that the assumption is warranted. %e universe, so far as 
known to us, is so constituted, that whatever is true in any one case, is true in all 
cases of a certain description; the only di!culty is, to "nd what description. (1882, 
p.223 emphasis added)  
It is no straightforward matter to determine which description or organization of things will 
do.  Kinds must not only group things that are alike, but group things that are alike in the 
correct way.  It is easy to stipulate a class of objects that share a property, but these are not 
necessarily Kinds.  Take the class of ‘round things’.  %is class is not a Kind because round 
things will not have anything in common beyond shape.  %ere is no deep commonality 
between members of the class.  
[E]ven the strongest understandings 'nd it di0cult to believe that things which 
have a common name, have not in some respect or other a common nature; and 
o&en expend much labor very unpro'tably (as was frequently done by [Plato and 
Aristotle]) in vain attempts to discover in what this common nature consists.  (p.67) 
Classes such as this do not help us learn anything about their members that is not speci'ed in 
the stipulation of the class.  Of members of the class ‘round thing’, we know nothing for 
certain other than that they are round.  Scienti'c inquiry requires broader uniformity:  
%e ends of scienti'c classi'cation are best answered, when the objects are formed 
into groups respecting which a greater number of general propositions can be made. 
(p.499) 
Members of Kind must be similar in inde'nitely many ways and the multitude of shared 
properties should not simply follow analytically from one another.  Not only does this allow 
us to infer a multitude of facts about an object based on its membership in a Kind, it also 
ensures that inquiry into those Kinds is fruitful. 
[A] hundred generations have not exhausted the common properties of animals or 
of plants, of sulphur, or of phosphorus; nor do we suppose them to be exhaustible 
(p.97) 
Mill did not start with a theory of kinds and then prove that they are apt for induction.  
Rather, Kinds just are whatever classes are best for induction.   
William Whewell, Mill’s contemporary and academic antagonist, also assumed that natural 
kinds were groups with robust likeness relations.  Like Locke, however, he shared some 
empiricist scepticism about our ability to know or verify those relations.  He nevertheless 
went beyond Mill’s account by recommending a realist inference: for Whewell, the repeated 
successful use of kinds in science was evidence of their reality.   
Whewell (1858) started from the observation that likeness was not a clear-cut relation:  
Upon what principle, under what conditions, is the idea of likeness thus operative? 
What are the limits of the classes thus formed?  Where does similarity end, which 
induces and entitles us to call a thing a [member of a kind]? (p.99) 
No universal set of necessary and su0cient likeness relations make all objects members their 
kinds.  It is not just that these conditions are di0cult to specify, it is that they are impossible.  
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Kinds can be tested, however, through their repeated use in scienti'c reasoning.  %e kinds 
that pass the test of induction are those that are most robust: 
… the Condition which regulates the use of language is that it shall be capable of 
being used;- that is, that general assertions shall be possible … the condition of use 
of terms is the possibility of general, intelligible, consistent assertions. (p.100) 
What makes Whewell’s theory particularly illuminating is the context.  He was attempting to 
stand outside of disputes between ontological realists and scienti'c pragmatists.  Working on 
geology, his realist contemporaries argued over whether nature’s geological joints were 
marked chemically or mathematically.  His Lockean pragmatist contemporaries, by contast, 
simply sought the most useful system of classi'cation based on essences.42  %ough he 
opposed essentialist realists, Whewell was no nominalist.  He argued that we could infer the 
naturalness of a taxonomic arrangement from its epistemic success.  If a taxonomic 
arrangement supports inductions, especially if a few distinct methods of sorting the same 
materials supported the same inductions with the same or similar taxonomies, then we could 
presume the identi'ed kinds to be natural kinds. 43,44  Interestingly, however, he claimed that 
this did not tell us anything about the method used to arrive at that arrangement, since we 
may well reach a correct taxonomy by way of inaccurate assumptions about the essences of 
the objects being classi'ed.  %us the wrong use of essence could still land on the right 
taxonomy.  A taxonomy of kinds should be presumed natural on the basis of inductive 
success, but inductive success not vindicate whatever ontological assumptions about those 
kinds were used to erect the taxonomy.  
2.3 Kinds in the Twentieth Century: Goodman, Quine, and Boyd 
Mill’s approach was in)uential in the short period immediately a&er his Logic.  %is is most 
notable in the writings of John Venn (of diagram fame), to whom Hacking (1991) erroneously 
credits the phrase ‘natural’ kind as an adaptation of Mill.  By the turn of the century 
discussions of natural kinds had fallen out of fashion (Magnus 2013).  A similar tradition of 
kinds soon sprang up, however, to which we now turn. 
Mid-twentieth century concern with kinds was brought about primarily in reaction to 
Goodman’s (1955) New Riddle of Induction.  Goodman’s New Riddle states a now-familiar 
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42 Whewell believed the former approach to be ultimately unverifiable and both approaches to be 
dangerous, since each focus on static definition and took attention away from the constant flux 
inherent in the natural world. 
43 Ruse (1987) uses this argument to support the claim that species are real, though perhaps not 
(Aristotelian) natural kinds or individuals.  He sees the convergence of multiple species taxonomies as 
evidence of their reality or objectivity, in direct analogy to Whewell’s geological case, discussed in 
(Ruse 1978).  
44 Henry (2011) offers a reading of Aristotle that appears to utilize the same type of realist inference. 
45On Hacking’s error, see Magnus (2013).   
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problem.  It has been used to many ends, but we will restrict ourselves to its relationship with 
kinds and induction.  We are asked to imagine a property called ‘grue’.  Objects are grue if 
observed before now to be green, and if observed a&er now to be blue.  %is means that all 
objects until now observed exhibiting greenness have also been consistent with grueness.  If 
this is the case, then we can make the prima facie bizarre claim that all emeralds are grue, 
along side the much more acceptable claim that all emeralds are green.  Grass is grue; there 
may be grue apples.  We might ironically re-name coniferous trees ‘evergrues’.  Something is 
amiss. 
%e New Riddle motivates two claims.  First is the claim that there must be something that 
distinguishes predicates like ‘grue’ from predicates like ‘green’ and ‘blue’.  What is it about the 
predicates blue and green that make their instances count as evidence toward inductions, and 
why does grue lack this quality?  Second is the claim that induction is not a purely syntactic 
matter.  We tend to think of inductions as observations of predicate application followed by 
generalization.  Inductions begin with the observation that the As in a sample are P, and 
proceeds to the general claim that all As are P, or that future As are likely to be P, and so on.  
%e New Riddle shows that the meaning of ‘A’ and ‘P’ are just as important to induction as 
their syntatic relations.  To join the two claims: Goodman’s puzzle forces us to concede that 
there must be something special about the predicates ‘blue’ and ‘green’ that makes them 
suitable for induction.  Whatever this special feature is, grue does not have it. 
Goodman calls this special feature ‘projectability’, since the inductions in question are 
‘projective’ inferences.  %us green and blue are projectible predicates, while grue is not.  %e 
question remains, however, as to what ‘projectibility’ is.46 
It is interesting that we haven’t settled on grue as a category, nor any other of Goodman’s 
bizarre non-projectible categories.  In general, humans seem rather good at deploying 
categories, a feat that is doubly-impressive when we remember that most people cannot give 
an account of projectibility.  Goodman’s solution was thus to claim that certain predicates are 
‘entrenched’ in our conceptual vocabularies.  Of all the predicates that we could use, we settle 
on those that are very good at informing reasoning, inferences, etc.  Blue behaves well in 
inferences; grue does not.  It is these projectible predicates that become entrenched.  Much 
like Whewell’s Kinds, Goodman’s projectible predicates must pass the test of reasoning. 
Following on from Goodman, Quine (1969) unpacked projectibility as a feature of 
predicates that is grounded in similarity-based grouping heuristics.  We seem to know that 
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46 The easy answer is to claim that ‘green’ and ‘blue’ are primary, given that ‘grue’ is defined in terms of 
them.  If grue is decomposable into green and blue, then they seem the more fundamental properties.  
Perhaps projectability is simply a matter of primacy.  But this answer rests on the rather coincidental 
fact that we have come up with the terms ‘green’ and ‘blue’ first, rather than the other way around.  To 
life-long users of ‘grue’, the terms ‘blue’ and ‘green’ would surely appear secondary. 
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blue things form a more coherent group than non-blue things, or than grue things.  Blue 
things are more similar to other blue things than non-blue things are to other non-blue 
things.  Grue things are extremely internally dissimilar: some are green and some are blue!  In 
this light ‘blue’ seems natural, whereas the ‘grue’ seems arti'cial.  It makes prima facie sense to 
group things in this way.   
According to Quine, projectible predicates are those that are true of things in a kind.  %e 
puzzling feature of Goodman’s puzzle is simply that we lack an adequate notion of kind.    But 
we risk here replacing the question of projectibility with the question of natural kindness.   
Two green emeralds are more similar than two grue ones would be if only one were 
green. Green things, or at least green emeralds, are a kind. A projectible predicate is 
one that is true of all and only the things of a kind. What makes Goodman's example 
a puzzle, however, is the dubious scienti'c standing of a general notion … of kind 
(p. 42).  
In a now-familiar move, Quine identi'ed kind relations with similarity.    
%e notion of a kind and the notion of similarity or resemblance seem to be variants 
or adaptations of a single notion. Similarity is immediately de'nable in terms of 
kind; for things are similar when they are two of a kind. %e very words for 'kind' 
and 'similar' tend to run in etymologically cognate pairs… we cannot easily imagine 
a more familiar or fundamental notion than this (p. 42).  
Quine’s move is a productive one.  He began with a puzzle about induction and ended with an 
account of natural kinds.   
Quine ultimately argued that the kinds we have are the result of long processes of 
conceptual evolution.  %ose kinds that are not projectible, or are poorly projectible, get 
replaced with categories that are more projectible and thus better kinds.  Even though we lack 
an understanding of similarity, we have a re'ned mechanism for seeking it and grouping 
things accordingly.   
Quine’s conception of natural kinds explicitly focuses on the need for similarity, but runs 
shy of explaining what similarity actually is.  %is is no shortcoming, however.  Quine argues 
convincingly that there simply is no objective notion of similarity.  %e concept is ‘logically 
repugnant’.  Like our kind terms, the type or degree of similarity we seek seems to have been 
re'ned over time.  Di*erent investigations, in di*erent theoretical contexts, will require 
di*erent standards of similarity.  %e point of Quine’s paper is thus not to present a theory of 
natural kinds, but to argue that scientists should aim at replacing their pre-theoretical notions 
of similarity with more re'ned, discipline speci'c rules.  %is is the mark of a mature science. 
It is striking how these mid-20th century are reminiscent of the older discussions just 
surveyed.  Oddly, Quine gives no mention of Whewell’s realism about natural kinds, with 
which he had much in common.  However Quine stops short of certain claims from the 
earlier empiricist.  Rather than o*er the claim that successful induction permits realist 
assumptions about kinds, he believes that the epistemic success of our inductive practices is 
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evidence for the robustness of the groupings on which those practices are based.  %e 
objective similarity of these groupings is re)ected in the successful inductive inferences they 
license.  Quine and Whewell both licence inferences from inductive success, however 
Whewell’s inferences concern the reality of groupings, while Quine’s concern their robustness. 
In recent years a new theory of kinds has arisen, Richard Boyd’s ‘Homeostatic Property 
Cluster’ (HPC) theory (Boyd 1991, Boyd 1999b, Boyd 1999a).47  %e view has come a long 
way and is arguably the most popular view of natural kinds among contemporary 
philosophers of science.  Boyd tries to provide a theory of kinds that is true to the empiricist 
aim of specifying the conditions of induction while also maintaining a commitment to 
realism, which is needed for but (seemingly) at odds with the prior commitment.  Boyd 
(1999a) sees himself as resolving Locke’s impasse, justifying induction absent knowledge of 
metaphysically spooky identities.  He aims at a theory of kinds that is mind independent but 
admits a role for human construction of kinds, and yet still possesses a mechanism of 
epistemic justi'cation concerning the principles of induction and scienti'c reasoning.  It is 
this justi'cation that is missing from Quine and Goodman.   
HPC theory shares with Whewell, Quine and Goodman the theory of kind term 
entrenchment.  Boyd also shares with Whewell the realist claim that successful induction is 
evidence of the naturalness of our categorizations.  Boyd di*ers from these philosophers, 
however, by providing a much more substantial theory of what the natural kinds actually are, 
and explaining just what it is that makes them natural.  %e key is to ground the similarity of 
kind members in the causal processes that sustain kind membership. 
Boyd claims that kinds are characterized by clusters of properties.  He adds the 
requirement that these properties coincide non-accidentally.  %eir co-occurrence should be 
the result of systematic and sustained causal tendencies—what Boyd calls ‘homeostatic causal 
mechanisms’.48  For a class of putatively kindred objects, there will be some set of properties 
that most of the objects share in common.  %ey share these non-accidentally.  %e properties 
are the result of a number of causal mechanisms that happen to be relatively stable in our 
world.  Because some accidental features of our world might interact with the causal 
mechanisms di*erently, certain members of the class will have only some of the common 
properties.  It is not the case that all members will have all of the same properties; this is an 
expected consequence of dispositional causal natures and an ever-changing world.   
Take the HPC kind ‘lemon’.  %ey look, smell, feel, and taste like lemons.  I won’t bother 
you with the details.  %ese properties of lemons are not accidental; they are the product of 
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47 Though now the most popular theory of natural kinds among philosophers of science, Boyd’s theory 
originally comes to us from his work on moral realism (1988). 
48 By homeostatic, Boyd means simply that they are relatively stable.   
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inheritance, genetics, epigenetics, nutrition, temperature, pressure, and many other relatively 
stable factors.  We can imagine how temperature interacts with pressure to in)uence 
epigenetic factors; how molecular mechanisms dictate the stability of genetic elements; how 
nutrition a*ects the rate of replication; etc.  %ese causal mechanisms are interdependent.  
%is is homeostasis.  %is homeostasis causally explains why the properties of lemons tend to 
cluster.  %e mechanisms behind one property are dependent on the mechanisms behind 
another, and so on.  Like a house of cards, they keep each other in order.49  Importantly, these 
mechanisms also explain why some lemons are smaller, sweeter, or waxier than others.  
%ough lemons tend to pass on genes perfectly, molecular mechanisms occasionally 
breakdown and result in mutants.  %ough temperature is o&en uniform in tropic lemon-
groves, o* years are inevitable.  Changes in some of a lemon’s clustered properties are the 
unavoidable result of breakdown in one or more causal mechanisms.  Any farmer could have 
told you that.  
One might wonder how we can know that a set of properties cluster because of a 
‘systematic, causally sustained tendency’, rather than by accident or happenstance.  It is here 
that Boyd employs the familiar claim that inductive success is evidence for the accuracy of our 
kinds.  When scientists deploy kind terms, and do so successfully over time, what they have 
done is 'nd ways to 'ne-tune their use of language to the causal structures of the world.  Boyd 
calls this ‘accommodation’.  In a bizarrely apt metaphor, Boyd characterizes the process as 
akin to the passing of a bill through the houses of Parliament and Lords: 
%ink of natural kinds as being established by a sort of bicameral linguistic 
legislation in which we and the world jointly legislate. Our legislative role consists of 
implementing disciplinary matrices with their associated accommodation demands. 
%e legislative role of the world consists in determining how and to what extent 
those demands can be met. Together we thereby establish the explanatory 
de'nitions of natural kinds (1999b, p.89) 
For Boyd, the study of natural kinds just is the study of how scientists accommodate their 
classi'catory language to the world.  %is in turn explains how we can have rational principals 
for induction: the successful use of natural kind terms gives reason to believe that these kind 
terms accommodate the causal structure of the world.  Accommodation, or belief in it, 
justi'es our inductions.  It is an abduction about induction.  
Boyd is no stranger to Quine’s claims that the kinds scientists use are inductively successful 
only against a given theoretical background.  Accordingly, Boyd allows that the natural kind 
terms we use are a function of our interests and focus, and are shaped by the theories within 
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49 Boyd claims that the point is not just that there are similar processes going on behind each lemon, 
but that this single set of causal processes is behind all lemons.  This allows him to avoid worries about 
whether two sets of causal processes are the same or different (for instance if the process at work in 
lemon groves in Florida is the same as those in Spain). 
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which they are formed.  %ese kinds are nonetheless not wholly constructed, since the world, 
not the theory, imposes the causal structure that language must accommodate. 
%e use we make of reference to the kind in induction and explanation requires that 
it be de'ned by a set or cluster of properties whose membership is determined by 
the causal structure of the world and is thus, in a relevant sense … independent of 
our conceptions or theorizing (1991, p. 129) 
%is allows a role for a posteriori creation of natural kind systems that can map to the causal 
structure of the world in a way that supports induction—Locke would be pleased. 
3. Lovely $eory, but What Can it Do? 
%is truncated history of natural kinds discussion reveals two distinct traditions. %e more 
popular tradition is pragmatic, aligning kinds with induction and scienti'c inference.  Less 
popular is the tradition interested in metaphysical and ontological questions about what 
makes things ‘what-they-are’. 50   I stated at the outset that my interest in natural kinds was tied 
to questions about the human-independent identities of objects in the world.  In this section, I 
evaluate these theories in light of this task.  Both traditions pro*er views on kinds that permit 
degrees of realism.  %is is the best place to start thinking about kinds and ontology.  %e 
realism of the HPC theorists concerns (at best) a certain causal structure of the world.  %e 
realism of other induction theorists concerns the objectivity of the similarity relations 
amongst kind members.  %e realism of the ontological tradition concerns the identities of the 
entities themselves, and is therefore the best choice for my aims. 
3.1 #e Induction Tradition 
Boyd’s HPC theory is in certain respects the culmination of Mill, Whewell, and Quine’s 
concern with scienti'c reasoning.  %ese authors share a great deal, and give us the 
requirement that natural kinds feature in induction.  %is comes with attendant claims about 
kinds and similarity.   
%ese theorists did not 'nd that natural kinds in the Aristotelian sense also happened to be 
good for inductions.  Nor did they 'nd that the things that do well in inductions happen to be 
Aristotelian kinds.  Rather, the theory of induction-supporting kinds is built around similarity 
in order to work in scienti'c reasoning.  A relationship between kinds and induction is 
assumed from the beginning.  Boyd is explicit on this point: 
It is a truism that the philosophical theory of natural kinds is about how 
classi'catory schemes come to contribute to the epistemic reliability of inductive 
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50 Plato recognized this distinction, too.  In Statesman 236D, in a discussion about classification, an 
interlocutor explains that, if cranes could talk, they would divide the world into cranes and non-cranes.  
The charge is that classification is always relative to the interests of the classifier—and thus always 
anthropocentric.  The theory of Forms offers an alternative, classifying the world according to natural 
divisions, carving nature’s joints. 
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and explanatory practices. Quine was right … that the theory of natural kinds is 
about how schemes of classi'cation contribute to the formulation and identi'cation 
of projectible hypotheses (in the sense of Goodman). (Boyd 1999a, p.146) 
It is not the case that these philosophers start with a conception of kinds and later 'nd that it 
happens to be well-suited to inductions.  Rather, they start with the need for groups that allow 
for scienti'c reasoning and then call whatever it is that 'lls this need ‘natural kinds’, ‘Kinds’, or 
Homeostatic Property Clusters. 
Focus on induction yields a notable outcome.  %e kinds of things that feature in 
inductions need not be based on natural groupings, only objective ones.  %us ‘natural’ takes a 
very di*erent form for these views.  Take HPC theory.  Boyd’s HPC kinds are realist.  Reality 
on the HPC view comes from accommodation.  Accommodation ensures that property 
clusters are non-accidentally clustered; they are causally clustered.  Clusters are out in the 
world, rather than in our heads.  So realism or naturalism on this view is akin to objectivity.  
%e clusters are real insofar as they are really out there, clustered.  %is avoids the mind-
dependence of property clusters but not the human-dependence of the kinds.  Human kinds, 
a&er all, can exhibit causally-supported clusters of properties—they can be HPC kinds.   
Induction is supported by all sorts of groupings.  Since the worry in induction is about 
consistency, inductions will range successfully over any groupings that exhibit robust 
similarity.  %ese need not be divorced from humans. Consider the kind classic car.  In many 
circles this kind is entrenched and supports a plethora of inductions.  Knowing that a certain 
Volkswagen Beetle is a classic tells me, for instance, that it is at least 25 years old, that it likely 
runs o* of a carburettor rather than fuel injection, that the value will be better than a slightly 
newer but non-classic Beetle, and that my auto insurance will fall into a certain category.  
%ere are many more inferences to be drawn about the mechanics, operation, and value of the 
car.  Classic car supports induction because it is robustly internally similar and is entrenched, 
not because classic cars would exist without humans or because classic car is in any traditional 
sense natural.  Induction is blind to the natural/arti'cial distinction. 
Another, more interesting, feature of induction kinds is the way in which even seemingly 
human-independent kinds still require human intervention.  %ere are many ways in which 
things can be similar or dissimilar—as many ways as there are properties.  A non-negligible 
set of these similarities will be causally sustained and so will permit inductions.  %e same is 
true of degrees of similarity.  It is for humans to wade in and determine which similarity 
metrics are the relevant ones and how much similarity is enough.  Consider the mineral 
commonly known as ‘Jade’.  Jade is actually a class of two separate silicates, Nephrite and 
Jadeite.  %e outward properties of these two stones are similar enough that they are still 
classed as being of the same type.  Both are green, reasonably hard, polish to an oily sheen, 
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and so on.  Even at a certain chemical level they are similar; both are silicates.  Yet, at a deeper 
chemical level the two are actually quite di*erent.  Nephrite is a silicate of Calcium and 
Magnesium, where Jadeite is a silicate of Sodium and Aluminium.  %ey have di*erent 
molecular weights, slightly di*erent crystallization systems, and di*erent optical properties.  
So Jade might be described as either one homeostatically maintained class or two, depending 
on which properties we choose to include in our analysis.  Which properties are relevant?  It 
depends on what you plan to use the categories for.  Surely we could come up with a list of 
social factors that lead these to both be called ‘Jade’.  Yet we can specify a di*erent set of social 
factors that lead jewellery specialists to care about the di*erences between Jadeite and 
Nephrite.  In certain circles it might be helpful to group the two, in others they might be best 
kept separate.  For a theory like HPC, this plurality does not matter.  Jade, Jadeite, and 
Nephrite are all natural kinds.  All three really represent the causally sustained clumpings of 
properties in the world.  All three are entrenched.  Jade is a natural kind for certain 'elds; 
Jadeite and Nephrite are natural kinds for others.  Because the world contains so many 
clumped properties, humans have to enter the picture and determine which clumps are the 
best clumps to name.  %is is all still objective (since the similarities really exist) but it is not 
human independent because humans wade in and determine the similarities that matter in a 
given context. 
Quine (1969) was aware of this limitation.  He concludes that there is no objective notion 
of similarity and that in devising natural groupings humans will always be needed to wade in 
and determine which similarities matter, and how much similarity is similarity enough.  It is 
for this reason that Quine viewed natural kinds as prescienti'c, claiming that it is the job of a 
mature science to eliminate the need for such categories. 
%ese problems might explain the absence of ‘naturalness’ from many discussions of kinds 
in induction.  It is interesting that Russell (1948), writing before Quine but long a&er the three 
empiricists, also notes that the connection between kinds induction entails a certain 
nominalism about those kinds.  In a move that has puzzled some interpreters (Magnus 2013) 
Russell claims that natural kinds are not used in the actual scienti'c practices of induction. 
Induction requires only reliable correlations of properties.  In other words, Russell thinks that 
induction does not require natural kinds, merely groups based on similarity.51  %ough we 
don’t know exactly what he thinks natural kinds are, he implicitly separates natural kinds 
from the groups or sets used in scienti'c reasoning.  Recall now that Mill and Whewell also 
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51 In a footnote, Magnus (2013) confesses: ‘I am not entirely clear on what the contrast is supposed to 
be. On Mill’s view, as we saw above, regularities of correlation just are natural kinds.’  Given his aim of 
tracking the development of the induction-focused tradition, Magnus understandably misses the 
possibility of the other tradition of kinds.  Russell seems to assume that natural kinds latch onto deeper 
metaphysical facts about things, whereas similarity is a superficial (albeit useful) fact. 
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avoided ‘natural’, using ‘Kind’ for a special type of set.  Quine’s theory is properly an account 
of the predicates that feature in induction, not natural kinds in any metaphysical or 
ontological sense.  Similarly, Boyd gives an account of the categories that are required for 
scienti'c reasoning, characterizing these as HPCs.52  %ough many of the progenitors of this 
tradition of induction did not regard their kinds as natural kinds, followers have not been so 
careful.   
I am perfectly happy to claim that HPC kinds (as pinnacle of this tradition) do indeed 
describe the categories of scienti'c inquiry in a way that is both realist and conciliatory to 
constructivists.  %e theory is robust and well articulated. One question is whether we should 
call this or any other theory of induction-supporting kinds ‘natural kinds’.53  %is is a purely 
semantic dispute, which I see no hope of settling.  It would not even be a problem, in fact, if 
natural kinds had not also become associated with other and very di*erent philosophical 
problems.  For the remainder of this work, I shall reserve the term ‘induction-supporting 
kinds’ for this tradition.  %e main question of this chapter is whether these kinds are suited to 
ontological inquiry.  %ey are not. 
3.2 #e Ontological Tradition 
We need to be cautious when interpreting Aristotle on kinds.  It is doubtful that all of his 
diverse claims about substances and essences are compatible.  But a few things seem certain.  
Aristotle thought at least some objects of the world came pre-divided into kinds of things.  
Groups were not ‘the workmanship of man’ but fundamental features of reality.  It was the job 
of philosophers to determine where the kinds were and what it was that made certain objects 
the members of their kinds.  It is also clear that Aristotle took particulars to be members of 
their kinds in virtue of some essential properties, though it is far less certain just what he 
thought that entailed.  Finally, it is clear that Aristotle meant to separate natural kinds from 
those kinds of things that are made by humans (artefacts).54   
We can strip away Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of language to arrive at a 
simple theory of kinds that is well suited to ontological enquiry.  %e theory asks a&er what 
things are, not how we treat them, relate to them, or want them to be.  It assumes as a matter 
of logic that there is something that makes things what-they-are.  %is feature, whatever it is, 
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52 He now occasionally calls his kinds ‘HPC kinds’ or ‘HPC natural kinds’. 
53 Khalidi (2013) calls these natural kinds, so long as the kinds are ‘world-dependent’. 
54 It is a matter of some debate whether he thought both could be substances or have essences 
(Katayama 1999), but we know at least that he saw some distinction between the two. Dominant 
opinion seems to be that substances were not artefacts.  A separate question is whether Aristotle 
conceived of there being human-kinds, where objects are grouped according to human convenience 
rather than according to nature.  His methodological suggestions would imply that he thought this ill 
advised. 
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is an ‘essence’.  An essence is a property a kind cannot lose without ceasing to be what-it-is.  
Essences allow investigation into the naturalness, structure, and uniqueness of kinds of things.  
If essences are anthropocentric, then the kinds are human kinds.  If essences are discrete, the 
kinds are discrete.  If things have multiple essences, then there is pluralism to the structure of 
kinds.  If things have only one essence, then there is only one structure of kinds.  Looking at 
essences tells us much about the kinds themselves. 
Many challenges arise for essentialism when we attempt to combine essentialism as an 
ontological project with essentialism as an epistemic project.  When Aristotle turned his 
attention to scienti'c classi'cation, he either developed an independent account of taxonomy 
or radically revised his ontological position.  If it is the latter, then he rendered it untenable.  
%e untenable epistemic version of Aristotelian essentialism has been the target of critique in 
the philosophy of biology for the past half-century.  In Chapter 2, I will show how the general 
ontological project of essentialism is untouched by these critiques. %e monism versus 
pluralism debate that centres round kinds and essentialism requires some conceptual 
clari'cation, which I tackle at the beginning of Chapter 3.  Combined, these discussions lay 
the groundwork for a modern theory of essence.  %e second half of Chapter 3 will introduce 
this theory, Kind Historicism, and apply it to the problem of intrinsic heterogeneity.  
4. Conclusion: $e Scope of Pluralism and Deference to Science 
We are now in a position to brie)y evaluate the scope of the recent trend toward 
metaphysical and ontological pluralism about natural kinds.  I do not mean here to criticise 
this trend, only situate it relative to the duality of kinds just introduced.  Many authors 
advance such views; some will be encountered in PART II.  For present purposes, it will su0ce 
to consider the grandfather55 of these positions: Promiscuous Realism (PR), mentioned in the 
introduction (Dupré 1993, Dupré 1996).56  PR is taken to include a host of claims, but the 
central claim is this: ‘there are many equally legitimate ways of carving the world into kinds’ 
(1993, p. 6).  More speci'cally, ‘there are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of 
classifying objects in the world.  And these may o&en cross-classify one another in inde'nitely 
complex ways’.  As such, PR is taken to constitute ‘a metaphysics of radical ontological 
pluralism’ (p. 18).   
Arguments for PR come 'rst from theoretical pluralism as a reaction to intrinsic 
heterogeneity.  Dupré’s (1993) main target is classi'cation systems for biological species, of 
which there are many and more.  Biologists classify species in many di*erent ways, using 
many di*erent properties as epistemic handles.  Some use morphology.  Some use 
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55 Because it is so often the source of the subsequent positions. 
56 See also (Daly 1996). 
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reproductive strategy.  Some use geography.  Some use phylogenetic history.  And these are 
just the main contenders.  Most of these classi'cations have some reality.57  %e properties 
they employ as nominal essences really exist, are really shared among some non-arbitrary set 
of species, and are really useful for classifying.  Scientists will insist that certain of these 
classi'cations represent the way the species really are, but Dupré presents good reasons to 
think otherwise.  Critics suppose that there might be hope for a single species classi'cation 
(Wilson 1996), as yet undiscovered.  However it is hard to imagine what this would be, and 
how it would 'll the various roles played by each of the current systems (see Dupré 1996).  
And this is where the force of pluralist arguments originates.  Each of these classi'cation 
schemes is incredibly useful in a circumscribed domain.  Within that domain, predictions, 
explanations, and generalizations are most powerful if made using one species system but not 
another.  Morphological systems are good for explanations involving body plan development, 
and physiology.  Phylogenetic systems are good for explanations involving historical relations, 
symmetries, homologies, and analogies.  Each classi'cation scheme is a great scheme for some 
things and not others.  Since it is impossible that a single scheme will categorize in the same 
ways as these incompatible schemes, it is impossible that a single scheme will replace them.  
%e claims of PR are best assessed within the induction-focussed tradition.  Within that 
tradition it is understandable, indeed expected, that di*erent modes of scienti'c inquiry will 
require di*erent kinds.  %is explains why multiple conceptions of the biological kinds can 
exist, and also why each can have claim to ‘legitimacy’, ‘objectivity’, or ‘reality’.   
It is not hard to imagine, however, how these sorts of investigations could mislead 
concerning ontological issues of the sort I am pursuing.  %e language surrounding PR 
evidences strong scepticism about the uniqueness of the identities of biological objects.  
Claims such as PR’s might lead the reader to wonder whether there is a single thing that given 
organism is, or whether an organism is as many kinds of things as there are scienti'c 
perspectives on it.  %e arguments presented above should, I hope, dissuade the reader from 
drawing such conclusions on these bases.  I have not yet o*ered a positive account of 
biological kinds, but I have shown how attempts to 'nd the best kinds for science should 
expect pluralistic results, and how these can be amenable to realist interpretation without 
thereby being identi'ed with natural kinds.  %e kinds used in successful science have no 
direct role to play in ontological investigations (given the sense of ‘ontology’ employed here).   
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57 Dupré (1993) originally claimed that all classifications were real insofar as they latched onto some 
really shared property.  More recently (2001), he has attenuated the claim, believing that certain 
classification schemes can work well in spite of being non-real in this sense.  Some classifications are 
metaphysically arbitrary while nevertheless helpful. 
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I anticipate two objections, the full responses to which will emerge over the coming 
chapters.  First, one might object to my separation of natural kinds from science.  Surely 
metaphysics of science should be deferential to scienti'c practice, says the critic, and not 
descend into armchair philosophizing.  With this sentiment I agree completely.  I view this as 
compatible with my investigation.  In cases such as PR, the philosophy is deferential to the 
scienti'c practices of classi'cation.  I believe this suitable only in case we are investigating 
induction-supporting kinds, in which instance we will want to know how well kinds perform 
in scienti'c reasoning.  In my own case, I am deferential to scienti'c knowledge, but not 
necessarily practices of classi'cation.  Scienti'c 'ndings will help determine what it is that 
makes something what it is, but scienti'c classi'cations will do no such thing.  I will elaborate 
this point considerably, by demonstration, in Chapters 4 and 5.   
Second, I anticipate a general objection to my separation of natural kinds from similarity.  
A critic might grant that similarity in properties is not what makes things members of a kind 
and that critic might even grant the point (made above and defended in chapter 2) that we 
need not assume a causal relationship between essences and characteristic properties.  Even 
still, there seems room to deny that two members of a kind will di*er in characteristic 
properties.  How could two things be of a kind, the intuition goes, if they are dissimilar?  As a 
matter of methodology, the similarity (or not) of natural kinds should be an open question.  
Just as we view the singularity or multiplicity of natural kinds (monism/pluralism) as an 
ontological fact to be investigated, so too should we view the various features of natural kinds, 
similarity 'rst and foremost.  Notice also that a partial response to this objection can be found 
in the norms governing lay-theory application of kinds.  We tend to think that all sorts of 
things form kinds that are dissimilar in certain important properties.  Biological kinds are 
wonderful examples of this sort.  As any pet owner can tell you, kind membership helps you 
understand animals to a degree, but each is highly dissimilar in psychology, dietary 
preferences, and even morphology.  %e point is that the same kinds can interact with the 
world in di*erent ways, resulting in potential di*erences in any and all outward properties.  In 
Chapter 3 I will explain in more detail how this holds for biological kinds, and in Chapter 4 I 
will explain how two chemical molecules of the same kind can have di*erent shapes and thus 
di*erent physical properties.  In each instance the explanations of within-kind di*erences lie 
in the interactions between particulars, their (historical) essences, and the world.  
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!ree !ings Essentialism is Not 
Popular opinion has it that essentialism is dead in the water: It was harpooned by Darwin 
from the deck of !e Beagle.  #is is simply not true.  While essentialist doctrine must be 
carefully applied, and while many speci$c applications of it are untenable, the Darwinian 
criticism leaves the general project of ontological essentialism untouched.  A few brave 
philosophers of biology defy the received view and o%er theories of natural kind essentialism 
(Devitt 2010, Gri)ths 1999, Millikan 1999a, Wilson 1999a, Wilson et al. 2007).  #at such 
theories are pro%ered at all suggests that we should re-think the ‘anti-essentialist consensus’ 
(Okasha 2002).  As Wilson (1999a) claims, 
[T]he concept of an essence need not be viewed as the concept of substance came to 
be viewed within modern science, as unnecessary metaphysical baggage to be 
jettisoned.  Rather, … essentialism represents an important way in which Aristotle’s 
views of the unity to the biological world … have proven to be correct.  (p.205) 
I do not endorse all of these contemporary essentialisms; in fact I criticise several in this 
chapter.  I do however share with these authors the recognition that essentialism about kinds 
need not be set adri, before philosophizing about the biological world.  I go further than 
these ‘new biological essentialists’ (Ereshefsky 2010a) by not only o%ering a theory of 
biological essentialism (to be elaborated in Chapter 3) but by $rst addressing directly the 
widespread criticisms that render essentialism taboo.  #at is the purpose of this short 
chapter. 
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My positive general account of essentialism was given in Chapter 1: particulars form kinds 
in virtue of shared essences, where an essence is a property or property set, in the widest 
possible sense of ‘property’.  Others share the general positive conception of essentialism I 
employ, at a minimum; but essentialism in the philosophy of biology has far more critics than 
defenders.  At least, a lot of philosophers critique views that they dub ‘essentialism’.  Central to 
these critiques are three beliefs about what essentialism requires or entails.  First is the claim 
that essences are sets of necessary and jointly su)cient intrinsic physical properties.  #is 
version of essentialism, we are told, was slain by Darwin (or at least by Darwinism).  Second is 
the claim that essences should causally explain the characteristic properties of the kind.  #is 
quality of essences is used by proponents to justify kinds’ presumed role in scienti$c practice, 
but it is also seized upon by critics who note that causal relationships in biology are imperfect.  
#ird is the claim that natural kinds are eternal and unchanging, like Platonic forms.  #is fact 
does not sit well with observers of biology, who notice that Parmenidian cosmology is 
incompatible with Darwinian change within species and with speciation. 
#ere are anti-essentialist critiques of each of these three claims, which invoke distinctively 
biological premises.  I have no qualms with these.  My target is not these arguments against 
essentialism, but rather the belief that any of the three claims standardly at issue is required 
for a mature natural kinds essentialism applicable to the biological world.  In this chapter, my 
goal is to sidestep the standard criticisms of essentialism by distancing essentialism as a 
general position from the speci$c essentialism(s) critiqued.  #e $rst claim about essentialism 
was initially applied only to essentialism as an account of scienti$c epistemology, and pertains 
to the speci$c view that essences are physical property sets.  #e second claim appears to arise 
from unwarranted combination of the two traditions of kinds described in the previous 
chapter.  #e third claim was certainly believed by Aristotle but is in no way a necessary 
component of natural kind essentialism.  Distancing essentialism from these claims is 
paramount for the future of essentialism in biology, and understanding the scope of the anti-
essentialist consensus is important for avoiding the pitfalls of essentialisms past.  Before 
addressing these three claims, I will brie/y introduce the ‘anti-essentialist consensus’ that I am 
attempting to avoid.  By way of conclusion, I will explain how the stripped-down conception 
of essentialism that avoids the anti-essentialist consensus is still worth using, for it permits a 
discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities of classes across the sciences by making clear 
the similarities and di%erences between kinds in the biological and physico-chemical worlds. 
1. "e Anti-Essentialist Consensus 
Traditional essentialism has been the subject of much debate in the philosophy of biology, 
nearly all of it in connection with the species debates and nearly all of it negative. #e received 
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view holds that traditional versions of essentialism will not provide an adequate account of 
biological species.  Samir Okasha (2002) refers to this as the ‘anti-essentialist consensus’,  
[#e] attack on essentialism has met with almost universal acceptance among both 
biologists and philosophers of biology. (p.190)  
Elliot Sober (1994) claims,  
Essentialism about species is today a dead issue. (p.163)  
Wilson, Barker, and Brigandt (2007) assert,  
Philosophers’ and biologists’ rejection of kind essentialism has become part of a 
canonical view of the history of essentialism in the biological sciences. (p.4)  
Citing a number of authors, Michael Devitt (2008) sums up the consensus nicely:  
Alex Rosenberg says: “#e proponents of contemporary species de$nitions are all 
agreed that species have no essence” ... Sober expresses this consensus as follows: 
“biologists do not think that species are de$ned in terms of phenotypic or genetic 
similarities”; tigers are “not de"ned by a set of traits” (1993, 148). Sterelny and 
Gri)ths put the point bluntly: “no intrinsic genotypic or phenotypic property is 
essential to being a member of a species” (1999, 186). (p.350)  
Philosophers of biology agree that they all agree that essentialism cannot provide an adequate 
account of biological objects.   
#ese critiques are echoes of David Hull’s (1965a, 1965b) famous argument against the use 
of Aristotelian de$nition in biological taxonomy.58  Hull’s essay exposed the incongruence of 
Aristotelian scienti$c method and contemporary knowledge and investigation of the 
biological world.  A de$nitional approach to taxonomy requires dra,ing lists of essential and 
accidental observable properties, but modern biological science tells us that all physical 
properties of species are liable to variation across and within biological groups.  #is is part of 
intrinsic heterogeneity.  All properties appear accidental, preventing a de$nitional approach 
to taxonomy.  Carefully articulated though it was, the pragmatic bent of Hull’s claim has been 
lost over time.  Adaptations of Hull’s point /irt with conclusions about metaphysics and 
ontology, in addition to those about scienti$c method. 
A related criticism, which was slightly older, was revitalized and strengthened in light of 
Hull’s work.  #is is the argument by philosopher Karl Popper (Hull’s mentor) and biologist 
Ernst Mayr that Greek thought had prized $xity over change, and that this corresponded to an 
a priori rationalist approach to science.  #e belief being criticized was that the world 
consisted in unchanging types.  According to Popper, this led to dangerous armchair science.  
If things are unchanging and eternal, then we can presumably come to know them by simply 
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58 Hull penned a now-famous paper in which he claimed that taxic essentialism had led to ‘two 
thousand years of stasis’.  His seminar leader, Karl Popper, was so impressed with the epic as to seek its 
publication in the British Journal for Philosophy of Science without Hull’s knowledge!  The narrative 
was soon picked up by others, most importantly by Ernst Mayr, as it made its way into philosophical 
folklore.  The view served as a convenient device for Mayr, who critiqued taxic essentialism as a proxy 
for views of speciation that disagreed with his own population approach.   
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re/ecting on their essential natures rather than by studying them empirically.  #is is at odds 
with a view of the biological world that emphasizes change and lawlessness.  #e motivations 
of these thinkers were a mix of philosophical and political59  but the legacy of the argument is 
the anti-essentialist consensus.60 
#e consensus can be helpfully distilled into three core criticisms, targeting three versions 
of essentialism.  #e $rst targets the claim that essences are intrinsic property sets.  #e 
second targets the claim that essences should cause/explain the characteristic properties of the 
kind.  #e third claims that essentialism commits us to eternal or unchanging kinds.  I will 
deal with each of these in turn, generally conceding the criticism while also demonstrating 
why essentialism need not be committed to intrinsic property sets, causal relations with 
characteristic properties, or Parmenidean ontology. 
2. "ree Perspectives on Essentialism 
2.1 Essence as Slain by Darwin (Intrinsic Property Sets) 
#ere is an old story in the philosophy of biology about Aristotelian essentialism and its 
eventual but long-overdue defeat at the hands of Charles Darwin.  I recount this story below.  
It serves o,en to obscure rather than illuminate the place of Darwinian theory in the history 
of ideas, and it is also o,en used to construct a straw person of essentialist approaches to 
kinds.  In spite of its exposure as confused and historically inaccurate, the story continues to 
appear in print.  Even more frustratingly, this story is still deployed in philosophy of biology 
circles whenever an argument employs the term ‘essence’ in anything but a derisive sense.  #e 
story is useful, however, because careful attention to the anti-essentialist argument helps 
reveal the limitations of essentialism as a scienti$c programme.  Darwinian theory precludes 
essentialism about scienti$c language and method, but leaves essentialism as a general 
ontological tool untouched. 
#e anti-essentialist story goes like this: Before Darwin, biology was saddled with an 
Aristotelian essentialist methodology, which held that all (natural) kinds, of which species 
were an exemplar, ought to be de$ned by shared sets of jointly necessary and su)cient 
properties.  Wilkins (2013) calls this ‘taxic essentialism’.  Taxic essentialism was a problem, the 
story continues, because it ignores the manifest diversity of individuals within a species that 
results from and enables evolution by means of natural selection.  Surely Darwin’s theory put 
an end to taxic essentialism by showing that species were not groups of members sharing 
necessary and su)cient properties, but rather populations of individuals who exhibit 
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59 Popper associated methodological essentialism with fascism (and all that was wrong with science in 
society). 
60 A detailed account of Popper and Mayr, and their differences, can be found in Wilkins (2013) 
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considerable variation.  For some time it was possible to hold out a Lockean naturalist hope 
that one-day science would reveal the shared microphysical properties that species had in 
common.  For a time it was not unreasonable to believe that the material of heredity would $ll 
such a role.  But this hope was dashed.   In contemporary forms, critiques of taxic essentialism 
typically culminate with the observation that even DNA change within a species—no property 
is safe from selection!61 
#e evidence against this tale as a historiographic claim is huge (Amundson 2005, Farber 
1976, Hodge & Radick 2009, McOuat 2009, Wilkins 2013, Winsor 2003, 2006) and I will not 
recount it here.  John Wilkins (2013) summarizes the body of historical work succinctly: 
‘#ere is little evidence that anyone was … [a] taxic essentialist’ (p.3).  Darwinian theory did 
not change an incumbent theory of classi$cation and kinds; it contributed to an existing 
discourse of species as heterogeneous and changing entities.   
History aside, it is worth understanding how taxic essentialism works and to what degree 
this represents essentialist doctrine.  #e birth of the contemporary erroneous pre-Darwinian 
history is generally credited to then-graduate student David Hull (1965a, 1965b), who 
attacked the claim that species have sets of ‘essential’ properties.62  His frustration is palpable: 
Presented with the welter of diverse forms to be classi$ed, a taxonomist can greatly 
simplify his task if he pretends that certain properties are 'essential' for de$nition. 
But he would have to do just that—pretend—since the names of taxa cannot be 
de$ned in terms of essential characters without falsi$cation on a scale which should 
have been evident even to the most uncritical investigator with only a limited 
knowledge of the organisms being classi$ed. (1965a, p.316) 
Two features are of note.  First, Hull’s claim is about scienti$c methodology and thus targets 
essentialism as a methodological thesis, not an ontological or metaphysical one.  Second, Hull 
targets even more speci$cally the version of essentialism that identi$es essences with intrinsic 
physical properties.  
  Understanding the appropriate scope of this Darwinian anti-essentialist argument 
requires identifying three versions of essentialism: 
!e Ontological Claim that (at least some) natural types are governed by a 
principle that uni$es the many components of that thing.  #is unifying principle 
makes the thing what-it-is. 
!e Semantic Claim that the de$nition of a thing is an account of its essential 
properties. 
!e Methodological Claim that the aim of science is knowledge of de$nitions 
(essences). 
At issue are the semantic and methodological claims, which can be lumped together for 
present purposes.  Hull’s point is that, as scienti$c methodology, de$ning species and 
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61 Not only that but it differs from cell to cell within an organism! 
62 Hodge and Radick (2009) remind us of Dewey’s similar proclamation, nearly 50 years earlier, that 
Darwin’s theory had ended the 2000 year reign of fixidity and perfection over change and origin.  
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searching for de$nitions cannot proceed by looking for intrinsic physical essences, since the 
physical properties of biological objects are by their very nature heterogeneous.   
Recall that for Aristotle a de$nition is a statement of essential properties.  In this context, 
essential properties are contrasted with accidental ones.  Essential properties should be part of 
a scienti$c de$nition, accidental ones should not.  Are ‘essential properties’ in the context of 
the semantic and methodological claims the same as the ‘essence’ in the sense of the 
ontological claim? Interpreters have wondered whether Aristotle has the same account of 
essence in mind for these epistemic issues as he did when making more metaphysically-
loaded claims.  It is unclear.  It is certainly the case that Aristotle will not have separated 
ontological and epistemic issues, the way a post-Kantian philosopher should.  But Hull was 
savy.  He asks us to forget about the term ‘essence’ and focus instead on the methodological 
point about science:  
Disregarding all the talk about essences, what Aristotle was advocating in modern 
terms is de$nition by properties connected conjunctively which are severally 
necessary and jointly su)cient … Such a mode of de$nition is eminently suited for 
de$ning eternal Forms.  It is not very well suited for de$ning the names of evolving 
species or for ‘species’ itself, and yet it is exactly this mode of de$nition which has 
been assumed to be the only mode of de$nition permissible until recently. (1965a, 
p.318) 
Hull is targeting not essentialism (understood as the Ontological claim) but the Semantic and 
Methodological essentialisms, speci$cally Aristotle’s versions of these claims.  Hull hits his 
mark.  When it comes to classi$cation in biology, strict essentialism will not do. 
#at Aristotelian de$nition is ill suited for biological classi$cation should be clear.  But 
modern applications of Hull take the argument to extend to essentialism as an ontological 
thesis.  #is is possible, but, even still, only essentialisms committed to intrinsic physical 
property sets are at risk.  It is worth looking brie/y at this assumed link between ontology and 
methodology 
Suppose we claim, as a neo-Aristotelian might, that a natural scienti$c classi$cation should 
result in categories re/ecting sets of necessary and jointly su)cient physical properties.  We 
might be interpreted as simultaneously making an assumption about the objects being 
de$ned: We are assuming that those objects are members of their kinds in virtue of those 
properties.  In other words, we might assume that methodology should track ontology.  One 
way of to connect Aristotle’s epistemic account of scienti$c method (de$nition) with his 
ontological account of essence, is to assume that Aristotelian methodology is a consequence of 
Aristotelian ontology.  #e assumption at work here is problematic.  Recall that, in this thesis, 
the relationship between natural kinds and scienti$c practice is an open question (Q3).  #e 
link cannot be assumed.  In order to establish a link from what-there-is to what scientists 
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should treat there as being, we need to know a lot about the suitability of natural kinds for 
scienti$c inquiry.  I will return to this in the next chapter. 
For now, even if there was a good link from ontology to epistemology, then Hull’s critique 
of essentialist method has implications only for ontological essentialisms committed to 
intrinsic property sets.  #e failure of Aristotelian methodology might be thought to re/ect 
the deeper fact that biological categories do not admit neat sets of necessary and jointly 
su)cient physical properties.  #is is intrinsic heterogeneity.  #is mode of argument is $ne 
only insofar as the ontological essentialism targeted shares with its methodological 
counterpart a theory of what essences are.   
Hull has assumed essences to be sets of intrinsic physical properties.  We can safely 
conclude that neither methodological nor ontological essentialism about these types of 
essences is viable.  But this does not tell us anything about the more general essentialist claim 
that objects are members of their kinds in virtue of some essence.  While Hull’s criticism is 
valuable in eliminating one speci$c view of essences, it should not be taken to support a more 
general anti-essentialist consensus.  #ere are views of essence on o%er that do not require 
necessary and su)cient property sets, and so do not run afoul of intrinsic heterogeneity.  
Some of the new biological essentialists have sought essences outside of the list of intrinsic 
physical properties.  Various forms of relations, histories, and phylogenies can $ll the role of 
essence without being liable to Darwinian variation. 
However, there is still an option for the anti-essentialist.  Even if property sets are not 
themselves essences, they are still causally guaranteed by the presence of the underlying 
essence—or so one interpretation of essentialism claims.  If this were true, of course, then a 
shared essence would entail shared property sets.  Once again, Darwinian theory would 
remind us that this is untenable.  It is to this presumed link between essences and properties 
that I now turn. 
2.2 Essence as Explanation 
A common assumption within contemporary discussions of essentialism is that essences 
must be explanatory of the properties of members of the kind.  Call this the ‘Essence-
Properties Principle’ (EPP).  Notice that EPP just is the claim that essences are causally 
responsible for the characteristic properties of a kind, since the sort of explanation required 
here is a causal one.63   #e position is popular.64  Even philosophers who /aunt the anti-
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63 Locke held something like the EPP.  He followed an Aristotelian account of essence as that which 
makes something ‘what it is’, but believed also that the properties of a thing depending on its essence: 
‘thus the real internal, but generally … unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable 
Qualities depend, may be called their Essence’ (III.iii.15).  Later on, however, Locke intimates that the 
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essentialist consensus nevertheless subscribe to versions of EPP (e.g. Devitt 2008, Gri)ths 
1999, Okasha 2002).  Proponents and opponents of essentialism reject theories of natural 
kinds on the grounds that they do not meet EPP (e.g. Ereshefsky 2010a, Slater 2009, Lewens 
2012).  #ey are right, of course, that these essences o,en fail to be explanatory, however the 
principle on which these criticisms depend, EPP, is unmotivated by ontological essentialism.   
Nothing about essentialism requires EPP.  If EPP is included as part of essentialism, it 
quickly collapses into the claim (above) that essences are intrinsic property sets.  If EPP is 
motivated by any version of essentialism at all then it is from epistemic versions of the claim, 
likely having crept in from the induction-focussed tradition of natural kinds.  A recent 
essentialist theory of biological species o%ered by Michael Devitt (2010) demonstrates 
precisely this type of account, but in the end fails to serve as either a scienti$c tool or an 
ontological theory. 
Causal links between essences and properties are doubly problematic in biological 
contexts.  First, such a link entails the existence of shared property sets.  If every member 
shares an essence and if those essences cause some set of properties, then all members share a 
set of properties.  As just discussed, few things in biology perfectly share sets of physical 
properties.  Second, causation in biological contexts is always highly contingent.  #ough we 
frequently specify relations of biological cause and e%ect, we tacitly know that these are 
subject to the presence of certain background conditions.  A certain combination of 
hereditary materials might be thought essential to tigers, given that it makes an organism look 
like a tiger, but this causal relationship holds only in the presence of life-supporting 
environmental conditions, adequate nutrition, and the absence of certain other genetic 
mutations.  So either the essence does not always produce the property set, or we roll the 
supporting conditions into the essence such that it does.  Neither option is attractive to the 
essentialist.   
But is an essentialist necessarily committed to EPP?  Essentialism is the claim: ‘particulars 
form kinds in virtue of shared essences’.  Nothing about this claim commits the essentialist to 
the further view that those essences are causally responsible for properties characteristic of the 
kind.  #e causal claim follows only if we add the extra belief that part of being a kind (part of 
the ‘what-it-is’) is having some set of shared properties.  However this addition robs the 
essence of its purpose, making the properties essential, too.  #e following example illustrates 
this point.  
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connection between essence and properties is simply assumed necessary or causal, given the frequent 
concurrence of those properties (II.xxiii.3). 
64 According to Hacking’s history of natural kinds (1991), the EPP (my term not his) is part of  the 
natural kinds of both Peirce and Leibnitz.  A watered-down version is endorsed by Russell.   
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Many theories of kinds claim that a molecule of gold is what-it-is in virtue of the atomic 
number 79.  #eories with EPP add that this atomic number should be causally responsible 
for the properties of gold, such as its ductility, malleability, and colour.  But notice that this 
rests on the further assumption that part of being gold is having the right set of properties.  If 
this assumption were not in place, it would not be necessary for the atomic structure to cause 
the physical properties.  #is assumption robs the essence of its primary function, such that it 
is now no longer the case that the essence makes something what-it-is.  Atoms need atomic 
essences plus the set of characteristic physical properties caused by them.  #e properties very 
quickly become parts of the essence, at which point we are back at the $rst anti-essentialist 
challenge. 
A better way to view this case is to note that, in this instance, the essential property, which 
happens to be a physical property, bears some causal relations to other physical properties.  
#ere is no need to assume the causal relation necessary.  It may be viewed as an interesting 
rather than constitutive feature of the kind-membership relation.  It is interesting that 
physico-chemical kinds have this feature while biological kinds do not.   
With EPP so easily revealed as unmotivated, the question remains as to its origin.  If I may 
speculate, EPP likely crept in from theories of kinds aimed at induction, since the addition of 
EPP strengthens the epistemic justi$catory status of knowledge of kind membership.  #is 
move, and its /aws, is exempli$ed in recent work by Michael Devitt (2008, 2010).   
Devitt claims that philosophers and scientists assume kind membership to be ‘explanatory’ 
rather than merely ‘informative’.  For Devitt, explanation is a causal account, while 
informativeness is a weaker epistemic justi$cation.  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
membership in an induction-supporting kind should be indicative of the presence of certain 
shared properties.  Members of the kind tiger are likely to be stripped, ferocious, etc.  We 
know this because these properties tend to cluster together.  If induction-supporting kind 
membership is indicative in this way, then knowledge of kind membership can be seen as a 
justi$cation of inductions about the kind.  We are justi$ed in assuming that future tigers will 
have stripes because most members of tiger observed until now will have stripes (or because 
stipes tend to co-occur with other properties of tigers, for HPC).  #is is the ‘informative’ role 
of kind membership.  But Devitt is not happy with kind membership merely justifying 
inductions; he wants it to explain them.  Kind membership can only be explanatory, according 
to Devitt, if members of kinds have essences that causally guarantee the presence of the traits 
over which we want inductions to range.   
#e latest molecular biology tells us that tiger stripes owe to the possession of an activator-
inhibitor pair of proteins, which act in a speci$c pattern of alternation during the 
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pigmentation of fur.  Devitt is therefore committed to the claim that these are parts of the 
essence.  It is partly in virtue of having stripes that tigers are tigers, and so it is partly in virtue 
of having the genetic machinery for making stripes that tigers are tigers.  If it were not, then 
we could not know that membership in tiger explains the presence of stripes.  It is implicit in 
Devitt’s argument that if it were not partly in virtue of having stripes that tigers were tigers, 
then we would not make inductions about stripes.   
What Devitt has done is to unpack the syllogism behind induction.  We do not predict that 
future tigers will have stripes because they will be tigers; we so predict because these future 
tigers will have the machinery for making stripes.  Notice however that Devitt has brought us 
to the same point as the misguided intuitive argument above.  He has simply de$ned as 
‘essential’ all of those properties we take as typical of a kind.  He has also de$ned as essential 
all of the machinery required for making those properties.  He has done this only so that 
inductions ranging over typical properties will count as ‘explanations’ rather than 
‘indications’.  #is burden is too much and the reward is unneeded.  If Devitt is truly 
committed to the full explanation of all traits of kind members, then his essences will swell to 
enormous size.   
Devitt has not supplied an explanation as to why tigers will have stripe-making machinery.  
#e answer: ‘because they’re tigers!’, will not su)ce, by his own logic.  #e protein explanation 
is proximate, not ultimate.  As a result, he will have to admit that the evolutionary history 
behind activator-inhibitor proteins is also part of the tiger essence, along with any other 
historical and physical machinery necessary for the presence of activator-inhibitor proteins.  
And this is only for one trait.  Devitt is tumbling down a slope.  Absent a way to limit the 
sense or scope of requisite explanation, the essence very quickly becomes the entire array of 
physical and non-physical facts required to explain typical features of the kind.  #e essence is 
nearly everything.  
Inductions ranging over well-formed kinds work, and Devitt seeks an account of why this 
is so.  His account must ground the success of explanations in real features of the world that 
make the inductions true.  #is requires explaining the reliable recurrence of the 
traits/properties involved in inductions.  Since this reliability consists in a large range of causal 
relationships, essences become now long, unwieldy and unconstrained conjunctions.  Devitt’s 
essentialism e%ectively becomes the claim that things are what they are in virtue of themselves 
and the world.  #is would make essentialism virtually meaningless.  It is for this reason that 
Devitt’s view has been dismissed as ‘too bland to be of interest’ (Lewens 2012).   
Devitt’s goal of grounding inductions can be met with far less metaphysical baggage, since 
his theory is in many ways a metaphysically-loaded version of HPC.  HPC is explicitly 
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epistemic.  On that view, a cluster of properties does not make something what-it-is; their role 
is epistemic, not metaphysical.  Property clusters are independently existing things in the 
world that humans latch onto in order to form categories for induction.  #e causal structures 
that maintain these property clusters are objective, but they need not be ‘essences’ in order to 
do so.  Property clusters and homeostatic mechanisms do not bestow identity or kind 
membership.  We do that (for HPCs).  It is hard to see what the extra baggage of ‘essence’ adds 
to this discussion. 
Ereshefsky (2010a) o%ers a similar criticism, noticing that Devitt’s essentialism clashes 
with biological practice.  He agrees with Devitt that biologists cite many intrinsic properties 
and causal relationships in order to explain the success of various projective inferences, but 
wonders why it is necessary to call these things ‘essential’.  Practicing biologists do no such 
thing.  Devitt’s view takes the induction-supporting kind tradition, which stands very well on 
its own, and supplements it unnecessarily with a metaphysical account of explanatory 
essences.   
2.3 Eternal and Unchanging Kinds 
#e $nal claim about the Darwinian overthrow of essentialism is present to some degree in 
Hull (1965a, 1965b) and Mayr’s (1976) 20th century accounts, but was in fact developed much 
earlier by John Dewey (1910).  In 1909 Dewey delivered a lecture on the in/uence of 
Darwinism on philosophy, published one year later.  He began by claiming that ‘the 
combination of the very words ‘origin’ and ‘species’ embodied an intellectual revolt and 
introduced a new intellectual temper’ (p.1).  Dewey saw Darwinian theory as overthrowing 
the out-dated view of a world constituted by eternal and unchanging forms.  He credited this 
idea, rather broadly, to ‘#e Greeks’, and praised its demise:  
#e conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for 
two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the 
mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the $xed and $nal; they rested 
upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality.  In laying hands 
upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been 
regarded as types of $xity and perfection as originating and passing away, the 
‘Origin of Species’ introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to 
transform he logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and 
religion. (1910, p.1) 
Dewey challenged the standard narrative about the acceptance of Darwinism, which focused 
on the clash between evolution and religion.  Instead, the clash was between $xity and /ux—
Parmenides versus Heraclitus all over again.   
A similar version of this criticism has strong connections to the $rst anti-essentialist claim 
(2.1).  Consider the following, from Ruse (1987), 
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Evolution says you can take virtually any property you like, and if you go back (or 
forwards) enough in time then ancestors (descendants) did not (will not) have it … 
this is just what Aristotle [essentialism] cannot handle. (229) 
Like Dewey, Ruse identi$es a clash between the Greek worldview of $xity and a Darwinian 
biological worldview of /ux.   
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that Dewey’s historiography is questionable (Hodge 
& Radick 2009).  Few in the time of Darwin held the Greek ontology that his theory 
challenged.  Even among ‘#e Greeks’ a diversity of views were held, some of which were 
compatible with Darwinian theory.   
Popular or not, however, Parmenidian ontology was indeed challenged by !e Origin.  Yet 
such an ontology of $xity is in no way a consequence of essentialism.  Aristotle’s essences were 
unchanging.  #e essence of a horse is the same now as it was in Aristotle’s time and the same 
as it will be 2000 years hence.  Yet this is not a property of the essence itself but a postulate 
based on Aristotle’s general cosmology.  Aristotle believed that the universe and everything in 
it had always existed.  Continual existence is a form of perfection and the universe, on this 
view, is perfect.  Fixity is a feature of the divine perfect superlunary sphere.  Sublunary 
material beings (like horses) are imperfect insofar as they are subject to generation and decay, 
but approximate the perfection of the superlunary by reproducing perfectly, generation a,er 
next.  #is allows animate objects on earth to obtain some perfection (by being members of 
unchanging kinds) while admitting of some obvious imperfections (namely dying).  Organic 
bodies die but the essential souls remain the same from parent to o%spring.  A similar focus 
on $xity can be found in Plato, who held that objects are what they are in relation to the 
Forms, which were unchanging and eternal.   
#ese Greek views are untenable in light of Darwinian theory.  Both lines of thought may 
have been compatible with the variation in traits required for evolution (perhaps an 
Aristotelian could admit change in ‘accidental’ properties of a kind), but Parmenidian 
ontology is incompatible with evolution itself, which tells us kinds change, that new kinds 
arise, and that old kinds die o%.  Interesting though this is, it is in no way a problem for 
essentialism more generally.  #at some early essentialists happened to also hold these ideas 
about eternal perfection should not count against essentialism.  #is line of argument is 
however a useful reminder that nature’s joints appear to change and also to come into and out 
of existence.  A theory of kinds must make sense of this. 
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65 Dewey lumped Aristotle and Plato together.  Both emphasized perfection but in entirely different 
ways.  Regardless, Dewey was correct to the extent that both Greeks presumed the things in the world 
to be unchanging.  It is this belief that was overthrown by Darwin—though few people held it by that 
time, anyhow.  For details, see Hodge & Radick (2009).   
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3. What is Essentialism for?  
#ere is one potentially ‘spooky’ power of essences le,: their ability to make things what-
they-are.  Recall that essences can be presented as the logical consequence of assuming that at 
least some things have their identities independently of human cognition.  Within this 
framework it would seem that some feature of those things or the world must make the things 
what-they-are, since we are assuming that it is the world, not us, that makes them what-they-
are.  #e question is how to understand this ability to ‘make’ something what-it-is.   
One available interpretation treats this as a causal claim: essences ‘make’ things what-they-
are in a causal sense.  A related interpretation is modal in nature: #e essence of a thing makes 
it necessary that the thing is a member of the kind of thing that it is.  Perhaps these causal or 
modal powers of essences lie behind some of the o%-putting metaphysical baggage that 
o%ends certain philosophers of biology.66  If so, it is needless; for I do not think that 
problematic versions of the causal or modal interpretation need to be adopted.67   
Part of the problem is the rei$cation of kinds required for these claims.  #ey treat the 
natural kind as an object or a property, something into which a particular can be transformed, 
or something that can be added to the particular.  Some undesirable consequences follow 
from rei$cation.  Most notably, we must then ask a,er the ontological status of the kind itself.  
Is it an object, property, individual, Platonic Form, independently existing universal, or 
something else?  #ese debates have been sampled and I have no interest in re-starting them.68  
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66 I will treat the causal and modal claims as the same, since what I am interested in is the idea that the 
essence performs some action on the object. 
67 A prominent school of thought interprets ‘essence’ as a modal operator, believing that essences 
render things members of their kinds in all possible worlds in which that thing possesses that essence.  
This is often associated with Kripke (1972, 1980) and Wiggins (1980), among others.  Applied to 
discussions of natural kinds and classification, this modal essentialism is either (i) too crazy to believe, 
or (ii) trivial.  (i) Some things do seem to change their kinds.  A molecule with 8 protons is a member 
of the kind ‘Oxygen’.  In all possible worlds this holds.  But, as any science nerd will tell you, we can 
take this Oxygen molecule and spin it around under Switzerland and France until it loses a proton and 
becomes Nitrogen.  It looks an awful lot like this molecule has changed kinds and thus modal 
essentialism is false.  On the other hand, (ii) one might try to claim that the Oxygen molecule ceased to 
exist and that a new molecule of the kind Nitrogen arose like a phoenix from the ashes.  If this is the 
case then the position seems a trivial addition to essentialism as we already have it.  This addition 
requires only that we re-think our theories of object persistence, tying them to kind membership.  
Weird as this thesis would be, it would not affect anyone’s claims about what is or is not a natural kind, 
or whether the world contains natural kinds.   
68 There are many philosophers who indeed view natural kinds as universals.  Hawley & Bird (2011) 
argue that instantiation of shared properties unifies particulars and that this brings into existence a 
universal, which is the natural kind.  Lowe (2006) treats natural kinds as ‘substantial’ universals, which 
are a fundamental ontological category, separate from particular objects or their properties.  Particulars 
instantiate kinds and exemplify properties.  Views such as these assume and characterize rather than 
establish the existence of universals.  I view these approaches as too ontologically-loaded, for this 
reason.  It is not clear at any rate that these discussions of kinds are worried about the sorts of 
classificatory issues that concern philosophers of biology. 
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In fact it was this type of failed and seemingly fruitless enquiry that frustrated Ghiselin and 
Hull into forwarding the species as individuals hypothesis.   
It may seem that rei$cation is the only route to realism about natural kinds, but that is not 
so.  Consider the alternative.  Kinds are groups; they are special sorts of groups but they are 
groups nonetheless.  Groups are things that minds recognize.69  In this sense they exist only in 
cognition.  Does that mean they are all non-natural, mind-dependent?  No.  We can admit 
that the group does not exist as a singular thing or attribute in nature without thereby falling 
into nihilism or conventionalism.  Naturalism can come from facts about the grouping.  If the 
objects really go together, naturally, then we might have natural kinds.  If they go together 
only from our perspective or according to some interests then they are probably not natural 
kinds.  Essentialist theories of natural kinds are simply theories about what it means to ‘really 
go together, naturally’.  Adding some additional invisible metaphysical netting surrounding 
the group does nothing but engender confusion and invite criticism. 
Even non-natural kinds admit of essences.  All things are made what-they-are in virtue of 
something.  #e more interesting question is the nature of that something.  Kinds like 
clothing, currency, and other artefacts are what-they-are in virtue of humans’ attitudes, 
designs, reference, and uses.  Since this fact about the world is quite obviously not mind 
independent, we would not want to call these things natural kinds.  But we would not allow 
that to stop us from saying that something (or sets of things) makes them what they are.70  #e 
interesting feature about natural kinds is that their essences are such that they are human-
independent, even if we need human perception to recognize them and human language to 
talk about them.   
In sum, essentialism is at base a rather simple notion.  It does not entail that things have 
lists of necessary and su)cient properties; it does not require that essences explain the 
characteristic properties of a kind; and it does not require that we adopt Parmenidian 
cosmology.  Essentialism is simply the claim that, if there are kinds in the world, objects are 
members of their kinds in virtue of some shared essence.  Any further claims about what 
essences are or how they operate are the creation of speci$c natural kind theorists and their 
critics. 
I hope to have dissuaded the reader from expecting that essences do many of the weird and 
wonderful things o,en claimed of them, for these expectations are unmotivated by 
essentialism itself and it is these expectations that render the position problematic.  #e role of 
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69 It seems that the argument can also be run where kinds are viewed as types.  One needn’t worry 
whether a type is an independently existing universal.  One need only worry whether the type is out 
there in nature to be discovered or whether it is being imposed on nature by human minds with 
specific interests.   
70 Perhaps some would not want to call that an ‘essence’ but that is a semantic dispute. 
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essences in my discussions of natural kinds will not be explanatory or causal or anything like 
that.  I look at essences because looking at essences is looking at kinds.  With theories of kinds 
back in view, thinking about the nature of essences provides some insight into the types of 
kinds at work, and into the features of those kinds.  In the next chapter, I will begin to 
describe a distinction between biological kinds and physico-chemical kinds.  #e di%erence 
manifests as a di%erence in types of essence.  Where physico-chemical kinds have at their core 
a physical structure, biological kinds have at their core a Darwinian history.  #e biological 
world is di%erent from the chemical world because the essences of biological kinds are of a 
fundamentally di%erent sort than those of physico-chemical kinds.  #is raises a host of 
interesting questions about the unity of the world as a whole, and the internal unity of 
biological things and physico-chemical things.  
#ese questions involve monism and pluralism.  Philosophers of biology and philosophers 
of physics and chemistry are divided on these issues.  #e former largely preferring pluralism, 
the latter largely preferring monism.  Before these issues can be assessed, some clarity must be 
brought to the meanings of the central terms in the debate.  It is to monism and pluralism that 
I now turn. 
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3 
Carving Monism at the Joints  
& Introducing Kind Historicism 
In this chapter I will introduce Kind Historicism, but in order to do so I must #rst 
introduce a distinction concerning types of monism and pluralism.  Kind Historicism is a 
pluralist account insofar as it does not exclude other categories of natural kinds.  However it is 
not (necessarily) pluralist in the sense of supporting multiple non-translatable taxonomies of 
natural kinds, which is how ‘pluralism’ about natural kinds is generally used.  $e distinction 
should be helpful in its own right, and will help situate Kind Historicism with respect to other 
perspectives on natural kinds.  
‘Monism’ can mean di%erent things to di%erent people, but for the purposes of this 
discussion it is chie&y a claim about metaphysics and ontology.71  Some philosophers of 
science have taken to using the terms ‘monism’ and ‘pluralism’ to describe states of epistemic 
scienti#c practice, as in Beatty’s (1994) ‘theoretical pluralism’, de#ned in the introduction.  In 
this chapter, however, these terms will always refer to metaphysical or ontological theses, 
unless otherwise stated.  $e metaphysical reading of monism sets to one-side questions about 
classi#cation as a scienti#c tool and focuses on questions about the metaphysics of natural 
kinds.  Ruphy’s (2010) characterization is typical:  
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71 Monism as a claim about kinds should not be conflated with monism as a claim about the relations 
between the sciences, which has more to do with (explanatory) reduction.  I call the latter claim the 
‘unity of science’ thesis, to avoid confusion.   
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Metaphysical monism states that there exists some natural order, that is, some 
objective, mind-independent divisions that cut nature at its real joints in a unique 
way.  In other words, the world comes pre-packaged with a unique set of … natural 
kinds. (p. 1116) 
Monism takes a stance on the general constitution of the kinds in the world, believing them to 
be somehow uni#ed or homogenous.  
Philosophers of science will be aware of the staggering number of cases taken to challenge 
or support monism.  Recent discussions have focussed on celestial bodies (Ruphy 2010), 
molecules (Hendry 2006), and proteins (Slater 2009).  $is is not to forget the perennial 
debate: biological species.72  Calls for pluralism take a number of forms.  $e weakest of these 
arguments appeal only to theoretical pluralism.  Philosophers document a plurality of 
successful classi#cation systems in play in a given #eld of enquiry and argue that multiple of 
those systems are natural.  A stronger argument builds on these characterizations by 
suggesting that facts about the objects in question preclude monistic classi#cation and so 
require metaphysical pluralism.  $ere are a number of ways to move from theoretical 
pluralism to metaphysical pluralism.  A di%erent line of argument appeals to intrinsic 
heterogeneity, noting that biological things are importantly di%erent from those of chemistry 
or physics, necessitating a uniquely biological natural kind.  Both lines of thought warrant 
careful consideration; the success of pluralistic taxonomies and the failure of traditional 
accounts of kinds to characterize biology constitute challenges to monism.  However it may be 
clear already that the ‘monism’ being challenged in each of these two cases is not the same.  
$ere are multiple monisms at issue.   
Before the pluralist challenge can be assessed and before its implications can be 
understood, we need to sharpen our conceptual tools and fully characterize monism and 
pluralism.  $is chapter will set out two monisms about classi#cation.  Ruphy’s ‘metaphysical 
monism’, above, evidences the received interpretation, which focuses on the uniqueness of the 
arrangement of kinds.  $is is ‘Taxonomic Monism’.  A second interpretation is also available.  
It focuses not on the number of arrangements of kinds, but on variation in the kind category 
itself.  I call this ‘Category Monism’.  Category Monism is necessary in order to represent cases 
where variance in the kind category is hidden within a single taxonomy.  $is is because, 
tempting though it is to assume that di%erences in the kind category will show up as distinct 
taxonomies, such entailment relations between the two monisms do not in fact exist.  $e #rst 
task of this chapter is to motivate and introduce this distinction, and then show that the two 
monisms are independent.   
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72 See citations in introduction. 
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$e second task of this chapter is to introduce Kind Historicism.  According to Kind 
Historicism, biological kinds are historical kinds.  $at is to say that biological things are 
what-they-are in virtue of their histories, and so the unifying feature of biological kinds, the 
essence, is a shared history.  Historical kinds should describe all biological objects—insofar as 
all have a history.  Biological kinds are categorically distinct from physico-chemical kinds.  
Fundamental heterogeneity thus exists between the physical and biological sciences, in the 
form of categorical di%erences, not necessarily within the biological sciences themselves, in 
the form of taxonomic plurality or indeterminacy.  I will conclude by sketching the 
relationship between historical kinds, intrinsic heterogeneity, and theoretical pluralism.  $is 
will be followed by a brief aside on the relationship between scienti#c realism and 
monism/pluralism in light of my taxonomy/category distinction. 
1. Monism(s) 
Monism and pluralism are ancient and well-travelled positions, applied now to everything 
from science to art to ethics.  What binds all monisms together is that they attribute oneness, 
contrasted with pluralists’ many-ness.  Because ‘monism’ refers to such a great range of 
positions, it is necessary to clearly articulate any given monism by specifying #rst a target of 
the predicate, the thing being counted, and second the unit for counting.  One might thus be 
monist about objects, counting types.  $is is ‘substance monism’, the claim that there is only 
one type of object in the world.  Compare this with pluralism about objects, counting tokens.  
$is is ‘existence pluralism’, the claim that there exists more than one token object.  Notice 
that this pluralist position is entirely compatible with the above monist position.  $ey are 
compatible because they count di%erent units.  Combined, they yield the claim that there is 
only one type of thing, but that there are many instances of this type.  $e point in all of this is 
not to survey the world of ontology and monisms, but to emphasize the importance of clearly 
specifying the target and unit for any monism, classi#catory or otherwise.  Changing either 
unit or target changes the meaning of the ascription.  
For the purpose of target and unit speci#cation, some terminology will be helpful.  Kinds 
begin with things.  $ese things may be ideas, relations, groups, individuals, processes, or 
objects.  $ey are the things to be classi#ed.  Out of convention call these ‘particulars’, but 
notice that they may be singulars or groups thereof.  Particulars get divided into categories.  
$ese are the kinds—call these the ‘kind categories’—which may themselves serve as 
particulars for yet further categorization.  $e sum total of all of the categories, categorising all 
of the particulars, is the ‘taxonomy’ [!g1].  Taxonomies are o,en depicted as hierarchical, 
containing kinds of kinds, but they could be much simpler, containing no superordinate  
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categories.  $is all holds true whether we are discussing natural kinds or simply human 
practices of classi#cation. 
Discussions of monism/pluralism oscillate between two di%erent targets, with 
correspondingly di%erent units.  Some discussions call for an examination of taxonomies, 
counting their number; others call for examination of kinds, counting types.  $ese are the 
two readings of monism/pluralism that I will distinguish.  $e former has implications for the 
uniqueness of the identities of particulars; the latter has implications for metaphysical 
interpretations of theoretical pluralism.  It is all too easy to erroneously run the two together. 
1.1 Taxonomic Monism and its Limitations 
$e received interpretation of classi#catory monism targets the taxonomy, counting by 
token.  $is is ‘Taxonomic Monism’: 
 Taxonomic Monism (TM): !ere is a single unique taxonomy 
 Taxonomic Pluralism (TP): !ere is more than one distinct taxonomy 
A token taxonomy is, admittedly, an unfamiliar notion.  Focus at the taxonomic level is on the 
number of distinct arrangements of particulars into kinds.  Two taxonomies are distinct if 
they are non-translatable.  Distinct taxonomies may have di%erent token kind categories, 
di%erent particulars in the same categories, the same particulars in di%erent categories, and so 
on.  Many di%erences can make for a plurality of taxonomies.  Perhaps this is o,en di-cult to 
determine, but the actual determination of TP or TM (or any monism) is an epistemic 
concern and thus not my own.  $e core of TM is that there is a single, unique, best, or most 
natural arrangement of particulars into kinds.  Sometimes this is articulated as the claim that, 
among many possible arrangements, one is privileged.  Other times, this comes through as the 
fig1: The Units of Taxonomy
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claim that the world’s kinds have a unique or de#nite structure.  TM is the interpretation 
behind Ruphy’s ‘metaphysical monism’, quoted above. 
One reason for interest in TM is its promise of a real sense in which science can get its 
classi#cations right … or wrong.  $is claim is bound up with the objectivity of science, and is 
o,en seen as a requirement for scienti#c realism.  I will return to this shortly.   
Besides taxonomies, oneness and manyness can occur at any level of kind classi#cation.  
Monism targeting particulars receives attention under the banners of existence and category 
monisms, noted above.  For kinds these positions are uninteresting.  $is leaves only the kind 
categories themselves.  Counting token kind categories is possible but trivially unhelpful.  
Unless there is only one natural kind, we expect a plurality of token natural kind groups.  
Counting category types, however, allows us to describe similarity and di%erence in the 
world’s kinds in a manner quite di%erent from that permitted by TM.  Not only do we want to 
know whether there is a single taxonomy, we also need to know if there is one type of kind 
category.   
It may seem at #rst glance that di%erent kinds make di%erent taxonomies, but this is not 
necessarily the case.  I will shortly show how the relations between the two monisms are in 
fact not so simple.  First, to introduce this position and illustrate the need for a second 
monism targeting the kind category, consider the following illustrative tale: 
A classic image in discussions of classi#cation and kinds is that of an ontological butcher 
‘carving’ nature at its joints.73  Gruesome as it may be the image is helpful, for it drives the TM 
reading of monism.  Instead of a butcher, however, I will talk about an ‘ontological anatomist’ 
which is both more apt and easier to stomach.  
$e ontological anatomist spends her days carving at joints.  Using major joints as her 
guide, she discerns that the thigh and the rump go together; as do the shin, calf, and foot; and 
the same goes for the breast, rib, and loin.  $ese are three large categories; but the anatomist 
can do better than this.  She is familiar with the most nuanced of cuts, capable of #nding the 
smallest of joints.  If required, she can carve at the joints of the foot, neck, or hand.  However 
#ne a grain of carving required, the subject admits of a (#nite) hierarchy of natural categories, 
marked by joints.  But no matter how many times she wields her knife the resulting 
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73 This image comes from Plato’s Phaedrus.  Socrates claims that the world comes divided into parts 
and that a good interlocutor ‘is able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, 
and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.’ (265E).  Socrates and Phaedrus are 
speaking here of love and rhetoric—specifically the fact that one must be conceptually clear in dialogue 
and that the language we use should map to the structure of nature.  Nevertheless, the general idea that 
the world is pre-divided has obvious carry-over to discussions of natural kinds.  A certain class of 
discussions about essence and reference in metaphysics and philosophy of language retains some 
affinity to Plato’s original discussion.  These are different from the essentialism in this thesis.  See 
Chapter 2. 
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arrangement is the same.  It is a uniquely natural arrangement.  Our anatomist believes 
Nature to be monistic.  $is is TM. 
Suppose that a new ontological anatomist arrives on the scene, carving not at the joints but 
at points where his knife cuts through smoothly, adopting an apparently pragmatic approach 
to his work.  Sometimes he happens to carve at the meeting of two bones, other times not.  
But he is not bothered.  He insists that nature has marked its kinds in many ways and that we 
would be foolish to privilege joints over changes in tissue type, cartilaginous fusions of bone, 
bone density changes, and so on.  $ese are all excellent natural places to carve.  Any point of 
physical di%erence is apt to be separated by his knife—if sharp enough—and the particular 
points he happens to pry depend on his needs, interests, and desires.  Any and all of his 
carvings, he explains, will yield workable natural classi#cations.  Each time he wields his knife 
the resulting arrangement may be distinct from the last.  All of these may be equally natural.  
He believes Nature to be pluralistic.  $is is TP.  
For the old anatomist, qua taxonomic monist, what makes the upstart so objectionable is 
that, in his lab, there is no uniquely correct answer to the question: ‘to which category does 
this piece belong?’  $e answer will be: ‘it depends on my needs at the time of carving’.  He 
does not believe that any one of these carvings is privileged. 
But the anatomists do not just disagree about numbers of taxonomies; their taxonomic 
dispute is just one corner of a more substantive disagreement.  $ey have very di%erent ideas 
of how to do their jobs because they fundamentally disagree about Mother Nature’s joints 
(kind categories).  While the old anatomist believes there is only one type of joint in Nature, 
the upstart disagrees.  He believes there to be many.   
Does this disagreement impact our ascriptions of ‘monism’ or ‘pluralism’?  $e category 
dispute is hardly ine%ectual, for it undergirds di%erences at the taxonomic level.  $eir 
respective views on Nature’s categories cause the old anatomist to carve one taxonomy and the 
upstart to carve many.  E-cacious as it may be, however, divergence in views about Nature’s 
categories perhaps seem incidental from the standpoint of the monist if we think that oneness 
or many-ness about Nature’s categories will show up at the taxonomic level, as in this case.  
$is is very o,en the case in scienti#c disputes, where di%erent conceptions of the kind 
category turn out to be driving competing taxonomies.  Sometimes these are disagreements 
about how Nature marks her joints; other times they are disagreements about the entailments 
and requirements of kind membership.  Regardless, when we say in these cases that the 
science is ‘pluralist’, based on taxonomic di%erences, we are in e%ect also capturing any 
additional disagreements about kind categories.  One might thus think that a stance on 
Nature’s joints just is a unique taxonomy.  For even if the upstart had just one idea of Nature’s 
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joints (rather than many) he still would have come up with a di%erent taxonomy from the old 
anatomist so long as their conception of nature’s joints were not the same.  $ere is an 
apparent dependence of taxonomies on kind categories.  
$is dependence appears to gain support when we consider cases of identical taxonomies 
resulting from (apparently) di%erent conceptions of Nature’s joints.  To really stretch the 
metaphor, suppose one anatomist believed nature to have marked her joints using axes of 
movement, while the other focussed on &uid-#lled synovial capsules.  $ese di%erent 
conceptions nonetheless produce inter-translatable taxonomies, and thus a verdict of TM.  
And yet this monist verdict seems appropriate, for shared taxonomies reveal that di%erence in 
the two conceptions was super#cial (anatomically, axes of movement are &uid-#lled synovial 
capsules).  Sameness or di%erence at the taxonomic level seems to trump sameness or 
di%erence at the level of kind categories.  
It really does appear that taxonomic output is determined by and thus tied to a conception 
of Nature’s categories.  It looks as though di%erences in categories just are taxonomic 
di%erences—and thus captured by TM/TP.  But looks can be deceiving.  Consider a postscript:   
$e old anatomist, frustrated by the young upstart, consults Mother Nature.  Nature 
con#rms that the upstart was indeed mistaken, but so too was the old anatomist.  Nature’s 
categories are anatomical, marked using joints in the way supposed; but this only holds true 
for musculoskeletal pieces.  In the brain and central nervous system, Nature explains, kinds 
are not anatomical, but functional.74  $ese kinds are accordingly marked not by joints, but 
with a capacity for function.  Nature, it turns out, has more than one sort of category.  
Is Nature monistic?  $e taxonomic interpretation seems to misjudge.  $ough Nature has 
two types of kind category, they are relativized, each occurring in a circumscribed domain.  
$is means that there exists a uniquely natural taxonomy, and so for any given particular 
there is a unique answer to the question: ‘to which category does this thing belong?  From the 
taxonomic standpoint we must conclude that nature is monistic.  Surely this misses 
something. 
‘Monism’ and ‘pluralism’ are supposed to capture something about the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the world.  Here, Nature has revealed herself to be heterogeneous in an 
important respect: ‘Kind’ is not one thing, but two.  $ere are two di%erent sorts of kinds, one 
structural, one functional, which come with di%erent conditions for and entailments of 
membership.  $is is di%erent from a case where Nature has just one type of category, as in the 
old anatomist’s original position; but TM and TP lack the resources to characterize this 
di%erence.  $e singular label, ‘monism’, hides underlying pluralism.  While multiplicity in 
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74 To be clear, I am not advocating any of these accounts of kinds.  It’s a story. 
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types of kind categories may seem incidental when it happens to line up with plurality of 
taxonomies, it seems much more important to recognize when concealed underneath a single 
taxonomic structure.  We need a monism/pluralism targeting kind categories. 
1.2 Category Monism 
TM cannot capture all of the relevant information in the above cases.  My point is not that 
TM is an irrelevant measure; just that it is an insu-cient one.  Category monism and 
pluralism are precisely the sorts of concepts the ontological anatomist needs to make sense of 
her new position.75   
Category Monism (CM): !e world admits of one type of kind category 
Category Pluralism (CP): !e world admits of multiple types of kind category 
Much of this section will be dedicated to articulating CM, focussing on explicating the notion 
of a category type.  
Essences are answers to the question: ‘what makes this object a member of its kind?’.  For 
the old anatomist an essence is a relation to a joint.  For the novice anatomist there are many 
essences, all marked by some physical di%erence.  Di%erent conceptions of what makes a 
particular a member of its kind drive di%erent conceptions of the kind category.  $e same is 
true in philosophical and scienti#c disputes.  Essential di%erences are the principal ways in 
which philosophical (and scienti#c) stances on the kind category vary.   
$ere is some tacit recognition of the category dimension of monism in the literature, 
albeit generally mixed with observations about scienti#c classi#cation.  In Ruphy’s (2010) 
analysis of celestial classi#cation, for instance, she helpfully insists that we separate arguments 
over particular views about kind membership conditions from ‘the claim that there exists a 
single kind-membership condition (or set of them)’ (p.1114, emphasis mine).  $ough she 
stops short of calling this latter claim ‘monism’ (identifying it instead with essentialism, which 
she takes to entail a taxonomic monism) she is correct to note that debates about the number 
of kind-membership conditions are worth pursuing on their own terms.  
Ruphy is not alone.  In his discussion of biological species, Dupré (2001) may not explicitly 
discuss the kind category itself, but he does give serious weight to considerations of di%erent 
approaches to the science of classi#cation: 
…there is no theoretical grounding for a classi#catory system that will universally or 
even generally provide a practically applicable taxonomy [of biological species], we 
are free to embrace taxonomic pluralism. Approaches to classi#cation will vary from 
one group of organisms to another … In many parts of biology, for example bacteria 
and many orders of &owering plants, it is doubtful whether any evolutionarily 
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75 To the best of my knowledge this TM/CM distinction is novel, having been introduced separately yet 
simultaneously by Matthew Slater and I.  See his brief distinction between ‘taxic’ and ‘category’ 
pluralism (Slater 2013 Ch. 7) compare to (Bartol 2014).  Slater does not dwell on the distinction. 
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grounded taxonomic scheme will be feasible, and it may be necessary to resort to 
morphology.  (p.209, emphasis mine) 
Dupré calls this TP, which is it, but it is more interestingly also CP.  He is not simply making 
the familiar point that biologists use competing taxonomies.  Rather, he is claiming that 
biologists need di%erent conceptions of species (di%erent conceptions of the kind category) in 
order to make sense of di%erent domains of the biological world.  $is is CP applied to extant 
classi#catory techniques, rather than natural kinds; but the concept is the same.  And since 
Dupré gives descriptive and normative accounts of scienti#c practice a serious role in his 
(de&ated) metaphysics of kinds, it is not a far stretch to turn this CP into a metaphysical 
thesis.  
$ere are two ways to read the implications of this claim: (1) $ere are multiple 
taxonomies, each corresponding to a unique kind category, and some of these taxonomies are 
better at representing some domains and worse at representing others; or (2) Di%erent 
domains feature di%erent kind categories, which are relativized to that domain—and so there 
is one taxonomy (as in [!g3]).  Dupré appears to opt for (1), embracing taxonomic pluralism, 
but (2) is equally compatible with the CP he espouses.  At any rate, this range of possibilities is 
impossible to see with only one concept of monism—the taxonomy/category distinction is at 
the very least useful.  Because conceptual utility is not enough, in the next two sub-sections I 
prove that TM/TP and CM/CP are logically independent.  
CP does not Entail TP. Claims about taxonomies are claims about the order or 
grouping of things in the world.  Claims about categories are claims about the nature of those 
groups.  $ese are di-cult to disentangle, since TP o,en seems to come via CP.  One set of 
particulars wholly sorted into two kinds of kinds would yield two taxonomies.  If every 
particular in a set is subject to every type of kind category, then there will be as many 
taxonomies as there are types of kinds.  In [!g2], for instance, there are two taxonomies of the 
same particulars in virtue of two types of kinds. Dashed lines and di%erent likeness relations 
represent di%erent kind categories.  $is is TP via CP.   
Yet CP can also occur in a taxonomically monistic system.  $is occurs when types of kind 
category are localized to speci#c sub-sets of particulars.  $is was illustrated in the postscript 
about the ontological anatomists, and is also described in the second interpretation of Dupré, 
above.  In [!g3], one set of particulars are classed using two di%erent kind makers in a non-
problematic way.  Some particulars are members of their kinds because of their colour, while 
others are members of their kind in virtue of their geometry.  If this strikes you as prima facie 
implausible, I will come to some examples shortly.  
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fig2: Taxonomic Pluralism in Virtue of Category Pluralism. One set of particulars are wholly sorted 
into two taxonomic arrangements, owing to two different types of kind (shade and shape). 
fig3: Category Pluralism.  One set of particulars are sorted into a single taxonomy, using two 
different types of kind, relativized to specific sub-sets of particulars.  Those with eight sides are 
subject to kinds based on shape, all others are subject to kinds based on shade. 
 
 
$ere is a possible misreading of these #gures, which is instructive.  Both types of kind 
category pictured utilize structural properties to sort their kinds.  Perhaps this di%erence is 
insu-cient to warrant the claim that the world admits a plurality of types of kind categories.  
Perhaps these di%erences are not di%erence enough.  It should become clearer as we proceed, 
however, that more substantive di%erences in kind categories may be possible.  It is 
nonetheless worth highlighting the fact that not just any di%erence would render two kind 
categories fundamentally di%erent.  In these #gures, trivial di%erences like shape and shading 
might be best interpreted as representations of deeper ontological di%erence.  
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TP does not Permit Inference to CP.  $at CP does not entail TP is reason enough not 
to roll the two monisms together.  Yet these cases do not rule out entailment in the opposite 
direction.  It is hard to imagine how plurality of taxonomies could be supported by a single 
type of kind category (TP & CM).  Fortunately, we have already seen a position that may be 
stretched to fit our need: the upstart anatomist. 
Many discussions of kinds begin with the observation that there are numerous divisions in 
the world and that many of these appear to be natural.  In a simpli#ed case, think of these as 
the many different properties that a set of objects possesses.  Similarities and di%erences 
across objects abound.  Monists suppose that it is the job of the natural kind theorist to figure 
out which of these are privileged.   The upstart anatomist disagrees, as you will recall.  He 
thinks that carving along multiple natural properties provides di%erent kind classi#cations 
and that these may be equally natural.  The upstart thus views the world as composed of 
innumerable natural properties, some of which naturally go together to form kind 
classifications, many of which will not cohere with one another, thus comprising distinct 
taxonomic arrangements: TP.76  To get CM, all the upstart needs to do is to claim that only 
one type of kind classification is natural or that only one type of property supports natural 
classi#cations, but that there are many classifications of that type.  Perhaps all and only the 
orthopaedic properties mark kinds.  If so then the multiplicity of such physical properties 
entails TP, but restriction to these properties entails CM. 
1.3 Two Objections to CP 
$ere are two lingering objections to the possibility of CP, which deserve attention.  $e 
#rst asks a,er the nature and degree of di%erence that constitutes a new category.  $e second 
doubts that it is possible for di%erent types of kind category to still qualify as ‘kinds’.  On 
balance, the #rst objection is epistemic, the second semantic.  $ough instructive, neither 
pose serious problems for the metaphysics and ontology of natural kinds. 
A critic may wonder which di%erences, or how much di%erence, constitutes a new type of 
kind category.  Any time we have di%erences in scienti#c classi#cation that look like CP, we 
cannot rule-out that the di%erences are merely artefacts of cognition.  Suppose we were to 
appeal to two domains of science that manifestly require di%erent essences.  Even granting 
that both are describing natural kinds, the critic can still claim that the ontological category 
underneath is in fact uni#ed.  Heterogeneity in the kind category is only apparent, claims the 
critic, perhaps a function of our fallible attempts to classify things into kinds.   
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76 Chakravarrty’s (2011) ‘sociability-based kinds’ provide a full treatment of this sort of position, absent 
the extra claim that gives me CM. 
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There are two worries here: one is scepticism about scienti#c knowledge and the other is a 
more serious worry about the unified/disunfied nature of the kind category.  There is little to 
say about scepticism except to hope that the right mix of science and metaphysics can carry 
the day.  The second worry has more bite.  $is criticism is more easily motivated via 
scienti#c classi#cation, rather than natural kinds.  Consider the various competing 
approaches to biological species.  Any observer must acknowledge that at least some of these 
di%erences are cosmetic, re&ecting fallible attempts to #nd epistemic handles for the same 
underlying kind category. 77   $is is arguably the case with interbreeding and genetic 
approaches to species, which are attempts to cash-out the intuition that species are groups 
that can persist as groups into the future, where the mating of two members does not 
(normally) give rise to particulars of new species.  One might attempt to describe many 
species concepts in such a way that they all come out as di%ering attempts to grapple with 
ostensibly interchangeable notions of what makes a species what-it-is.  Returning to the 
natural kind versions of this objection, it is possible that even a metaphysics of natural kinds 
may fall victim to this sort of accidental consilience of kind categories, masked by super#cial 
di%erences.   
$ere is little to be done to satisfy this objection except acknowledge that distinctions 
between types of kind category are at times murky.  Nevertheless, I insist that starker 
di%erences in kind categories arise when we move beyond singular taxonomic endeavours 
and look across broader domains. In the next section I will claim that the kinds of biological 
world are categorically distinct from those of the physical world.  One type are historical, the 
other are physical.  $ese di%erent kind categories underlie important di%erences between 
their respective kinds.  I leave it to critics to show how historical essences, on the one hand, 
and intrinsic physical essences, on the other, might fail to mark a di%erence in kind category. 
But #rst there is a related objection.  Suppose we agreed that two domains of objects really 
did have fundamentally di%erent kind categories.  A critic might then press for an explanation 
as to why both of these categories are kind categories.  Perhaps one is a kind category and the 
other is something else entirely.  If so, then it would hardly warrant CP.  Playing the critic’s 
game, it is hard to imagine what sort of account would satisfy the demand that we show how 
these are both kind categories that did not also establish that the two types of categories are, in 
some more fundamental way, the same type of kind category a,er all.  Either we admit that 
the two types of category are not both natural kinds, or we run the risk of establishing that 
they are at base the same kind of kind.   
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77 This is the intuition that Whewell pressed in the geological case from Chapter 1.  See (Ruse 1978) 
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I do not think we need to play the critic’s game.  Perhaps we might want to claim that the 
two categories are both kinds, but resist the further claim that both are members of some yet 
more-fundamental singular Natural Kind.  $is resistance would not be without principal, for 
this further claim seems to assume rather than establish category monism.  Alternatively, we 
could admit that only one category is a kind category and the other is kind*.  Call this CM if 
you wish, but the existence of kind* is philosophically signi#cant nonetheless.  It is hard to 
imagine what interesting metaphysical or ontological claims follow from CP that do not also 
follow from the existence of kind and kind*.  $is second objection amounts to little more 
than a semantic dispute. 
2. Biological Kinds are Historical Kinds 
According to the received view, in the world investigated by the physical sciences, when it 
comes to natural kinds, things are what-they-are in virtue of their physical structure.  $e 
canonical kinds of physics and chemistry are united by structural essentialism.  According to 
the account developed in this thesis, this type of kind category does not extend to the 
biological realm, for in biology kinds are determined by long-run interactions between 
particulars, development, and the environment.  Biological kinds are not structural; they are 
historical.   
Structural essentialism is at its best when applied to the paradigm case of natural kinds in 
science: atoms.  It is generally agreed that atoms are all what-they-are in virtue of their unique 
atomic micro-structures (or simply, ‘structures’).78  Similar accounts can scale up to describe 
larger molecules (as I will describe in the next chapter) or down to describe the fundamental 
particles of physics (e.g. Lange 2011).  
For these objects microstructure is essential in the sense defended in Chapter 2.  All other 
properties of a microstructural kind particular can be gained or lost without a%ecting the 
fundamental kind of thing it is.  An atom, for instance, can have a di%erent genesis, location, 
mass79, and it can be bound to di%erent partners, all without changing its kind.  Yet changes to 
atomic structure constitute a change in kind.  An oxygen atom can be part of H2O or CO2.  It 
can originate from fractional distillation or helium fusion.  It can exist on earth or in space.  It 
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78 I am skeptical that microstructuralism should be taken to support the periodic table of elements as a 
natural kind classification.  Surely the periodic table is too coarse, and a taxonomy focusing on nuclides 
or isotopes is more in line with microstructuralism (since one element in the periodic table will 
subsume multiple physically-distinct isotopes/nuclides).  But this thesis is about biology, not 
chemistry, so I will adopt the received view of microstructuralism and the periodic table as the default 
account of natural kinds in chemistry.  At any rate, the change I imagine would constitute an 
amendment to the application of microstructuralism, not a challenge to microstructuralism as a theory 
of non-biological kinds.  See Chapter 4 for more on microstructuralism. 
79 Relativized atomic mass; not relativized isotopic mass. 
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can be stable or transient.  But if it is bombarded with particles and loses a proton then it is no 
longer oxygen, it’s nitrogen.  
Structural essentialisms are a poor #t for biological kinds, owing to intrinsic heterogeneity. 
It is on di%erences in physical traits that evolution acts, and so insofar as evolvability is a 
feature of the biological world, intrinsic heterogeneity is a feature of the biological world.  
Every property of a biological object is the result of complex and highly contingent historical 
processes—interactions between selection and the world.  Because the process occurs 
imperfectly, in di%erent environments with di%erent starting conditions and di%erent 
intervening forces, intrinsic heterogeneity is inevitable. Outside the realm of organisms 
intrinsic heterogeneity is pervasive as well; even cells exhibit considerable structural variation 
within types (Slater 2012).  Increasing intrinsic heterogeneity has recently been proclaimed 
the ‘#rst law’ of biology (Brandon & McShea 2010).  In all of its forms, intrinsic heterogeneity 
is a problem for structural essentialisms.  Structures (and microstructures) are heterogeneous 
and so none are essential.  $is point is at the centre of the anti-essentialist consensus 
(Chapter 2), which is more appropriately viewed as an anti-structural-essentialist consensus.  
No single physical property is shared by all and only members of a biological kind.  Any 
physical characteristic, any genotypic signature, any physiological structure is liable to 
variation.  $e biological world simply does not do uniformity.   
Members of biological kinds do not share structural essences.  $ey do, however, share 
histories.  A history (or a set of historical relations) is the one and only thing that a biological 
kind cannot lose without ceasing to be what-it-is.  Genes can mutate, physiology can change, 
all physical properties are up for grabs; but histories are not.  On this view, when we say that 
two biological particulars are kindred, we cannot claim this relationship on the basis of shared 
properties, however o,en we use physical properties as epistemic handles for such claims.  We 
cannot mean that they are ontogenetically similar, since they may happen to develop in 
divergent ways.  What we mean is that those particulars posses some speci#c type of historical 
relationship—about which I will say more shortly. 
Historical routes through selection, chance, and evolution play a large role in determining 
the existence and nature of present-day biological kinds.  $at chance and evolution furnish 
the world with its current biological kinds should be obvious.  Some biological kinds persist 
through time because they are #t, others because they are lucky.  In addition to a%ecting the 
existence of biological kinds, these historical interactions also a%ect the way the kinds are—
what they are like.  Interactions between kinds and their environment determine the #tness of 
particular variations on that that kind.  Relevant #tness di%erences between variants within a 
kind conspire to shape subsequent generations of particulars of that kind.  Of course selection 
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is not everything.  Many features of biological kinds are retained or lost due to dri,.  $ese 
chance events, too, impact the make-up of subsequent generations.  When looking at a 
biological kind and asking a,er the present state(s) of its particulars, we look to their histories 
of chance, function, dri,, and selection.  
Ruth Millikan (1999a, 1999b) and Paul Gri-ths (1996, 1999) have separately called 
attention to historical essentialism for biological species.80  $ough both move between 
natural kinds and induction-supporting kinds, their views provide, at minimum, accounts 
worthy of consideration for present interests.  
With induction on his mind, Gri-ths attempts to explain why we can expect historical 
processes to provide unity to members of biological kinds.  He explains that heredity acts as a 
force, which he calls ‘phylogenetic inertia’, ensuring that organisms of shared descent stay 
relatively similar in their properties until some adaptation occurs.  $at the similarity is 
imperfect is not a problem for this view, since physical properties are non-essential.   
$is phylogenetic inertia is what licenses induction and explanation of a wide range 
of properties –morphological, physiological, and behavioural– using kinds de#ned 
purely by common ancestry.  If we observe a property in an organism, we are more 
likely to see it again in related organisms than in unrelated organisms.  Since 
Darwin, this idea, much elaborated, has been the basis of comparative biology. 
(Gri-ths 1999, p.220) 
Millikan builds on this point to arrive at a partial account of intrinsic heterogeneity.  
Appealing to the imperfection of the biological copying mechanisms that link moments in 
phylogenetic histories, Millikan explains the poor #delity with which generalizations ranging 
over those kinds hold. 
[H]istorical kinds are unlikely to ground exceptionless generalizations. $e copying 
processes that generate them are not perfect, nor are the historical environments 
that sustain them in the relevant respects. (Millikan 1999a, p.55) 
$ese accounts explain how a robust essentialist account of biological species as induction-
supporting kinds can yield kinds that fail to feature in laws, fail to ground exceptionless 
generalizations, but nevertheless feature in reliable inferences and explanations. 
Both accounts of induction-supporting historical kinds o%er interesting explanations of 
the diversity and similarities within biological classes.81  More relevantly, however, these 
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80 Elder (1995) presents an account of historical kinds, as well.  However his account focuses on the 
structural and teleofuncitonal connections between members of kinds, not their historical relations. 
81 There are criticisms of the historical essences view as an account of induction-supporting kinds.  
Most notably, Chakravarrty (2007) notes that phylogenetic inertia does not guarantee that properties 
will be shared.  He thinks that if inductions work for these kinds then they work because the kinds are 
HPCs, not because they are historical kinds.  The attack appears misplaced.  Phylogenetic inertia is part 
of the causal homeostasis that supports inductions.  But we need not expect inductions to be perfectly 
guaranteed.  In fact intrinsic heterogeneity should lead us to expect exception-ridden generalisations.  
Chakravarrty has found a virtue with the account, not a problem.  See also the exchange between Boyd 
and Millikan (Boyd 1999b, Millikan 1999b). 
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authors also provide an argument for historical kinds as natural kinds.  Gri-ths is explicit on 
the matter.  He argues that historical properties are essences, the only properties that 
organisms cannot lose without ceasing to be the kinds of organisms that they are:  
Although Lilith might not have been a domestic cat, as a domestic cat she is 
necessarily a member of the genealogical nexus between the speciation event in 
which that taxon originated and the speciation or extinction event at which it will 
cease to exist.  It is not possible to be a domestic cat without being in that 
genealogical nexus.  Furthermore [such kinds] have no other essential properties. 
(1999, p.219) 
$is is a speci#cally biological version of Kripke’s famous claim about history as essence, 
nearly two decades earlier, though Gri-ths does not notice the connection.82  Millikan does 
not make this same claim, focussed as she is on the role of natural kinds in laws and 
explanations.  She does however refer to historical essences as ‘the ontological ground’ of 
inductions ranging over the kinds, suggesting that she may view historical kinds as more than 
just convenient tools for biologists.   
As I will illustrate in the next chapter, the historical kinds account is useful beyond Lilith 
and her ilk.  Processes of dri,, selection, and evolution give us far more than just species.  
Many categories of biological object are historical kinds.  In the next section, I will examine 
the implications of the historical kinds view as an account of natural kinds. 
3. Historical Kinds are Categorically Unique 
Structural kinds and historical kinds constitute distinct types of kind category.  Di%erences 
in category type underpin other interesting and relevant di%erences between the kinds.  I will 
highlight the most relevant of these di%erences here.  $e #rst set concern the relation 
between essences and properties of the kind.  $e second set concern the possibility of change 
within the kind.  Together, these features of categorical distinctness account for widely-
recognized core features of the biological world o,en thought to preclude biological natural 
kinds.  
Static physical essences can function as reliable causes with a degree of #delity not possible 
with historical essences.  A physical property, in a world governed by physical laws, can and 
will reliably cause other physical properties.  Since the physical essence will occur in all 
members of a kind, so too will any properties that it causally supports.  Physical essences may 
causally guarantee certain other properties, as when no supporting conditions need be 
present, or the essence may render other properties likely, as when context matters.  In the 

82 In Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argued, in a buried footnote, that the only feature 
of things that was truly essential was their origin.  This is not quite the claim on offer here, since Kripke 
was talking about individuals and not kinds, but the basic point is similar.  The belief is that the only 
feature of thing that cannot be faked, lost, or construed as accidental, is its origin. 
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case of the chemical elements, atomic structure reliably supports a host of characteristic 
properties.  Atoms’ weights, ductility, conductivity, malleability, and even colour can be traced 
to the atomic microstructure.  Many of these remain stable across all possible physical 
conditions.83  Even the dispositional causal pro#les of atoms are tied to atomic structure.  
Atoms will exist in speci#c states under speci#c conditions, will react with certain partners, 
and so on.  All of this is uniform across the kind because of static shared physical essences, in 
a world governed by static physical laws and regularities.  $e relative homogeneity of the 
characteristic properties of physical kinds is a result of the type of property that serves as their 
essence. 
$is causal link also happens to make many structural kinds ideal induction-supporting 
kinds.  Projections over kinds hold for any property guaranteed by the essence.  $e strength 
of other projections is determined by the likelihood that any necessary supporting conditions 
are present.  It is possible that the Essence-Properties-Principle, critiqued as unmotivated in 
Chapter 2, arose out of consideration of canonical natural kinds such as these.  Rather than a 
constitutive feature of all natural kinds, the link between essence and properties may be an 
accidental feature of structural kinds.   
Historical kinds lack the possibility of so strong a casual link between essence and 
properties.  With historical kinds there is no static property that can serve as an anchor in 
reliably recurring causal events.  $e shared property is a history, which is not the sort of 
thing that is identical from one particular to the next.  Each particular has its nature 
determined by a historical trajectory through time, but the speci#c way in which that 
historical legacy impacts a given particular will depend on the context.  Since contexts vary, so 
too do kindred particulars.  
A history is a curious thing.  To say that two particulars are kindred in virtue of a shared 
history is not to say that they share their entire history, for then they would be numerically 
identical.  Rather, kindred particulars share a long evolutionary history and diverge at some 
comparatively recent point.  $is divergence makes all the di%erence.  $e particulars will 
di%er in starting conditions and will face di%erent developmental pathways.  $ey will likely 
even di%er in intrinsic structure—one may acquire a DNA/RNA mutation, for instance.  
Precisely how they di%er will depend on the details but that they will di%er in some way is 
virtually guaranteed.  Even in cases where the divergence occurs extremely recently, small 
developmental di%erences can yield large e%ects.  Any set of twins can tell you that.  $e two 
California lemons in my fruit bowl share a trajectory beginning with the hybridization of 
citrons and sour oranges, including a trip across the Atlantic courtesy of Columbus, and 
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83 Some physical conditions will of course destroy the atomic structure (knocking off a proton or two) 
but at this point the properties are not expected to persist because the kind, too, has ceased to exist. 
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diverging at some point just before the planting of the seeds that yield the trees that grow the 
lemons.  Between the divergence and now, much will have happened to yield two lemons that 
are distinct in at least some of their physical properties.  $is is why one is large and the other 
small.  One has slightly thicker skin.  One is mildly sweeter and better hydrated.  Taken across 
an entire lemon grove, the heterogeneity in even a relatively genetically homogenous 
population will be surprisingly large.  $e heterogeneity of properties within a biological kind 
is a result of the historical nature of their essence. 
Historical kinds thus do not happen to be great induction-supporting kinds.  $e strength 
of an induction is determined by the frequency of shared properties.  Unlike structural kinds, 
the historical kinds of biology do not have the types of essences that guarantee characteristic 
properties.  Biological kinds are therefore full of particulars that lack certain properties and so 
projections about those properties will occasionally fail.  $is is not to say of course that 
historical biological kinds cannot support inferences.  $ey can and do.  Rather, these kinds 
will not support perfectly general inferences in the way that structural and induction-
supporting kinds may. 
Members of historical kind will indeed have various features in common.  It is no accident 
that both of my lemons are recognizable as lemons.  It is not because I can see into their 
histories, but because those histories have rendered them objectively similar.  In spite of their 
di%erences, they still have enough in common to be recognizably similar.  $at is similarity 
enough to ground certain weak projections from one to the other, or from this sample of two 
to a larger class.  $is is a point stressed by Millikan.  She writes:  
Historical kinds are domains over which predicates are non-accidentally projectable: 
there are good reasons in nature why one member of an historical kind is like 
another, hence why inductions are successful over the kind.  (1999a, p.55) 
$ough she notes the reduced strength of these projections, she is careful to ground this 
reduced strength in features of the very same mechanisms that make the projections possible 
in the #rst place: 
On the other hand, historical kinds are unlikely to ground exceptionless 
generalizations.  $e copying processes that generate them are not perfect, nor are 
the historical environments that sustain them steady in all relevant respects. (p.55-6) 
$e historical nature of biological kinds explains the existence and limited scope of their 
ability to feature in inductions. 
$e second striking di%erence between structural and historical kinds is the possibility of 
change to the kind.  At issue is not whether a particular can change kinds but whether the 
kind itself can change over time.  $e question is whether the make-up of members of a kind 
at time t can be interestingly di%erent at some later time t+1.  Structural kinds do not change in 
this way; historical kinds do.   
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Static physical essences cannot change, by their very nature.  $e microstructure that 
makes an Oxygen atom Oxygen will be the same 2000 years hence as it is now.  It is 
conceivable that an atom with a structure hitherto unrealized in this world will at some point 
in the future come into being.  But this is a new kind, not a change to an existing one.  
Particulars come and go, forming old, new, and di%erent kinds, but the kinds themselves 
remain—whatever particulars have this or that essential physical structure.  Perhaps it is this 
feature of physical kinds that has led so many to assume that unchanging natures are a 
constitutive feature of all natural kinds.   
Historical trajectories, by contrast, are by their very nature developing things.  A history is 
not a static thing, but an evolving one.  Particulars of kinds with historical essences can 
physically diverge not only at the same time, as described above, but also across time.  A 
particular on a historical trajectory at time t may be quite di%erent from a di%erent particular 
on that trajectory at time t+1.  Events will have cropped up along the way that impact its 
makeup.  Changing kinds are the expectation within Kind Historicism. 
In sum, I have provided an introduction to Kind Historicism and a sketch of its 
implications.  In the next chapter Kind Historicism will be put into action, resolving a dispute 
about proteins as natural kinds.  $erea,er, I will examine a role for Kind Historicism in 
resolving questions of biological individuality.  A,er a detour to discuss induction-supporting 
kinds, in Chapter 6, I return in the concluding chapter to the implications of Kind 
Historicism. 
4. An Aside on Realism 
Pluralism is o,en associated with scienti#c anti-realism.  $e motivation perhaps stems 
from realists’ commitment to the mind-independent structure of the world.  $is is 
summarized in Stathis Psillos’ (1999) in&uential characterization: 
$e metaphysical stance [on realism] asserts that the world has a de#nite and mind-
independent natural kind structure … [this] thesis is a basic philosophical 
presupposition of scienti#c realism.  It is meant to make scienti#c realism distinct 
from all those anti-realist accounts of science … which reduce the content of the 
world to whatever gets licensed by a set of epistemic practices and conditions. (p.xix) 
But there is no sound reason why realism should be associated with either pluralism or 
monism, exclusively.  Monist positions may be the most attractive to the realist, but there are 
viable realist options along both the category and taxonomic dimension.  In order to see this, 
we must stress the distinction between ‘de#nite’ structure and ‘singular’ structure.  $e world 
can have a de#nite structure without that structure being monistic.  It can de#nitely and really 
be the case that the world admits of multiple taxonomies, for instance.  $e di%erence is 
obvious when pointed out, but still seems easily forgotten.   
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TP is entirely compatible with realism about natural kind classi#cations.  One might think 
that the world really does not have a single unique structure without denying that there is real 
structure.  As an example, Anjan Chakravartty (2011) has recently advanced a realist TP, 
according to which natural kinds are any group of particulars based on shared properties.  
Since particulars have many properties, and since no single property is fundamental, one 
particular will belong to multiple natural kinds.  $e distributions of properties are real, and 
so are the kinds.  According to Chakravartty, nature really does have joints.  $ey are 
innumerably many and admit of no singularly best way to carve.  $is is a taxonomically 
pluralist but realist-friendly option.  $e only concession that a TP advocate needs to make 
concerns the uniqueness of kind membership.  $is brand of realism still permits belief in 
pre-existing order, it’s just that the order is complex and admits of innumerable non-
overlapping groups.   
Interestingly, pluralism with respect to categories is hardly a problem for the realist.  $e 
category pluralist can be realist about the particulars, the relations between them, and the 
kinds that they form.  She needn’t make any anti-realist concessions! 
5. Conclusion 
Robert Wilson made the following remark about the emergence and dominance of 
pluralism in the philosophy of biology.  I think he gets the motivation for pluralism right, but 
errs when characterizing the bene#ts pluralism o%ers:  
For philosophers, pluralistic views o,en mark a departure from traditionally 
dominant views within the philosophy of science … Such views are seen, I think 
rightly, as imposing a sort of straightjacket on the biological sciences, forcing their 
conformity with the physical sciences taken as a paradigm within the philosophy of 
science until the last thirty years … So one motivation for pluralism within the 
philosophy of biology might be characterized, in the most literal sense, as 
reactionary in rebelling against dominant traditions within the philosophy of 
science.  But pluralism carries with it a more positive view of the nature of biological 
reality, of the biological world as more complicated, various, and messy than even our 
sophisticated views of theories, explanations, and kinds have allowed.  Pluralism aims 
to more adequately capture this complexity.  (Wilson 2005, pp.12–3 emphasis 
added) 
Wilson’s view is in turns helpful and misleading.  He is correct to note that the view of kinds 
in the physical sciences is a poor #t for biology.  Structural essentialism simply will not suit.  
$e biological world is importantly di%erent, and category pluralism makes sense of that 
di%erence.  $is does not lead, however, to his ‘positive view’.  Biology can be deeply di%erent 
from the world investigated by the physical sciences without being hopelessly messy.  It is 
complicated, yes; but it need not be taxonomically pluralistic, which is what Wilson and this 
pluralist challenge imply.  Intrinsic heterogeneity in biology is an expected outcome of 
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historical natural kinds.  Kinds in biology can be uni#ed, mind independent, monistic, and 
still be internally heterogeneous in kind. 
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II 
Applying Kind Historicism:  
A World of Evolving Ontology and  
Sciences of Limited Means 
I began with three questions: 
 Q1: What kinds of things populate the biological world? 
Q2: What does the correct answer to Q1 entail for monism and pluralism? 
Q3: What role should this biological ontology have in scienti$c practice? 
PART I sketched answers to these three questions in the abstract, by way of articulating Kind 
Historicism, a theory of biological natural kinds.  PART II will add substance to these answers 
by applying this theory to biochemicals (Chs. 4 & 5) before addressing the practical 
limitations of natural kind theorizing (Ch. 6).  &e second part of my discussion of 
biochemicals, in Chapter 5, will address the lingering problem of biological individuality.   
PART II o'ers a rather drastic change of style.  &e opening chapters of this thesis dealt in 
concepts—their histories, forms, and relations.  Science was discussed, but at a certain 
distance.  &is distance aided in the isolation of distinctively metaphysical and ontological 
issues.  &e chapters that make-up PART II are not so hospitable to these lines of enquiry.  
Rather than developing and exploring concepts, the task is to bring them into contact with 
scienti(c knowledge.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine issues that have received some measure 
of philosophical attention: biochemical kinds and biological individuals.  In each instance, 
philosophers have been interested in (what I call) epistemic forms of these issues—though 
 84 
occasionally vaulting metaphysical and ontological conclusions, too.  I ask, in light of recent 
work on the epistemic questions, what can we say about the ontological and metaphysical 
ones?  &e (nal chapter is again of a di'erent form. Chapter 6 comes in two parts.  In each, I 
advise caution in cases where philosophers and scientists have been overzealous in arguments 
over the precise ontological status of (i) human races and (ii) cognitive modules.  &e point of 
that chapter is not to illuminate the natural kinds, but to show how questions of natural 
kindhood are o)en not relevant to scienti(c investigation.  Because all three chapters 
constitute a shi) in the style of argumentation it may be helpful to (rst recapitulate, in brief, 
the answers to the three central questions, before pressing forward.  
Q1: What kinds of things populate the biological world?  &e objects of the biological 
world are those that exist in the ways that they do in virtue of Darwinian processes of 
conservation, selection, and change.  &at is to say that many of the objects commonly 
thought of as biological do indeed come in kinds.  &ose kinds are Darwinian.  &ey are what-
they-are in virtue of their unique histories; they have historical essences.  A thing is a member 
of a biological kind if it is a part of this sort of Darwinian lineage.  
From this account a few interesting metaphysical features of kinds follow: there will be 
many biological kinds; biological kinds are relational, and so two kinds can be ‘closer’ or 
‘further’ depending on the evolutionary details; members of a single kind will be 
heterogeneous in their properties and so causally heterogeneous also; and the biological kind 
can change over time, including coming into and out of existence.  &ese features, in turn, 
have interesting implications for science: biological kinds will be imperfect tools for scienti(c 
inquiry, owing to their heterogeneity; and biological kinds are o)en unknowable, since 
phylogenetic histories can be epistemically inaccessible.84 
A complicating factor arises when we remember that biological objects are composed of 
physico-chemical kinds.  &ese kinds are not Darwinian, they are physical—microstructural, 
to be precise.  &ey are what-they-are in virtue of physical microstructures.  Characterizing 
this relationship is one of the tasks for Chapters 4 and 5.   
Q2: What does the correct answer to Q1 entail for monism and pluralism?  &is question 
is more complicated than it seems.  Monism and pluralism are not straightforward notions.  I 
have separated taxonomic monism/pluralism from category monism/pluralism.  &e account 
of kinds presented in PART I is categorically pluralist and taxonomically monist.  &e theory is 
categorically pluralist because biological kinds and chemical kinds are two very di'erent types 
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84 Bapteste and Dupré (2013), discussed at length in Ch. 5, describe cases in which the evolutionary 
histories of microbes are not just difficult to determine, but impossible, owing to excessive gene 
swapping. Versions of this problem, of differing magnitudes, will crop up across all biological 
kingdoms. 
 85 
of natural kind.  One is historical, the other physical.  &e theory is taxonomically monist 
because the physico-chemical and biological kinds do not cross-classify.  Each set of kinds is 
taxonomically monistic.   
&e complicating factor arises again.  &e compositional relationship between biological 
and physico-chemical kinds makes it di-cult to evaluate their taxonomic status.  Even if we 
agree that a biological object has some unique kind membership in virtue of its unique 
evolutionary history, we still must reckon with the fact that, qua physico-chemical kind, there 
is (in some sense) a giant pile of molecules that compose that biological kind, which 
themselves have a unique kind membership in virtue of their collective microstructure.  &is 
complication is not so obvious when thinking in terms of large organisms (few have the 
occasion to think of a tortoise as a singe biochemical mass), but it becomes much more clear 
when we think about smaller biological kinds, such as biochemicals.  Exploring the 
compositional nature of biological individuals and its implications for monism and pluralism 
is one of the tasks for Chapter 5. 
Q3: What role should this biological ontology have in scienti$c practice?  A principle 
implication of the theory of biological kinds on o'er is that biological kinds should not 
necessarily furnish biological science with its taxonomic categories.  Manifest ontologies in 
science have many properties that biological ontologies do not, and the facts required to 
generate a biological ontology will o)en be epistemically inaccessible.   
In PART II, I will discuss a number of actual scienti(c enquiries for which a biological 
ontology is not at all well-suited.  &e case of proteins illustrates the epistemic inaccessibility 
and heterogeneity problems, the case of races illustrates the need for pragmatic attention to 
classi(cation, while the case of cognitive modules describes a wealth of kinds that fail 
metaphysical scrutiny but nevertheless provide good categories for science. 
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4 
Biochemical Kinds* 
Protein molecules are an interesting case for philosophy of science because they are at once 
the objects of biology and chemistry, an in-between status that leads to con/icting intuitions.  
&e (rst is that, qua chemical molecules, their physical structure is fundamental.  &e second 
is that, qua biological objects, their physiological roles are important to recognise and 
understand.  &e con/ict manifests in a number of ways, but the principal problem is the 
classi(cation of proteins into kinds.  Consider the lens crystallin protein, which forms the lens 
of your eye but also ‘moonlights’ as a number of functionally distinct enzymes. Common 
structural classi(cation, like that used for simpler chemical molecules, will gloss over this 
biological diversity.  Intuitive functional classi(cation will separate these proteins and so fail 
to highlight structural similarities.  Privileging one of these classi(cations over another 
appears at best subjective and at worst arbitrary.  
Two issues arise.  First, we might ask a)er the actual scienti(c practices of classi(cation, 
focussing on how scientists can, should, or do address this problem.  Caught up with this 
inquiry we (nd a mix of questions about the aims, norms, contexts, and limitations of 
scienti(c investigation.  Call this the ‘epistemic question’ about protein classi(cation.  Second, 
we might ask a)er the status of proteins as natural kinds.  Is there a natural or correct 
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* This chapter is closely based on a previously published paper.  I am grateful to the referees of that 
paper for their helpful comments and suggestions—Bartol, J., (2014) ‘Biochemical Kinds’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Advance Access 24 Dec, 21pp. 
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arrangement of proteins into kinds, no such arrangement, or many?  In case there are natural 
kinds, we want to know what sorts of kinds they are and how they relate to one another.  &is 
second line of inquiry asks a)er the ontological structure of the biomolecular world and the 
metaphysical relations therein.  Call this ‘the metaphysical question’ about protein 
classi(cation.  Recent work on the epistemic question leads me to turn my attention to the 
metaphysical one.  &is chapter asks, in light of what we know about proteins and 
biochemistry, what can we say about nature’s joints? 
William Goodwin (2011) recently argued that the practice of protein taxonomy begins 
‘fundamentally’ with structural considerations, but classi(cations are then adjusted ad hoc as 
dictated by speci(c phenomena and scienti(c interests.  Considerations of function, chemical 
properties, or di'erent levels of structure may alter speci(cs of the classi(cation scheme.  Call 
this position ‘pragmatic pluralism’ about classi(catory practice.  Goodwin resists this label, 
but my use of it will become clear as we proceed.   
Pragmatic pluralism about taxonomic practice is fairly open as regards metaphysical 
interpretations.  Nominalism is always an option, of course, but so too are all of the various 
realist interpretations.  Pragmatic pluralism is compatible with taxonomic and category 
monism.  One might insist that there is a single set of uniform kinds, but that these are 
inaccessible or do not facilitate scienti(c inquiry.  A permissive pluralist metaphysics is also 
available, which reads the metaphysics straight from the practice, assuming there are a wide 
range of taxonomies and categories.  Perhaps structure is the most useful, but occasionally we 
must sample from taxonomies based on function or reaction pro(les.  Finally, a number of 
less permissive interpretations are available, which posit a select few taxonomies or categories.  
Neither biologists nor philosophers hold out hope for a tidy ontological reduction to either 
biological or chemical kinds.  &is rules-out metaphysical monism.  Nominalism and the two 
pluralisms remain.   
On its own, Goodwin’s account privileges no particular interpretation.  Two other recent 
papers, by Matt Slater (2009) and Emma Tobin (2010), also call for pragmatic pluralisms but 
venture beyond the epistemic question and into the territory of the metaphysical.  &ese 
authors pro'er a highly permissive brand of pluralism.  &ey begin by noting the need for two 
categories and taxonomies, biological and chemical, but then claim that even the chemical 
side of the protein case is pluralistic, citing the physical underdetermination between a 
protein’s initial amino acid sequence (called ‘primary structure’) and its (nal folded three-
dimensional state (called ‘conformation’).  &is problematisation is consistent with many 
scienti(c accounts (e.g. Copley 2012, Wright & Dyson 1999, Dyson & Wright 2005).  Slater 
adds even more plurality, explaining that there are multiple legitimate ways to determine 
 89 
protein function.  If accurate, these accounts point to the conclusion that there are many ways 
that proteins can be members of kinds, and even more taxonomic arrangements; possibly as 
many ways as there are structural and functional properties.  It is widespread pluralism about 
both categories and taxonomies (though these philosophers do not attend to the 
distinction).85  &is is what I mean by ‘permissive’ pluralism.   
In section 3, I dismiss the ‘permissive’ bit of the pluralism, arguing that physical 
underdetermination is in fact not a problem.  Microstructuralist accounts of chemical kinds 
are well equipped to treat higher-level chemical structures as constrained by the lower-level 
microstructure.  &e multiple-realization of function, too, is not a problem since an adequate 
biological kind classi(cation is not functional but historical.  &e pressing issue remains the 
multiple-realisation of physiological roles by chemical microstructures.  
With the con/ict thusly framed, I dispense with the nominalist option as unmotivated and 
introduce my position, which is a far more restricted pluralism.  I remind the reader of my 
duality of kind categories: the biological (historical) and the physico-chemical 
(microstructural).  It is within this framework that I resolve the problems presented by Slater 
and Tobin.  &ough the disconnect between structure and function is instructive, it would be 
a mistake to identify biological protein kinds with their functions.  &ere are a number of 
well-known problems with functional kinds, and function appears to be an accidental 
property of chemical structures rather than a necessary property of any kinds.  &is becomes 
clear when we conceive of biological protein kinds as Darwinian.  On the proposed view, 
chemical kinds are best viewed as pieces or tools that are picked up, shu1ed, and recombined 
and sometimes acquire physiological functions.  &ese pieces are occasionally conserved 
through evolution.  It is through this process that biological kinds emerge.  Biological kinds 
are what-they-are in virtue not of their physical structure, but their evolutionary history.  
Within that history chemical structures have some in/uence on outcomes, but biological 
kinds are ultimately created and shaped by their histories of contingency, chance, and 
selection.  
Separating the proposed duality from the permissive pluralist picture is important because 
the former is more fruitful.  While the permissive pluralist is forced to view di'erent 
classi(cations as alternate ways of describing the same world, the theory I o'er describes two 
fundamentally di'erent kinds and their interactions, on the model developed in Chapter 3. 
&is account paves the way for more general discussions about the di'erences between the 
kinds of the biological world and those of the physico-chemical world.   
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85 It is odd that Slater (2009) misses the distinction, since he recognized it in a later work (Slater 2013).  
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Implications for metaphysical monism, on the one hand, and for biochemical practice, on 
the other, will come into full view in the concluding section.  To begin, I will introduce the 
two intuitions and their con/ict, which form the backdrop of my analysis. 
1. Con"icting Intuitions About Kinds of Proteins 
At base, the con/ict between the biological and chemical is a clash of intuitions.  
Respecting both aspects of proteins comes at the expense of a single consistent classi(catory 
scheme.  While practical workarounds can and have been found, these might trouble the 
natural kind monist.  I begin with the pre-theoretic con/ict between these biological and 
chemical intuitions before expounding the precise nature of the relationship between these 
two sides of the protein world. 
&e biological intuition has a long history in the sciences that study proteins.  &is 
tradition emphasizes the importance of proteins in physiology.  &ough many of proteins’ 
biological roles are newly discovered, their importance has long been recognized.  &e term 
‘protein’ was coined in the mid-19th century from the Ancient Greek ‘proteios’ meaning 
‘primary’ or ‘in the lead’, in order to emphasize their presumed essential role in micro-
biological processes.  Proteins are the most profuse macromolecule, occurring in all parts of 
all cells.  &ough they carry out a wide variety of functions and take on a staggering number 
of forms, all proteins are created from amino acids linked in linear sequences and then folded 
into complex shapes, called ‘conformations’.  &ere are two varieties of protein.  &e (rst are 
(brous proteins. &ese make up every tissue in organic bodies; common textbook examples 
include keratin and collagen.  Second are globular proteins, which carry out important 
physiological roles as enzymes, antibodies, regulators, and cellular messengers.  &e 
importance of proteins in this regard should not be understated.  Enzymes are necessary for 
the catalysation of nearly all organic chemical reactions and, as such, are involved in a wide 
variety of molecular biological processes—and this is not to downplay the biological 
importance of messengers, regulators, and antibodies.   
Understanding protein function is a key part of understanding molecular biology.  Not 
only do they comprise all organic bodies and play key roles in organic reactions, they have 
recently become the subject of re-focussed interest for their role in molecular evolution.  
Adaptations from the development of anatomy to alteration in metabolic processes involve 
changes at the protein level.  As a result, a key tool in uncovering the progeny of extant 
physiology is the study of the proteins involved.  Speci(cally, biochemists study the semi-
autonomous ‘domains’ from which proteins are compiled.  Conserved domains are shu1ed, 
recombined, duplicated, and changed to carry out new functions.  Tracking domains allows us 
to map the evolution of new traits.  Understanding their physiology is key to understanding 
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ancestral functions of current protein molecules, which is key to understanding the process of 
molecular evolution.   
It is fair to say that not only are proteins fascinating for their chemical complexity, but also 
for their biological signi(cance, on multiple fronts.  Any description of protein kinds should 
respect this—so the intuition goes.  
&e chemical intuition, on the other hand, is an extension of standard thinking about 
natural kinds in science, which has long been structured by treatments of chemical kinds.  
Indeed, the gold standard case of a natural kind is a chemical one: gold.  Nearly all 
introductions begin with this elemental example.  Even Marc Ereshefsky’s (2009) reference 
article ‘Natural Kinds in Biology’ introduces kinds not with a biological example, but with the 
familiar chemical:  
&e traditional account of natural kinds asserts that the members of a kind share a 
common essence. &e essence of gold, for example, is its unique atomic structure. 
&at structure occurs in all and only pieces of gold, and it is a property that all pieces 
of gold must have.   
Paul Gri-ths (1999) similarly explains: 
My gold watch resembles your gold navel ring […] because the atoms of which both 
are composed share an essence: their atomic number. (p. 209) 
&e received view of chemical kinds is microstructural essentialism, introduced in Chapter 3.  
Both Ereshefsky and Gri-ths, referencing the atomic structure of gold, align themselves with 
this tradition.  Simple chemical objects make ideal examples because they are neatly divisible 
and eminently familiar.  More importantly, microstructure is a unique determinate of identity 
since any instance of a chemical kind cannot lose its microstructure without changing kinds.  
Microstructural essentialisms also hide the distinction between induction-supporting kinds 
and natural kinds, because they admit a clear physical reduction of their macro-level 
properties to some physical microstructure.86 
&ough elements provide the simplest cases, we can extend theories of chemical kinds to 
more complex molecules.  Robin Hendry (2006) has recently shown how microstructuralist 
accounts can be scaled up from elements to molecules, arguing that just as the essence of Gold 
is represented by atomic number 79, so too might we identify the essence of carbon dioxide 
with its constituent atomic elements, represented by the formula CO2.  Again, this is a kind in 
both senses, since the microstructure is causally e-cacious, explains the relevant properties of 
carbon dioxide, and is necessary and su-cient for being carbon dioxide. 
Microstructure becomes less clear as we move up the complexity scale.  &e microstructure 
of CO2 might be its constituent atoms, the atoms and their bonds, or the atoms, their bonds, 
and their spatial relations.  Chemists and biochemists describe a range of ‘levels’ of structural 
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86 This point was elaborated in Chapter 3, section 3. 
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arrangements.  &e problem becomes considerably more complex when we get to proteins.  
Protein molecules are described at the level of primary structure, which includes just the 
linear sequence of amino acids; secondary structure, which describes stable recurring 
geometrical patterns in localised sections of the molecule; and tertiary and quaternary 
structures, which describe the geometric and bond structures of the whole molecule or the 
molecule plus bound partners, respectively.  Forwarding a metaphysical thesis, the 
microstructuralist would do well not to attach to any one of these representations.  For these 
are just that, representations, fallible attempts to capture the physical state of the protein.  &e 
physical facts that get included in a given representation are a function of goals and interests, 
but also of the context, since certain physical features are stable only in speci(c environments.  
Given present concerns, what is interesting about microstructuralism is the grounding of 
kinds in microphysical facts.  How and whether we know or represent those facts is a separate 
matter.  Rather than take a stance on which representation of microstructure is best, I will use 
the general phrase ‘chemical structure’.   
&ere are several reasons why philosophers might expect and want a theory of chemical 
kinds to extend upward to proteins.  First, from a purely physico-chemical point of view, 
proteins are simply very large chemical molecules; they are macromolecules.  &ey can be 
annotated and described in much the same way as smaller molecules, but on a much larger 
scale.87  If microstructuralism can handle one step up the complexity scale, from elements to 
molecules, then what’s a few more?  Second, some may (nd it suggestive that 
microstructuralist individuation is a dominant method in protein classi(cation today.  When 
biochemists investigate proteins, they work largely at the levels of conformation and primary 
structure.  &is is the main way in which proteins are annotated and referenced.  But the (nal 
and most philosophically forceful motivation behind extending the standard account of 
chemical kinds comes from the prospect of monism.  As Slater explains, 
Following the lead of natural kinds essentialists of old, one might suggest 
individuating proteins (and other biological macromolecules) on the basis of their 
chemical structure. At (rst glance, this stance a'ords a tempting monism about 
biochemical taxonomy. (2009, p.852) 
&ough he goes on to reject this possibility, the prima facie appeal of monism is worth 
understanding.  &e issue evinces a longstanding concern with the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the world investigated by the sciences.  &ere is great appeal in the thought 
that molecules, atoms, and macromolecules are all fundamentally the same types of thing.  A 
monist might envision a single (enormous) hypothetical taxonomy representing the varieties 

87 My point is not that proteins are described in the exact same way as smaller molecules, but that they 
can be.  The chemical formula of a protein is far too long and cumbersome to be of any use in talking 
about proteins and so is not used.  A higher level of description, focusing on component motifs and 
domains, is much more practicable.  
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of chemical types, from hydrogen to ununoctium, and on to molecules and proteins.  
Microstructuralism pro'ers one set of things with one type of kind membership conditions.  
&ere are two senses of ‘monism’ and both are bound up with the appeal of 
microstructuralism.  First, microstructuralism o'ers monism in the fashion a)er which 
molecules are naturally individuated.  &is is Category Monism.  Scaled up to large molecules 
or down to single atoms, the kind category is the same.  Microstructuralism holds that all 
chemical kinds are what-they-are in virtue of microphysical facts.  Second, 
microstructuralism o'ers the promise of a single taxonomy.  &is is Taxonomic Monism.  
Every kind in the microstructuralist taxonomy is unique.  &ere is no worry about one 
particular belonging to multiple incompatible kinds.88   Both brands of monism are on the 
table.  Slater is right to be tempted.  I will return to the prospect of monism in the (nal 
section.  
Notice that microstructuralism as a putative account of biochemical kinds also avoids 
intrinsic heterogeneity.  Groups based on microstructure are by de(nition uniform in at least 
one important property: their microstructures.  &e questions are thus whether those 
microstructures are ever lost and whether these groups are distinctively biological. 
Hopes for grounding protein identity in microstructure are not just idle metaphysics.  &e 
tradition has a corresponding scienti(c history.  Scientists long presumed that chemical 
structure determined biological properties.  &e study of proteins was once dominated by 
reductionist ideology, which claimed that the function of a protein was determined by its 
three-dimensional structure, itself determined by the protein’s molecular composition.  &is 
came to be known as the ‘Sequence-Structure-Function’ paradigm (SSF), a development of 
Emil Fischer’s (1894) in/uential ‘lock and key’ model of enzyme function.  &is became a 
central principle for all proteins with the rise of physical chemistry in the early 20th century.  
Physical chemistry was reductionist.  It sought to ground all chemical properties in atomic 
physical reactions.89  On this perspective the key to binding is molecular shape.  Binding 
requires that particular atoms on binding molecules be brought into close physical proximity; 
only then can the atoms form the weak covalent bonds that hold adjoining molecules 
together. &e more atoms in the molecule, the more complex a shape must be assumed to 
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88 The point here is that no single object will be two incompatible kinds.  An atom cannot be both 
hydrogen and oxygen—nor can it be both hydrogen and water, even though a water molecule might be 
composed partly of hydrogen.  
89 Fibrous proteins do what they do not through interactions, but though the joining of many proteins 
of the same type—often in a sheet or coil. The physical properties of the macro-structures fibrous 
proteins create (like hair or skin) are a function of micro-structural features of the proteins. William 
Astbury of Leeds, for instance, found that the elasticity of many fibrous materials, from hair to muscle 
tissue, was a function of their molecular composition (Hall 2011). 
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bring everything into alignment. &is is how keys open locks.90  Since denatured proteins can 
recover their shape, it was believed that the shape of a molecule was a perfect function of its 
amino acid sequence. 91   &us sequence determines structure and structure determines 
function.  
When SSF stood strong there was no problem of protein kinds, since, according to SSF, 
there was a straightforward link between molecular composition and physiological function.  
Whether individuated structurally or functionally, the result should have been the same.  
Unfortunately these canonical beliefs have proved false.  &ough various phenomena have 
caused doubts about SSF, multifunctional (or ‘moonlighting’) proteins are taken by many to 
be the nail in the co-n—so much so that one researcher recently declared, ‘Moonlighting is 
mainstream: Paradigm adjustment required!’ (Copley 2012).   
Multifunctional proteins are a heterogeneous class.  As the name suggests, these are cases 
where ‘one’ protein performs multiple functions.  &e relations that make these count as ‘one’ 
protein vary, but in general proteins are considered the same when they share an amino acid 
sequence.  &ere are several molecular mechanisms that permit multifunctionality.  In some 
cases, proteins with identical sequence adopt di'erent folds in di'erent contexts in order to 
carry out di'erent functions.  Di'erential folding serves to utilize di'erent functional 
domains, associated with di'erent tasks.  In other cases, conformationally-identical proteins 
carry out di'erent but related roles in the same physiological process (Copley 2012).  
Regardless of the particulars, proteins that share some chemical structure but di'er in 
physiology have le) scientists without a theory of protein kinds.  It is unclear whether a 
protein is what-it-is in virtue of chemical structure, biological function, or something else 
entirely.  &e result, among other things, is a serious disjoint in competing classi(catory 
techniques (see report from Carr et al. 2004) leading to poor understanding of when two 
proteins are or are not the same.  
&ough protein taxonomists still tend to classify microstructurally, microstructuralism 
alone does not undergird taxonomic practice.  Using only microstructural classi(cation 
results in unhelpful and counterintuitive classi(cations, such as cases where proteins that 
appear wildly di'erent at the biological level are grouped together at the chemical level, and 
proteins that ful(l the same biological role yet are grouped apart due to chemical dissimilarity.  
As a result, microstructural classi(cation is supplemented with biological considerations, 
when appropriate, to correct these irregularities.  &us Goodwin’s concession: though he 
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90 The complementary relation between protein and binding partner is called ‘specificity’. For a history 
of the idea of ‘specificity’, see Judson (1980). 
91 A particularly significant finding came from Mirsky and Pauling (1936), who found that a denatured 
protein lost structure and function, but regained structure and function when renatured. 
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wishes biochemical classi(cation to be based on physico-chemical structure, biological facts 
must be accommodated, o)en ad hoc, by augmenting or supplementing structural 
classi(cations. He explains, 
While there is a fundamental, structural way of individuating proteins, there are also 
supplemental classi(cations introduced to address various biological interests. 
(2011, p.537) 
Structural information about proteins may come close to a biologically meaningful 
classi(cation, but it must be adjusted to highlight pertinent biological similarities or 
di'erences.  
&e point can be made salient with the example mentioned at the beginning: the 
multifunctional protein family known as ‘crystallins’.  Crystallins are the transparent 
structural proteins found in the lens and cornea of the eye.  &ere are many varieties of 
crystallin but nearly all demonstrate some multifunctionality.  In chickens and ducks αβ-
crystallin forms the refractive surface on the lens of the eye, yet also occurs as a heat-shock 
protein and an enzyme, called a ‘lyase’.  &is is mirrored in many other animals.  In birds and 
crocodilians the crystallin that forms the lens also doubles as the digestive enzyme lactate 
dehydrogenase.  &e α-crystallin present in all vertebrate lenses also functions as a molecular 
chaperone and may have an enzymatic role in digestive processes (Copley 2012).  Standard 
physico-chemical classi(cation leads us to say that we have one protein, but intuitions about 
biological function lead us to conclude otherwise.  &ese intuitions come out when Slater 
(2009) insists that protein kind classi(cations preserve ‘important biochemical facts’ about the 
molecules, something that structural de(nitions fail to do.  &ough the chemical facts are 
presumably explained, many functional (o)en physiological) ones are not.  &e desire for 
category monism is at odds with the desire to respect the biology. 
Scientists can describe structural proteins with multiple biological roles, or biological 
proteins with multiple structures.  But no single scheme will perfectly categorize both.  Hybrid 
schemes are needed.  Di'erent taxonomies and di'erent types of kind category are necessary 
under speci(c disciplinary circumstances.  &ough some communicative problems may result 
(Carr et al. 2004), these are presumably resolvable with more speci(c language or better 
databases for classi(cation.  Biochemists face no in-principle problem, having developed a 
rich epistemic system of interwoven classi(catory practices, which change with contexts and 
aims.  &e situation is only problematic if we hold the belief that there is a ‘correct’ or ‘natural’ 
way to classify proteins—to carve nature at its joints—and that biochemistry should aim at 
this ideal, but misses for all its pragmatism.   
In the (nal section, I will argue that scienti(c practice need not utilize a taxonomy of 
natural kinds.  Yet without being normative about scienti(c practice, we can still ask what 
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pragmatic pluralism in practice means for the metaphysical question.  It is still possible to ask 
what structure of kinds is compatible with known phenomena and would support the 
pragmatic pluralism that characterizes taxonomic practice.  
Pragmatic pluralists see multiple kind classi(cations as alternate and equally legitimate 
descriptions of the same entities.  If there is no sense in which one such scheme is 
fundamental, or privileged, then there exist no grounds on which to say, ‘this classi(cation 
describes how the kinds really are’.  From here, there are still a number of answers to the 
metaphysical question.  One option is nominalism.  Perhaps pragmatic pluralism reveals the 
poverty and scholasticism of natural kinds talk altogether (Hacking 2007).  Not only is there 
no single way that the kinds are, perhaps there is no way at all!  Another option is highly 
permissive category and taxonomic pluralism.  Perhaps each type of kind category forms a 
di'erent taxonomy of natural kinds, and we simply pick and choose from di'erent natural 
kind structures as situations dictate.  On this somewhat de/ationary view, there are as many 
natural kinds as there are natural properties from which to classify.  A third option is to 
accept a more conservative pluralism.  Perhaps there are not innumerably many kinds, just a 
select few.  Relying on the account of biological kinds developed in Chapter 3, I will argue for 
the third option: a restricted category dualism. 
2. Against Permissive Pluralism 
Setting aside for the moment the nominalist option, the two realist pluralisms have similar 
appeal.  Both concede the force of the pre-theoretic observation that one classi(cation will not 
do.  &e choice between the two is a matter of just how many types of classi(cation might lay 
claim to naturalness or primacy.  Many treatments of proteins emphasize the physical 
underdetermination of (nal conformation.  &ese accounts draw attention to the number of 
distinct ‘levels’ of structural arrangement of molecules, suggesting that each might be a unique 
physico-chemical kind. Such descriptions strongly legislate for permissive pluralism.  &is is a 
red herring.   
Imagine a protein family where a single sequence of amino acids results in a number of 
distinct (nal conformations under di'erent conditions.  Many such cases exist.  Classi(cation 
according to primary structure would yield one scheme of kinds; classi(cation according to 
(nal conformation would yield another.  &ese cases are frustrating to practicing taxonomists 
and appear to have implications for the philosophical discussion, as well.  As Tobin claims,  
If two chemical kinds can have the same [microstructural] essence, yet are 
considered distinct at the macrostructural level, then the … microstructure would 
seem insu-cient for macromolecular classi(cation. (2010, p.53) 
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On the surface, physical underdetermination appears equally problematic as the disconnect 
between biological and chemical classi(cation.  &e claim is that these cases recommend a 
collection of di'erent physico-chemical kinds, appealing to many di'erent levels of structural 
organization.92 
Yet microstructuralism is well equipped to handle these cases.  We can maintain that 
conformation is selected extrinsically from within a space of possibilities imposed by the 
intrinsic microstructure.  Some comparatively simpler cases from chemistry will help clarify.  
Many molecules share a chemical composition but exist in di'erent states at higher levels of 
structure.  One such group are conformational isomers, called ‘conformers’, where one set of 
component atoms, with just one arrangement of bonds, can exist in multiple conformations.  
&is happens in relatively simple molecules and is also a common feature of proteins.  
Conformational isomerism is a property of bond structures that permit movement, usually 
around single bonds, enabling multiple geometries.  &e particular geometry that obtains is a 
function of external forces; temperature is perhaps most commonly discussed.  Certain 
possible conformations are stable under common conditions and these are the conformations 
that are recognized in practice.  Given free reign over extreme temperatures, electrostatic 
forces, and other conditions scientists can bring about additional marginally-stable forms.  
&e familiar n-butane (C4H10) is commonly recognized to have two conformers (trans and 
gauche), but these are just the most common and stable in our world.  At least two more 
isomers are possible yet di-cult to isolate and stabilize in the lab and even more intermediate 
forms might be possible across a wider range of conditions.  But however many possibilities 
exist, they are (nite, constrained by the bond structures that must realize them together with 
the laws of physics.  Possible conformations are constrained by the microstructure.  For this 
reason, conformers pose no threat to microstructuralism.  Extrinsic determination of 
geometry should be viewed as the selection of one possible geometric state from an internally-
constrained space of possibilities.  
A second type of isomer might be thought more problematic, and indeed more similar to 
the troublesome protein cases.  &ese are structural isomers: cases where the same component 
atoms, represented by the same chemical formula, can be arranged in unique bond structures, 
yielding unique geometric shapes.  Chemists o)en regard structural isomers as being of 
di'erent kinds.  Consider again n-butane.  In addition to its two conformers, n-butane also 
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92 The motivation for this perceived problem is thorny.  I see two options: (1) Disconnect between 
lower-level structure and higher-level structure violates some a priori principal concerning the link 
between essences and the properties of a kind; or (2) Adopting different higher-level conformations 
constitutes a loss of the lower-level shared microstructure, thus introducing a new kind.  Tobin and 
Slater seem to be pressing (1), which is of course a non-starter in view of Chapters 1 & 2.  I will 
therefore charitably critique (2), but notice that the argument I present would work against 1, as well. 
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has a structural isomer, methylpropane.  Both have four carbons and ten hydrogens, but n-
butane is a linear structure and methylpropane is a branching structure.  Like the conformers, 
the space of possibilities for structural isomers of a molecule are limited by the available 
arrangements of constituent atoms together with the context and laws of physics.  
Colloquially, the conformers and structural isomers are all called ‘butane’, but the 
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) separates the structural isomers 
into two types.  &is is in contrast with its treatment of the two conformers, which are viewed 
as two instantiations of the same type, n-butane. 
It is important to consider the IUPAC standard.  &e rules for dividing and grouping 
isomers are complicated, o)en tied up with concerns about nomenclature, but the relevant 
concern here is practical: n-butane and methylpropane behave di'erently, are independently 
stable in experimental contexts, and are used separately.  Contrast this with the conformers of 
n-butane, which rapidly /ip back and forth between conformations and exhibit relatively 
similar properties.  In practical applications chemists simply do not work with pure solutions 
of a single n-butane conformer; nor would they need to, given the negligible di'erence in 
behaviour.  Di'erent IUPAC stances on conformational versus structural isomers re/ect 
practical demands of science, not fundamental metaphysical di'erences.  &ese classi(catory 
norms have an important place in the practice of chemistry and are accordingly relativised to 
the contexts of the human pursuit of chemistry.  Radically di'erent contexts, new uses, or 
more stringent acceptability standards for di'erence could lead to di'erent decisions.93 
While IUPAC’s practices do count against microstructuralism about classi(catory practices 
(as a descriptive or normative claim), they should not count against microstructuralism as a 
metaphysical thesis.  Both conformational and structural isomers exhibit the same type of 
relation between higher and lower levels of organisation.  &ough structural isomers admit a 
greater space of possible geometries, the relation is still one of internal constraint and 
contextual determination.  &e atoms in butane are subject to the electrostatic properties of 
the collective component atoms and within that space of possibilities the physical 
environment (understood as a number of various forces over time) determines which possible 
arrangement the molecule can actually take.  &e molecular essence provides a disposition to 
act this way or that, depending on relevant context.  
&ere is no reason why this strategy cannot scale up to proteins.  We can treat di'erent 
conformations adopted by multifunctional proteins as a function of extrinsic factors, 
constrained by the possibility space imposed by the physical microstructure of the 
macromolecule.   
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93 Notice for instance that the stance on n-butane is relativized to human timescales. 
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If I may now anticipate an objection, the reader might justi(ably wonder why we cannot 
extend this strategy to explain the underdetermination of physiological function.  If 
conformation is constrained intrinsically and determined by environment, why not say the 
same thing about physiology?  We might think, for instance, that just as a structure contains 
the potential for many conformations so too any given structure contains the potential for 
innumerable physiological roles.  &e roles that get selected are a function of extrinsic 
determining factors.  Indeterminate intrinsic physical microstructure at the lower level, plus 
context, equals determinate outcome at the higher level.  On the face of it this seems very 
much like the problem of isomerisation with a larger space of possibilities and a lower 
likelihood of actualization.  But there is an important di'erence.  In the case of isomerisation, 
the phenomena at the higher level are not multiply-realised at the lower level.  Any molecule 
that is n-butane or methylpropane is necessarily C4H10.  Nothing could be one of these 
structural isomers yet originate from a di'erent underlying microstructure.  &e same cannot 
be said of physiological roles.  Phenomena at the biological level are multiply realisable at the 
structural level.  &e lens crystallin role may be (lled by the αβ variant, but so too could it 
have been (lled by a number of other crystallins.  &is possibility is clear from the large 
numbers of species utilizing di'erent crystallins in their lenses.  Many molecules are suited to 
this biological role.   Molecular structures are surprisingly functionally /exible.  &e molecule 
that gets the job is the one that happened to have been evolutionarily conserved, which is a 
matter of great chance and contingency. 
A stronger (and more loaded) way to say this is that in all possible worlds the chemical 
structure we recognize as n-butane is realized by C4H10, but there are many possible worlds in 
which the biological role ‘lens crystallin’ is realized by structures other than the αβ-crystallin 
protein.  While there are commonalities between the underdetermination of conformation 
and the underdetermination of physiology, the di'erence lies in the existence of multiple-
realizability in the opposite direction.   
&e con/ict is much deeper than an observed incongruence between microstructural and 
biological classi(cation, since this weak observation would also lead us to claim that 
microstructure cannot account for (nal conformations, which also appear quite di'erent from 
the microstructures that bear them.  Much more strongly, the claim is that microstructure 
lacks the bidirectional relations with physiology that are in place between microstructure and 
conformation. 
Without the problem of physical underdetermination, there is no push le) toward the 
highly-permissive pluralist interpretation.  Classi(cation need only accommodate the 
microstructuralist, on the one hand, and the biologist, on the other. But further elimination is 
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not possible.  &e multiple-realization problem shows that it would be folly to attempt to 
privilege one of these considerations over the other.  It would be no more than a trading of 
intuitions over the relative signi(cance of biology versus chemistry.  Any such decision would 
be metaphysically arbitrary.  &e phenomena are best respected by a dual theory, comprised of 
biological kinds and chemical kinds.  &ough chemical kinds are well described by 
microstructuralism, biological kinds are more di-cult.  Philosophers and scientists have 
tended to think of protein biology through the lens of function.  &ough tempting, functional 
kinds will not su-ce.  Not only are there well-rehearsed di-culties with functional 
individuation (Slater (2009) covers some of these with regard to proteins), the functional 
/exibility of molecular structures, the multiple realization of biological functions, and the 
evolutionary contingency of function suggests that function is an accidental property of 
molecules, not an essential property of any kinds.  Instead, I suggest conceiving of biological 
kinds as historical kinds.  I will now unpack this account while defending it against the 
nominalist option.  
3. Against Nominalism, Toward a Duality of Kinds 
With the structural underdetermination problem dispensed with, two answers to the 
metaphysical question remain: nominalism and restricted pluralism.  &e most plausible case 
for nominalism about protein kinds derives from the observation that microstructuralist 
classi(cation can neither explain nor capture certain characteristic properties of proteins.  
Granted, chemical structure can explain certain of the physical properties of proteins, but it 
cannot explain everything about the biological functions.  It cannot tell us, for instance, why a 
certain biochemical performs the speci(c multiple functions that it does.  For a nominalist, 
this limitation forces scepticism about proteins as microstructural kinds and probably about 
proteins as kinds altogether.  Both of these conclusions are misguided. 
To introduce my position, consider the following extended analogy:  
 Take a solid gold necklace, a solid gold ring, and a solid gold electronic 
connector pin.  It is perfectly acceptable to tell a story about atomic structure 
according to which the gold of the jewellery and the gold of the electronic pins are 
all members of the same kind; we might take this to be a story about why all of this 
gold is indeed the same kind of thing.  &is story would be one about natural kinds. 
 Now suppose you were asked about the other kinds in this scenario: viz. gold 
jewellery and gold electrical components.  Your account might include some facts 
about the gold from which they are created, including facts that account for its 
ductility, conductivity, malleability, and colour, which explain why gold makes 
useful electrical pins and attractive jewellery.  Yet these facts would not tell us why 
humans chose to make jewellery and electrical pins, nor would they tell us why we 
chose to make these things from gold rather than palladium, silver, cadmium, or 
platinum.  &ese facts would not tell us why these very di'erent kinds of things 
happen to have been made from the same material, nor would these facts tell us 
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much about the uses to which jewellery and electrical pins are put.  In short, the 
physico-chemical facts about gold are helpful, but they do not tell the full story.  A 
better account would include any number of historical, economic, and 
anthropological facts.  &ese facts are about humans, not nature, and for this reason 
we do not call kinds like jewellery and electrical pins natural kinds.  If they are kinds 
then humans, not nature, make them so.  Yet the fact that the microstructure of gold 
cannot account for the existence or form of the kinds ‘jewellery’ and ‘electrical pins’ 
would not prevent us from saying that gold was a natural kind. 
 Consider now a more di-cult case: -crystallin.  Recall that in addition to 
serving as the lens in ducks and chickens, -crystallin also occurs as a lyase 
enzyme.  If we wanted to tell a story about how duck-lens protein, chicken-lens 
protein, and lyase protein were all similar, we would appeal to their physico-
chemical microstructure, much as we did with gold.  A shared microstructure is why 
all instances of -crystallin are generally taken to be instances of the same kind.  
We might take this to be a story about natural kinds.   
 Now suppose you were asked about the other kinds in this scenario: the kinds 
‘duck-lens protein’, ‘chicken-lens protein’, and ‘lyase enzyme’.  You could appeal to 
some facts about the -crystallin molecule, explaining why it happens to be well 
suited to refracting light and binding various substrates.  &ese facts tell us why -
crystallin makes e'ective eyes and also why -crystallin makes useful enzymes.  
Yet, just as we saw with jewellery and electrical pins, these physico-chemical facts 
about -crystallin will not give us the full story about these kinds.  &ey do not, for 
instance, tell us why -crystallin is used to make duck-lenses, rather than -
crystallin, -crystallin, or -crystallin.  &ough helpful, the physico-chemical facts 
about -crystallin do not tell us everything about the various uses to which it is 
put.   
I take it that no one will believe my tale to have proved that gold is not a natural kind.  Rather, 
the point is that we would not take our inability to account for the existence of the kinds ‘gold 
connector pin’ and ‘gold jewellery’ as evidence against gold’s status as a natural kind.  By 
parity of reasoning, I suggest, we should view biological facts about chemical kinds to be non-
problematically beyond the pale of microstructural kinds. 94   We should not take the 
incongruence of chemical and biological classi(cation to count against the natural kind status 
of the chemical kind αβ-crystallin.  &e correct move is to retain the microstructural chemical 
kind and search for a second set of kinds.  In the gold case the second set of kinds were 
artefacts, in the protein case the second set of kinds are biological kinds. 
&e kinds ‘gold jewellery’ and ‘gold electrical pin’ are not natural kinds.  &ey are human 
kinds.  How about lenses and lyases?  We should view them as evolutionary or historical 
kinds.  Are they natural kinds?  Like others, my argument for their naturalness will be le) 
implicit, an appeal to the naturalness of natural selection.  
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94 Morange (2012)  provides an excellent discussion of the limitations of both chemical and biological 
explanation.  He claims that biological—specifically evolutionary—explanations provide a sort of 
historical explanation that fills in the sorts of details left out of a chemical explanation, such as why a 
molecule performs this or that function.  
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4. Biological Kinds, Chemical Kinds, and &eir Relations 
&e microstructuralist versus historical kinds debate has traditionally been rehearsed in 
the context of biological species (Gri-ths 1999).  According to proponents of historical 
biological kinds, the only essential properties for species are their unique histories.  It is these 
histories of selection and chance that have made them what they are.  Compared to species, 
biochemical molecules are a more instructive case, owing to their comparative simplicity.  
Unlike species, the case of biomolecules makes it easy to see how microstructural and 
historical kinds relate.  &is can be seen already from the gold analogy.  Gold is a chemical 
kind that can be picked up and used by humans in the service of creating new kinds of things.  
&ese take on a life of their own, independent of the materials from which they were 
originally created.  We view the chemical kind ‘gold’ as a tool or part.  Human kinds like 
jewellery and electrical pins are created with or from these tools, by design or by 
happenstance, and are subsequently maintained or changed by innumerable forces, both 
intentional and accidental, using new and di'erent chemical kind tools.  If we wanted to 
ground the stability of these human kinds in spite of structural and functional changes, we 
would need to take recourse to their trajectory through human history.  It is this unique 
history that has shaped the contemporary kinds.  
We can think of proteins the same way.  Swap gold for chemical macromolecules, rings for 
enzymes, and humans for evolution and you have an account of biochemical kinds.  &ere are 
chemical kinds that get picked up, used, and changed, by selection and dri) in the service of 
biological kinds.  Di'erent chemical kinds come in and out of this process as genes mutate.  
Di'erent functions emerge and disappear as contexts change and selection pressures emerge.  
&rough all of this change the closest thing to a constant is the biological protein’s historical 
trajectory.  Current chemical microstructures and current physiological functions are simply 
the latest stage in an on-going history. 
Conceiving of proteins qua biological kinds as essentially historical entities helps avoid the 
intrinsic heterogeneity problem faced by the microstructuralist account.  Over time a set of 
genes coding for a protein will mutate, leading to change in protein structure.  Many of these 
will have no impact on the protein’s physiological function yet are stabilized over time.  How 
are we to conceive of these?  Should we say that the protein has changed kinds?  Other 
mutations may be more severe, inducing physiological changes slight enough to register as 
‘change’, but not enough to remove the protein from the proteome altogether.  In case of 
functional alteration, should we consider it to be a new protein?  Biological species pose these 
same two problems.  &ey exhibit change in genetic and morphological structures and also 
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gain, lose, and alter behaviours during and between generations.  &ese problems strain 
microstructural accounts. 
In the case of species, the reply to both of these worries is to reject the microstructuralist 
account.  &e same is true of proteins.  &e microstructure of a biological individual does not 
make it what it is.  &e microstructure is just one part of the biological individual.  &e parts, 
like the whole, change. We can think of the chemical kinds from which proteins are compiled 
as sets of o)en interchangeable parts, with varying e'ects on functionality.  We can likewise 
think of the function of a biological protein kind as just another property, subject to sporadic 
change and change in response to force.  Neither of these are ‘essential’ properties of the 
biological kind.  
So when we ask: Are proteins that share a function but di'er in structure the same natural 
kind? How about proteins that share a structure but di'er in function?  &e answer will be: It 
depends on the historical details.   
5. Implications for Biological Individuals 
Attention to evolution recommends one additional change: a refocusing of particulars 
away from whole molecules and toward evolutionarily-conserved units.  &e common sense 
focus for a theory of biological protein kinds is the protein molecule itself.  Intuitively this 
seems rather simple: why wouldn’t you focus on the spatially delimited molecule?  &is sort of 
physical delimitation is o)en a good strategy when it comes to chemical kinds.  But a prima 
facie problem should give pause: Biomolecules are o)en ever-changing composites, made up 
of smaller proteins and amino-acid residues.  &ough these parts converge onto one chemical 
molecule, they will almost certainly be of di'erent evolutionary origins.  It is unclear where 
and when one molecule ends and another begins, and it seems that solving this problem by 
appealing to the entire composite as a single molecule runs afoul of the historical kind 
theorist’s appeal to evolutionary history. 
To solve the mereological quandary we might borrow a trick from certain discussions of 
biological organisms and draw physical limits according to whatever composition is required 
to achieve physiological integration.  Yet this appears to inherit the general problem of (nding 
a mind-independent sense of ‘function’.  If physical composition is judged against functional 
integration, then there must be a privileged sense of physiological function.  But philosophers 
have long-strained to (nd any such notion.  Slater (2009) has already shown how di-cult it is 
to (nd the function for a given protein molecule.  Which of many actions and interactions we 
take to be the function is a matter of explanatory context.  An appeal to physiological 
integration will not work. 
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Historical kinds are whatever individuals have been conserved over time, or have resulted 
from the historical processes of which they are the current terminus.  &is approach would 
thus suggest focus on conserved domains, rather than spatially-delimited molecules.95 
Taking conserved domains as the individuals is not without precedent in practice.  
Biochemists do not explicitly conceive of conserved domains as the individuals, but it is 
nevertheless conserved domains, not whole molecules, that serve as the focus of work on 
molecular evolution.  Biochemists recognize that one spatially delimited molecule may 
contain amino acid strings of unique evolutionary origins.  &inking of conserved domains as 
potentially distinct from the whole molecule is necessary in order to explore the evolutionary 
history of protein molecules and establish cladistic relationships. 
&is approach need not face the mereological problems imposed by the need for static 
physical constraints, or the function problem imposed by the need for physiological 
integration.  &is approach is not challenged by the existence of molecules that contain 
conserved domains of di'erent historical origins, since it regards these as separate individuals 
and so they are able to be members of di'erent kinds.  &is allows us to say that, in many 
cases, di'erent biological kinds converge into a single chemical molecule with a single set of 
physical limits, to participate in the same or di'erent physiological performances.  A full 
discussion of these mereological issues continues in the next chapter, when I examine the 
problem of biological individuality in greater depth.  
6. Implications for Monism and Scienti)c Practice 
&e treatment I o'er requires conceiving of proteins in a very di'erent way.  A single 
chemical molecule may contain multiple biological individuals.  Moreover, the same 
biological kinds will o)en exist on di'erent chemical kinds. &is shi) in focus leaves the door 
open to a form of monism about taxonomies.  Proteins consist of two di'erent types of 
objects, with similar extensions.  &ere is no cross-classifying the same object.  In the 
chemical case, we have whole molecules characterized by physical microstructure.  In the 
biological case, we have conserved domains characterized by evolutionary relations.  &ough 
we must admit a duality of kind categories, there is a strong sense in which they do not 
categorize the same objects.  But taxonomic monism is just a door prize.  &e more important 
implication is that this avoids a potentially unsavoury consequence of permissive pluralism.  
On that view, one will have to concede that there are many di'erent but equally natural ways 

95 It is common to call these sequences ‘domains’, but since that term is also used to refer to units of 
function it is perhaps better to call them ‘conserved domains’, reserving ‘functional domains’ for the 
other use. 
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to categorize the same protein molecules.  Instead, we have an account of two di'erent types 
of kinds and their relations. 
What is lacking in this account is a single taxonomy of biochemical kinds.  It is not that we 
have multiple taxonomies of biochemicals, of course, it is rather that biochemical kinds 
appear not be kinds at all.  Biochemicals are at the nexus of two kinds (of kinds); but this is no 
skin o' the nose of the monist. 
&ough this position is overtly category dualist, notice that the chemical side of the protein 
case appears consistent with other chemical kinds.  One type of chemical kind—that 
described by microstructural essentialism—seems perfectly equipped to describe atoms and 
molecules of all shapes and sizes.  &e protein case o'ers no reason to suspect that there are 
limitations to the scope of microstructuralism within the world of chemical molecules.  
Insofar as this is the monism behind the chemical intuition, the desire appears stated.  
Some philosophers of science might be troubled that my theory of protein kinds diverges 
radically from actual scienti(c practice and that my theory cannot take the place of current 
taxonomies.  While we should allow scienti(c knowledge to guide investigation into kinds, it 
is certainly not the case that scienti(c practices should straightforwardly dictate metaphysical 
conclusions.  Nor is it the case that the conclusions I o'er should be taken to recommend the 
revision of scienti(c practice.  
Epistemic barriers constrain classi(catory practices.  &ese are a function of the means of 
acquisition of human knowledge and so should not constrain classi(catory metaphysics.  To 
take a simple example, we do not know the evolutionary histories of most proteins; this would 
preclude my biological classi(cation.  But a more subtle point is also worth considering.  In 
order to begin an investigation of evolutionary origins, proteins must (rst be carved up into 
operational types.  &ose types should be carved according to their evolutionary relationships, 
but that would be putting the cart before the horse.  In order to investigate the evolutionary 
history of a protein type, we need to have marked o' that type to facilitate investigation.  &e 
best option is to use structure.  One might try to classify in a way that approximates 
physiological similarity or phylogenetic relationships, but even this would be grounded in the 
relevant structural similarities.  It is for precisely these reasons that biochemists use structure 
as a primary investigative tool in the understanding of physiological function.  Structure 
provides the only currently accessible epistemic handle for thinking about proteins.  &e tools 
and techniques of biochemistry are accordingly built around structure.  &is is how I interpret 
Goodwin’s (nding that biochemical classi(cation is ‘fundamentally’ grounded in structure.  
He writes, ‘one of the enduring goals of biochemistry has been to explain the function of 
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proteins in terms of their structure’ (2011, p.534).  It would be wrong to read this as 
commitment to reductionist metaphysics.  &is is simply a response to epistemic barriers. 
Supposing we could perfectly re(ne a biological taxonomy, perhaps based on god’s eye 
view of evolutionary history, it is still not clear that this would provide the sort of taxonomy 
that scientists need.  Natural kind taxonomies are insensitive to the contexts of investigation, 
whereas actual taxonomies need to be pragmatically tailored.  While metaphysicians want 
their results to hold over all possible worlds, across all possible conditions, real-life scientists 
tend to work in just one actual world, and even then in a fairly circumscribed range of actual 
conditions.  It is perfectly acceptable if they (ne-tune their taxonomy to this world and those 
conditions.  Yet when we set practice to one side we can see that, when it comes to 
biochemicals, nature has two sets of joints. 
 
  
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5 
Biological Individuality 
In day-to-day conversation I have no trouble picking out individual things.  I separate my 
chair from the desk at which it sits, I di$erentiate my clothing from my body, and I have no 
trouble separating my friend Sarah from her twin sister Dani.96  Most of this work is done 
e$ortlessly by language that re%ects spatial boundaries, such that I need not put much thought 
into a lay theory of individuality.  But the biological world throws up a number of challenges 
to the lay theory. 
&e human gut is home to catalogues of microbes that aid with digestion and other 
metabolic processes.  &e microbes and I are functionally integrated.  Are these symbionts 
part of me?  I have no intuition one way or another.  &e dandelions in my garden reproduce 
by cloning themselves, making parent and o$spring genetically identical.  Selection sees these 
as one individual, but to my eyes they appear as many.  Which is it?  Is there a correct answer 
to be found?  A theory of biological individuality is needed. 
A concept of the individual has several roles to play.  Concerning biological individuals, 
certain of these roles are practical or epistemic.  In demographic surveys we need to know 
which things to count.  In modelling evolution we need to di$erentiate between things 
increasing in size and groups of things are increasing in number.  Individuality as it bears on 
these practical issues has received a lot of attention from philosophers of biology, particularly 

96 Dani is also my friend, even though this sentence is ambiguous on that point. 
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in the last few years (Clarke 2010, 2012, 2013, Clarke & Okasha 2013, Ereshefsky & Pedroso 
2013, Godfrey-Smith 2013). 
Epistemic work aside, individuality also performs some metaphysical and ontological 
heavy li*ing. Individuality di$erentiates between collections with many members and 
individuals with many parts; individuals and collections relate to their properties in di$erent 
ways; parts and members bear relations to one another in di$erent ways; and the status 
individual versus collection is thought to have implications for causal powers.97  A collection 
of philosophers also think that ontological facts about individuality bear on social and ethical 
issues, such as those surrounding abortion (Lee et al. 2014, Smith & Brogaard 2003).98  &e 
metaphysical side of biological individuality asks whether certain collections of biological 
matter form one thing or multiple things 
&ese metaphysical questions of individuality are questions about how to negotiate 
part/whole relationships.  &ough biology furnishes us with catalogues of challenging cases, 
the general problem is not unique to our ,eld.  In analytic metaphysics and ontology the 
problem even has its own name, rarely uttered by philosophers of biology: &e Special 
Composition Question (SCQ).99  SCQ asks: under what conditions do objects combine to 
constitute other objects?  Answering SCQ would tell us not only what biological things form 
wholes, but also what it is about those things that marks them o$ as ontologically di$erent 
from mere collections of parts.100   
Unfortunately, the literature of SCQ is far from conclusive.  Few proposed answers have 
gained traction; none come anywhere near consensus.  A philosopher of biology cannot 
simply look to those mereological theories, ,nd the correct account, and then start carving up 
the biome.  Nevertheless, looking at SCQ is the best way to regiment the metaphysical 
discussion of biological individuals.  At the very least, this perspective makes plain exactly 
what is at issue, metaphysical and ontologically, and what sorts of account may be applicable.  
I describe three forms that answers to SCQ may take: universal, moderate, and nihilistic 
compositionalism.  It is clear that philosophers and biologists seek a ‘moderate’ form.  
According to the moderate compositional intuition, we must separate the ‘real’ composite 

97 On the second and third points see the concise overview in (Varzi 2007).  The final point is discussed 
below. 
98 These accounts focuss on the part/whole relationship of mother, foetus, and associated biomass. 
99 This comes from Peter van Inwagen (1990). 
100 van Inwagen actually distinguishes three questions: The General Composition Question (GCQ), the 
Special Composition Question (SCQ), and the Inverse Special Composition Question (ISCQ).  GCQ 
asks about the relationship between wholes and parts, SCQ is specifically about the relationship 
amongst parts that compose a whole, ISCQ asks about the property instantiated by an object in case it 
is composed of parts.  The discussion in this chapter deals mostly with SCQ, but will overlap 
occasionally with GCQ.  I ignore the difference for present purposes, but see Hawley (2006) for a 
detailed treatment of the varying forms that answers to these questions must take. 
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entities, like organisms and proteins (perhaps), from the apparently composite entities, like 
%ocks of birds or transient molecular compounds.  &e intuition is strongly shared among 
philosophers of biology who want to secure some realism about the higher-level objects to 
which they appeal.   
A second shi* will further these goals.  Rather than a shi* in perspective, it is a shi* in 
examples, away from the standard examples—organisms—and toward other biological 
composites.  Here I discuss biomolecules.  Biomolecules demand an account of individuality 
for all the same reasons as organisms.  &rough this lens, it quickly becomes clear that many 
accounts of biological individual will not provide general answers to biological composition, 
but are rather answers to the question: ‘what is a life?’, or ‘what composites form singular 
lives?’, focussing as they do on physiology, reproduction, or other apparent features of living 
things.   
&is chapter critically evaluates two theories with the potential to satisfy the moderate 
compositional intuition, both of which tie individuality to features of the world rather than 
properties of life.  In each case it is unclear whether the account is meant as an ontological or 
conceptual clari,cation.  &e charitable interpretation is conceptual, and so I view my project 
as evaluating the possibility of extending these accounts to provide a rich metaphysics of 
biological individuality.  &e ,rst theory grounds individuation in causation (Bapteste & 
Dupré 2013, Dupré 2007, Wilson 2000).  According to this account, individuals are the relata 
of causal relations.  I will argue against adopting this view as a metaphysical account.  Features 
of the world can be lumped together operationally for the purpose of causal claims, but the 
accuracy of these claims says nothing about the compositional status of the objects that 
feature in them.  Our causal theories of the world can be accurate even if our ontology of 
objects is not.  &e second theory emerged in a landmark paper by Ellen Clarke (2013).  For 
Clarke, individuality is tied to mechanisms that determine the level(s) at which selection is 
happening.  I will argue that this account is compatible with Kind Historicism.  Since Clarke’s 
account is aimed at modelling future evolution, it must be modi,ed slightly in order to 
include the genesis of past and current biological individuals.  Once this is done, what remains 
is a theory according to which individuals are whatever composites have participated in 
Darwinian processes.   
Once modi,ed (or ‘ontologized’), Clarke’s theory becomes Kind Historicism.  Both claim 
that individuals are composites participating in and resulting from Darwinian processes.  We 
therefore do not need a separate theory of biological individuality.  It is the kinds, I will claim, 
that help us reward the real collections with a special ontological status.  &is move is extra 
appealing when we remember that many putative individuals in biology can fail to participate 
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in evolutionary processes (e.g. sterile organisms).  If we attach individuality to kind 
membership, not particulars, then these putative individuals are not a problem.  &ey are still 
individuals in virtue of being members of kinds that are the result of long-run Darwinian 
processes.  Kinds therefore perform the ontological heavy li*ing sought a*er by the moderate 
compositionalist intuition.  A theory of individuality seems super%uous.  Which clumps of 
matter have some ontological status over and above the other clumps?  &e natural kinds!   
&is chapter marks the beginning of a shi* in focus, away from ontology and toward 
scienti,c reasoning, in pursuit of Q3.  &e shi* reaches its climax in the conclusion.  Here and 
in the next chapter, I speak somewhat tongue-in-cheek about quests to award ‘badges of 
ontological merit’.  What I am criticising with this phrase is not the idea that there are 
metaphysical or ontological facts pertaining to biology.  To the contrary, I think that Kind 
Historicism helps illuminate these facts.  Rather what I am criticising is the tacit assumption 
that those ontological and metaphysical facts should dictate scienti,c categories.  My criticism 
of this assumption comes out largely in the next chapter.  First, in this chapter, my goal is to 
simultaneously show how Kind Historicism relates to individuality while also downplaying 
the import of ontology facts of individuality.   
To stress the importance and independence of the pragmatic approach to questions of 
individuality, I begin by brie%y introducing questions of individuality and separating an 
epistemic side of the debate.  I then discuss individuality as an ontological concept before 
evaluating the causal and Darwinian approaches to individuality.  A*er explaining how 
Clarke’s (2013) Darwinian approach to individuality is ultimately an application of Kind 
Historicism, I conclude by re%ecting on the possibility of using natural kinds to secure 
physico-chemical individuals, as well.  
1. Why Individuality? Which Individuality? 
In both biology and in its philosophy a great many scholars have turned their attention to 
the question of individuality.  &e problem is an old one.  In writing-up the Beagle voyage, 
Darwin mused about the nature of biological individuality, noticing that some organisms 
seem to be ‘incomplete’ without the presence of others (19 May 1834; in Darwin, 1913).  T.H. 
Huxley (1852) worried about biological individuality, identifying individuality with 
microphysical (genetic) similarity.  Julian Huxley rebuked his grandfather’s position, believing 
that it could not handle monozygotic twins.  &e younger Huxley preferred to think of 
individuals as self-maintaining integrated systems: 
[L]iving matter always tends to group itself into these ‘closed, independent systems 
with harmonious parts.’ &ough the closure is never complete, the independence 
never absolute, the harmony never perfect, yet systems and tendency alike have real 
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existence.  Such systems I personally believe can be identi,ed with the Individuals 
treated of by the philosopher (1912, p.ix) 
And debates about individuality are still in vogue among biologists.  Following the 
comparatively recent discovery of a giant genetically-homogenous fungus in Michigan, the 
pages of Nature were awash with debates about the nature of biological individuality.101  Upon 
the completion of the ENCODE project, one (of many) controversies centred round the 
individuating criteria used for genes and functional genetic elements. 
&ose worried about biological individuality o*en have in mind the growing number of 
bizarre biological phenomena that challenge our common-sense notions about what makes a 
thing a thing, rather than a collection of more basic parts.  Anyone who has seen a yogurt 
advertisement in the last 10 years will know that our digestive system is home to untold 
numbers of tiny microbes, which, among other things, help us to digest our food and 
maintain normal metabolic function (see discussion in O’Malley & Dupré 2007, Dupré & 
O’Malley 2007).  Are the microbes part of us?  Are they di$erent individuals inside of us?  
Perhaps the inside wall of the gut in fact marks an outer surface of the human, such that we 
are really long tubes in the void of which an ecosystem of microbiological life thrives.102  &e 
animal kingdom is full of these cases—and so is the literature on biological individuality.  But 
symbiosis is not the only problem.  Problems of individuality also arise when we consider 
‘superorganisms’ such as the 8 square kilometre fungus in Oregon (Ferguson et al. 2003), or 
the 6000 tonne 40 000 trunk tree named Pando in Utah (Grant 1993).  &is collection of 
mushrooms and forest full of trees are believed to be single individual organisms, respectively, 
because they are connected via complex root systems and are genetically identical.  In the late 
1970s biologist Dan Jenzen caused a stir when he announced that populations of 
parthenogenic103 organisms were in fact single individuals.  Janzen (1977) described the clonal 
o$spring of female aphids as ‘pieces’ of a rapidly growing parthenogenic individual; he 
described ,elds of dandelion clones as giant trees that spread laterally across the valley %oor, 
rather than vertically toward the sky.  Other troublesome cases have included lumps of algae 
and lichen, viruses, and the microbial populations that form bio,lms104 (Ereshefsky & Pedroso 
2013).  &ese cases are puzzling because they share some but not all of the hallmarks of 
prototypical individuals, such as physical connection (Hull 1980), genetic identity (Janzen 
1977), or physiological integration (Wilson & Sober 1989).  It is a complex question whether 
shared physiology, shared genetics, shared evolutionary fate, or something di$erent altogether 

101 Nature 356, April 1992. 
102 This possibility is discussed by Dupré (2007). 
103 Parthenogenesis is a type of asexual reproduction absent the fertilization of an embryo.  In Janzen’s 
cases what is relevant is the existence of a genetically homogenous population. 
104 A ‘biofilm’ is a collection of microorganisms that are connected by a self-produced extra-cellular 
‘slime’.  They can be composed of one or multiple species.   
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combines parts together to form biological wholes.  Beyond these cases there are many and 
more bizarre forms of life that have perverted attempts at reaching a consensus de,nition the 
biological individual.   
It is surely the case that certain practical and epistemic issues hang on the de,nition of 
individuality on which biologists settle.  So it is important that philosophers examine how 
biologists do or should conceive of individuals, and what the implications of various such 
conceptions might be.  However it is an open question whether there is a corresponding 
metaphysical or ontological dimension to these issues.  Not only is it unclear whether the 
pragmatically-selected de,nition could/should/does line up with where the individuals really 
are, it is unclear even whether it makes sense to talk about the real individuals, at all.  
Certainly the tone of debates about symbionts, clones, and superorganisms suggests there is a 
‘correct’ answer to be found; and the word ‘ontological’ appears throughout discussions of 
biological individuality.  However this alone does not establish that there is a genuine issue.   
Debates about biological individuality are nearly always fought over organisms.  It is not 
just that organisms are the proto-typical examples of biological individuals; it would seem 
that, for many, the search for an account of individuality will end if and when we ,nd an 
adequate account of organism.  To some extent this is a function of the practical and 
epistemic side of the individuality debate, which arises within the context of evolution and is 
therefore discussed primarily using organisms.  So what is the ontological problem of the 
biological individual?  &ere are two possible answers.  On the one hand, the problem might 
be a matter of determining what is an individual life, or an individual living organism.  On the 
other hand, the problem might be a matter of addressing an intuition about composition 
according to which certain things ‘really’ come together to form biological wholes and certain 
things do not.  In this chapter I examine the latter question.  My defence of this choice is 
simply that it forces us to include biological objects that are evolved but are not intuitively 
alive, such as biochemical molecules.  &is choice is also motivated by a desire not to 
discharge philosophical work to a positively ba0ing notion such as ‘life’, and by my extreme 
scepticism that ‘living thing’ picks out a category about which anything intelligible can be 
said.  
1.1 Individuality as a Conceptual Tool 
Faced with mycological monsters like the giant mushroom of Oregon, or symbiotic 
sycophants like our gut %ora, biologists need a conceptual tool for separating organismal parts 
from the (apparent) functional whole—and not simply to satisfy curiosity.  &e way in which 
we conceive of individuality will have big rami,cations for the way in which we model 
evolutionary systems.   
 113 
A fundamental activity in evolutionary biology is counting.  Sounds easy.  But the trouble 
is that we do not always know what to count.  Place me in an animal shelter and ask me to 
count dogs and I will have your answer in no time.  Place me inside of Pando and tell me to 
count trees and I will need to ,rst ,nd a good armchair.  Decisions on this matter have big 
implications.  In addition to the obvious ones, such as a$ecting the number of individuals we 
take to be present, conceptions of individuality also impact reasoning about and modelling of 
selection and evolution.  Individuals are bearers of ,tness, non-individuals are not.  It is 
individuals over which our evolutionary reasonings range.  If individuals of type-a are ,tter 
than of type-b, then we expect individuals-a to be present in greater numbers than 
individuals-b in the next generation.  In fact this claim has meaning only in light of a concept 
of individuality.  &e terms featured in evolutionary theorizing are all relative to individuals: 
generations, traits, and phenotypes are all ‘ … of individuals’. 
Pando helps make the problem concrete.  Suppose that one of Pando’s 40 000 ‘stems’ 
(trees?) acquires a mutation during mitosis, which leads to faster root growth and hence 
increased reproduction.  &is heritable growth pattern is an increase in ,tness and so, ceteris 
paribus, selection is happening.  For a scientist modelling Pando as the individual the 
selection will be invisible, lost within Pando’s aggregate ,tness.  For a scientist modelling 
stems as individuals it is clear that within-Pando selection is happening.105  Both conceptions 
map onto something important.  In one sense there really is tree-level selection happening, 
which will impact the future composition of Pando.  In another sense, this selection really is 
just one part of Pando’s ,tness, which must be balanced against all of the other bits of Pando if 
we are to understand Pando’s future.106 
Arguments about individuality o*en proceed by testing de,nitions against special cases, 
like those listed above.  &us recent reviews and articles reject extant theories on the grounds 
that they fail to capture the individuality of niche multicellural taxa (Herron et al. 2013), 
plants (Clarke 2012), or bio,lms (Ereshefsky & Pedroso 2013).  Just as single trees require a 
di$erent individuality concept from Pando, so do plants require a di$erent individuality 
concept from bio,lms.  &is appears to support a relaxed common-sense pluralism about 
biological individuals.  Much like pluralism about natural kinds and species taxa, pluralism 
about biological individuals is driven partly by the observation that di$erent branches of 
biology and di$erent investigations need di$erent concepts, and partly by the failure to ,nd a 
single theory that uni,es our pre-theoretic use of ‘individual’.  &ere are at least 13 de,nitions 
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105 A more detailed version of a similar example (using aphids) can be found in (Clarke 2013). 
106 You might think, as Clarke seems to imply, that averaging will misestimate the fitness. This is true 
only if fitness is taken as a static measure.  If we measure instead change in fitness over time and 
average the changes in fitness over time from various parts of Pando, the result should be an accurate 
representation of the acceleration in fitness. 
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common in the literature, which carve up the biological world di$erently (Clarke 2010).  &e 
biological world contains a myriad of types of physical organisation.  Not only are there huge 
di$erences between mammals, bacteria, reptiles, or archaea; there are also huge di$erences 
within these groups.  It is this heterogeneity that frustrates consensus de,nitions of 
individuality.  &is, combined with recognition of the diverse explanatory demands placed on 
the concept, make pluralism quite tempting.  It also makes the ontological question all the 
more interesting. 
1.2 Individuality as Ontological Merit Badge 
&e ontology of the material world throws up a prima facie challenge for the realist.  We do 
not experience a world of fundamental particles or isolated atoms; the world as we experience 
it is made up of composite things.  &e challenge is to give an account of when composition 
occurs; that is, when little things combine to make larger things.  For philosophers of science 
the debate concerns the existence of groups over individuals, organisms over parts, and so on.  
For mereologists this debate concerns all physical objects above fundamental particles.  &e 
content di$ers but these discussions are substantially the same.  &e task is to determine how 
it might be that wholes exist consisting of parts.  &is task carries a concomitant burden: 
providing an account that distinguishes the clumps of parts that really form wholes from 
those that merely appear to do so.  &ere is an intuition, and it is a strong one, that some 
things really do go together and other things really do not.  It is the former things, the 
intuition goes, that our ontology should reward.  &ose things deserve badges of ontological 
merit.  &is intuition is ‘moderate compositionalism’ and I think it explains the drive behind 
ontological approaches to biological individuality.   
&e label ‘moderate’ sets this compositionalism apart from two more extreme forms: 
nihilism and universalism.  Nihilism is the claim that composition never happens, that the 
world just is a distribution of fundamental particles.  We can imagine why this is not an 
attractive option for philosophers of science.  Universalism is the claim that composition 
always happens, that it is automatic that for any number of things there is another thing that is 
their composite.  Universalism is harder to resist, for it would seem to be implied by the truth 
conditions for conjunction.  If A exists and if B exists, then A+B exists.  Universalism does 
permit us to claim that some lumps of atoms do form real wholes but this comes at a cost, for 
we have to admit that all collections of atoms do so.  So universalism allows me to claim that 
the bundle of particles that makes up my cat Ellie107 really do form a thing that is Ellie, but 
only if I am willing to admit that there are innumerably many other things that are those same 

107 No, I did not forget the name of my cat.  Joey, from the introduction, is one of two.  Ellie was my 
second cat. 
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particles plus one or two more from somewhere else in the universe.  To stick with the stock 
mereological example, there is some thing that is Ellie and the Ei$el tower.  Both really exist 
and so too does their conjunction.   
Moderate compositionalism lies in-between.  &e belief is that sometimes, in certain cases, 
under certain conditions, we have genuine wholes composed of parts.  &e trick is to come up 
with the conditions—then we can start conferring the badges.  
Biologists appeal to a great number of higher-level organisations as real things.  Organisms 
are the best example, but more abstractly some may want to think of populations, hives, oosts, 
herds, troops, kin groups and families as real objects.  In fact, biologists do nothing but appeal 
to higher-level composites—they do not much care for fundamental particles.  Certain 
philosophers of biology have sought to advance an anti-reductionist description of these 
higher-level individuals as genuine entities, not arbitrary collections of particles.  Sometimes 
this discussion takes the form of physicalist anti-reductionism (Dupré 1993), sometimes of 
strong emergence.108  Regardless, the claim is that certain collections of things deserve 
recognition as real collections.  Implicit in this claim is the belief that other collections do not 
go together in this same way. 
1.3 Individuality and Biology 
Discussions occasioned by Pando, bio,lms, the giant mushroom, and symbiosis are 
instances of the moderate compositionalist intuition.  &ese debates appear to be more broad 
only because they represent a move beyond providing conditions for the possibility of 
composites and now address distinctions between composites at di$erent levels.  But this is 
only a small extension.  Whatever the conditions are that allow me to sort the genuine 
collections of matter from the apparent ones, those same conditions allow me to claim that 
Pando is one such collection but that normal forests are numerous such collections.  When we 
are giving badges for ontological merit, it doesn’t matter whether we are sorting the 
fundamental things from the composite things or the single composite things from the 
collections of composite things, the desire in both cases is to sort the real from the apparent, 
decorating the former.  
Moderate compositionalism is just as much at home in the context of biomolecules as it is 
in the case of organisms and other higher-level groups.  A survey of the biomolecular world 
reveals phenomena very much like those that occur at higher levels.  For one, protein 
molecules o*en join forces, sometimes for prolonged periods of time.  &ese compounds are 

108 British Emergentism, most closely associated with C.D. Broad, often focussed on biological 
examples of this sort.  Today this is often read as a commitment to non-reductive materialism. 
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so common that they are o*en considered to be a ,nal ‘level’ of structure for each partner, 
called the ‘quaternary’ structure.109 
Additionally, the non-rigid and occasionally ‘transient’ (Mittag et al. 2010) nature of 
chemical bonding should su1ce to raise mereological worries about biochemical molecules.  
Far from being groups of balls and sticks as we frequently picture them, biomolecules can be 
considerably more loose collections of free-moving atoms and electrons.  &e emerging view 
of molecular interaction among those who study ‘disordered’ proteins is of a loose aggregate 
of atoms and a sheet of electron density.  &e electrons do not bind to the target molecule but 
move dynamically to create a weak force of attraction.  As a more general problem, that same 
thing occurs within molecules—proteins and otherwise—according to at least one in%uential 
de,nition of ‘bond’ (Bader 1990).  On this view, bonds are not rigid links between atoms, but 
peaks in the molecule’s aggregate electron distribution.  Since anything in close physical 
proximity to the molecule will a$ect the energy of the system, we face a prima facie 
demarcation problem. Absent sti$ bonds to help us decide what is and is not part of a 
molecule, we need some way of distinguishing the molecule from everything that surrounds 
and interacts with it. 
&ere are many parallels between biomolecular composition and organismal composition.  
Both feature vague collections of interacting parts at multiple levels, which persist for various 
periods of time.  Both exist as physiologically integrated composites of heterogeneous origins 
and opaque boundaries.  Both appear to have persisted through generations as integrated 
composites.  &e moderate compositionalist intuition is as applicable here as anywhere in 
biology.  If anything solves the composition problem then it will solve it for the entire 
biological world, not just for organisms. 
Expanding focus to include biomolecules will not somehow provide the de,nition of 
individuals, as authors claim of certain other test cases.  What it does, however, is highlight 
the fact that certain proposed solutions to the individuality problem are in fact solutions to a 
di$erent problem altogether: the problem of de,ning an organism, or life.  Superorganisms 
and symbionts can easily be viewed as cases where questions about individuals just are 
questions about individual lives.  When implicitly taking this form, treatments of individuality 
hinge on immune systems (Pradeu 2012), reproductive bottlenecks (Maynard-Smith & 
Szathmáry 1995), and various other physiological marks of living beings.  &ese are non-
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109 There is interesting social epistemological work to be done to explain why we conceive of these as 
two separate things coming together and not two pieces forming a whole.  Similarly, there are more 
basic mereological issues to do with protein origin.  The amino acid residues of which a protein is 
composed can come from very different genetic origins.  They may come from different regions of 
DNA, which may not even lie on the same chromosome.  Again, the norms governing when we 
consider these amino acids to have formed a protein are complex.   
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starters—unless, of course, organisms are somehow the only genuinely compound things in 
the biological world.110  &ough popular, I do not consider these approaches to be applicable 
to the present discussion.   
2. No Merit Badges for Causal Agency 
&ere is much that can be said for what makes something an individual.  As a ,rst pass we 
can say that individuals are not properties; they are things that bear properties.  &is is 
Aristotle’s de,nition of substance, later picked up and modi,ed by Locke.  On this 
conception, individuals are the sorts of stu$ of which things are predicated but are not 
themselves predicated of anything.  To describe them, as Locke found, is impossible; we are 
only describing lists of their properties.111  &is no more than gestures at a solution to the 
composition problem, since something predicated of a whole may well be shorthand for 
predication of some sub-set of the parts of that whole.  Substance only gets us so far. 
In a development along these lines, many philosophers of biology proceed with the claim 
that individuals are anything that has causal powers (e.g. Bapteste & Dupré 2013) or the 
similar claim that biological individuals are the locus of agency (Wilson 2005, Wilson & 
Barker 2013).  I will treat these two criteria as equivalent and call the resulting theory the 
‘causal node’ account.112  &is account is strongly tied to non-reductive physicalism about 
biological groups, but I will not dwell on this connection.   
&e causal node view is very helpful in %eshing out our pre-theoretic claims about 
individuality.  We do seem to think that groups that act as a whole are good candidates for 
being treated as wholes.  &ese things are referred to as wholes when reference to their parts 
seems redundant, given that they constantly behave as wholes as far as we are concerned.  
O*en, causal features of a system only become intelligible when we conceive of some 
aggregates in that system as wholes.  So the causal node restriction on individuality gives us a 
property of a compound entity to which we can appeal in talking about compound 
individuals.  &ough it is certainly true that this view provides useful epistemic shorthand, it 
is far from clear that the view can secure an ontological ground for composition.   
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110 Van Inwagen (1990) claims just that … and more!  He thinks that there are no composite objects 
that are non-natural and that the only natural composite objects are unified by giving rise to life.  So 
organisms (and maybe viruses?) are the only composites in the world.  Everything else is fundamental 
particles appearing to form compounds.  I will discuss this view below. 
111 There is a contemporary (though classically empiricist) view, in the philosophy of physics, that holds 
that individuals are only bundles of properties.  This is the ‘bundle’ view.  
112 Getting rid of the word ‘agency’ is helpful.  The causal node view is not the same as the view that 
certain biological things exhibit intentionality (as ‘agency’ might accidentally indicate).  The view on 
offer here is rather that individuals are the sorts of things that can serve as nodes in a causal chain or 
network. 
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If this view provides criteria for composition, it does so by claiming that the piles of matter 
that really go together are those piles that exhibit causal powers only as wholes.  Ultimately, the 
only way for this view to get o$ the ground is with a pre-existing assumption of the non-
supervenience of the higher-level composites whose ontological status is sought in the ,rst 
place.  &e argument is either circular or requires rejecting reductive materialism—and I am 
not about to concede that.113 
It should be uncontroversial that behaviours and interactions of organisms are best 
described at the organism level.  &is requires treating the organism as a whole rather than as 
a collection of parts.  When we are describing the grazing habits of a goat we do not describe 
the cellular interactions in the gut, their e$ect on dopamine receptors via neurotransmitters in 
the brain, which lead the goat to drop its head an munch away.  Instead we talk about the goat 
getting hungry.  Explanations are a lot more helpful when we can treat the situation as though 
there is a thing that is a goat and that this goat has goat-level behaviours and goat-level 
interactions.  As an explanatory strategy, attributing agency and existence to the goat is 
invaluable.  But explanatory utility does not an ontological status buy. 
&e ontological status of the goat as a badge-deserving individual hangs ultimately on its 
ability to be an agent of causal change over and above the causes of its parts.  &is position is 
frequently expressed as the claim that causation must exist as more than the sums of the 
individual causal powers of the parts: 
We assume that real entities are those that have causal powers; complex entities are 
real if they have causal powers that are not merely aggregates of the causal powers of 
their parts.  Organisms, for instance, can do things that none of their parts can 
manage on their own.  Similarly functional proteins have capacities – catalytic, 
structural, etc. – that are not exhibited by any of the amino acids of which they are 
composed. (Bapteste & Dupré 2013, p.380) 
 
[T]here are may di$erent kinds of things in the world, from physically simple things 
like electrons or quarks, to very complex things such as planets, elephants, or 
armies.  Many or all of these things, in my view, have equal claims to reality.  As the 
basis of this position is the idea that many or all such entities have causal powers 
that are not simply consequences of the way their physical components are ,tted 
together. (Dupré 2007, p.12)  
 
[T]here is a whole hierarchy of increasingly complex things that really exist, and that 
have causal powers that are not reducible to the mechanical combination of the 
powers of their constituents. (Dupré 2007, p.15)  
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113 Noticing a similar dependence on non-reductive materialism in the context of special science laws, 
Callender and Cohen (2010) also reject this brand of metaphysics (somewhat more briskly than I do) 
claiming, ‘If we have reason to believe anything in science, it’s that macroscopic entities are constituted 
by microscopic ones and their relations.  If we insist on this, as we do, [the account given by Dupré and 
others] won’t do all of the things we want our metaphysics of science to do’ (p 5). 
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&ese claims are grounded in observations of the explanatory utility of appealing to wholes 
over parts.  If these epistemic observations are to be anything more than suggestive about the 
wholes that feature in explanations, some meat must be put on the bones of this position.   
We can all agree that novel properties may arise in compound entities.  Even the 
ontological reductionist can be happy with this claim, since it says nothing about the novel 
property being more than the sum of its parts.  Weight is the easiest example.  If we add the 
weights of the components of a composite we arrive at a summative weight.  We call this the 
weight of the compound.  It is novel in the sense that the sum is not contained in the list of 
weights added to obtain it; but this does not entail that the summative weight is somehow 
greater than the sum of its parts.  It exactly is the sum of its parts.   
Perhaps weight is too easy, since it is summative and relatively unrelated to causation.  
Take instead the claim about proteins from the ,rst quote, above.  Bapteste and Dupré are 
correct: &e catalytic properties of a whole protein are novel.  &is is true in the sense that if 
we listed the properties of each of the composing amino acids, nowhere in that list would the 
catalytic role appear.  &e amino acids have many causal properties, many of which will not 
manifest once they aggregate into a single protein.  &is is certainly true of any 
conformationally-dependent properties, which will be increasingly truncated in systems that 
permit less freedom of movement.  Does this aggregation simultaneously permit other causal 
properties?  Surely it does.  &e question is whether these are numerous properties of some 
pieces or singular properties of the whole.   
&e causal node theorist will claim that the new catalytic property is a property of the 
protein.  &ey must mean by this not just that no single piece has the catalytic property, since 
nobody would claim otherwise.  Instead they mean that the catalytic ability is not simply a 
manifestation of the aggregation of some subset of the causal actions of the parts.  I claim, in 
contrast, that the amino acids exhibit individual causal properties, which, in aggregate, 
constitute causal events visible at the protein level. &e visibility at this level does not entail 
that some object at this level deserves a badge of ontological merit.  
&e issue is not whether there is causation happening at the higher level.  Several popular 
theories of causation are equipped to handle causation at macroscopic levels.  &e account 
preferred by causal node theorists is the interventionist framework made popular by James 
Woodward (2003).  Interventionism is an undemanding account of causation in the sense that 
it places few constraints on what counts as a ‘genuine’ cause, adopting a metaphysically 
de%ationary attitude toward any connections between causally associated variables.  For an 
interventionist, X causes Y just in case, given stable background conditions, following some 
 120 
intervention on X the value of Y would change.114  &is account has become popular for 
conceptualising causation in biology (Waters 2007, Woodward 2010).  But the interventionist 
framework alone cannot support the sort of ontological claims needed here.   
Notice that the interventionist is uncommitted to the existence of causation at any 
particular level.  Causation exists at whatever level of description it is appropriate to make 
these sorts of claims.  So we can talk about electrons causing changes at the sub-atomic level, 
proteins causing catalysis, baseballs breaking windows, and economic policies causing 
recessions.  Anytime we can de,ne two variables and claim an interventionist relation 
between them, we have described causation.  On this view, providing a causal explanation just 
is providing information about a case of causation.  
&e interventionist picture places no constraints on the relata of a causal relationship.  
&ough many causal theories speak of ‘events’, Woodward speaks even more generally about 
‘variables’.  In the statement ‘X causes Y’, X and Y can be any multi-valued variable.  O*en 
these variables will be properties of the things in our causal chain, but they can also be 
Boolean representations of events’ occurrence or non-occurrence.  In the baseball case, X can 
stand in for the position of the baseball in space time and Y can stand in for a property of the 
glass, broken or whole.  To claim that the baseball causes the window to break is to claim that 
a change in the value of the spatial location of the ball would result in a change in the value of 
the state of the window. 
Simple cases like this seem to vindicate the causal node view.  In spite of the fact that the 
baseball is composed mostly of isoprene and the glass of silicate, we predicate the causation of 
the wholes, not the molecular parts.  But many cases are not so hospitable.  Switch now to the 
case of a protein catalysing a reaction.  In this case, X is presumably a state-space description 
of the protein molecule, while Y (catalysis) does not belong exclusively to any of the reactants.  
&e antecedent variable Y can be described as a property of all reactants, or of the local 
system.  A change in the state space of the protein [X] may result in the disappearance of the 
reactants [Y1], or it may result in a new state of the local system [Y2] (viz that the system now 
contains a di$erent arrangement of particles in space).  Does the second description make the 
local system an individual?  How is this to be negotiated?  &e causal relationship could also 
be broken down into components.  Perhaps X causes ,rst a change in binding [Y], where Y= a 
range in the peak electron densities within one domain of one reactant.  Later X causes a 
lowering of reaction potentials [Z], where Z= the state-quantity of rate-limiting free energy of 
the local system.  Notice that I’ve le* the le* side of the expressions static (X=protein 
molecule) but I could as easily break it down along similar lines.  In each case of binding the 
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114 See Woodward (2003, p.98) for an explanation of ‘intervention’.   
 121 
relevant variable is not the whole protein but the peak electron densities of some sub-set of 
one domain.  So where are the individuals? 
&e interventionist framework can subsume any group under a single variable where 
interventions causing changes in that group reliably result in changes in some other variable, 
under at least some circumstances, however narrow or unlikely.  For this reason, the 
framework does not supply the sorts of composites that the causal node theorist desires.  
In general, causal claims are a poor guide to an ontology of entities.  History is full of cases 
where accurate causal claims turn out to have been based on a misunderstanding of the 
entities involved.  Woodward (2010) discusses a few such cases, explaining that we should be 
realist about the causal structure, not the particular relata we invoke in representing that 
structure.  I do not mean to claim that the groups referred to in interventionist style causal 
expressions are not somehow interestingly di$erent from the groups that cannot feature in 
these expressions.  Baseballs have some basis in our experience of reality that my cat and the 
Ei$el Tower do not.  &at is evidenced by their ability to feature in successful causal 
explanations.  I suspect, however, that the moderate compositionalist intuition at play in 
discussions of biological individuality will remain unsatis,ed in the face of composites 
permitted by the interventionist framework.  Certainly it would not deliver intuitive verdicts 
on symbiosis, superorganisms, or other popular cases.  
So far I have established only that the issue is not simply whether or not causation is 
happening at higher levels, since composition is unhelpfully unproblematic on metaphysically 
and ontologically de%ationary (or uncommitted) schemes.  &e causal node theorist must ,nd 
some grounds on which to argue that the levels of speci,c composites are better or more 
accurate representations of the structure of the world.115 
One attempt appeals to our ability to unify explanations by predicating them of a single 
whole.  Protein catalysis could be described as a series of disconnected causal relationships 
predicated of domains and sub-sets of total molecular structures.  But this picture does not 
allow us to see that all of the protein domains are domains of a protein.  One might wonder 
whether these are distinct events of objects located in close spatial proximity, or if they are 
parts of a larger event of a single object.  &e only way to conceive of these as parts of one 
event is to predicate them not of a collection of disconnected atoms or domains, but of an 
integrated whole protein.  But the argument quickly reveals itself to be circular.  If we need to 
,nd a protein-level cause in order to ground the claim that the protein is an individual and 
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115 I made this same point, targeted instead at mechanistic theories of causation, in (Bartol 2013b).  
This criticism is compatible with (if not enhanced by) the causal pluralism advanced by Dupré (2013).  
It is that argument that leads me to believe that his causal node view is intended not as a metaphysical 
account, but rather (what I call) an epistemic or pragmatic one.  
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not a collection of atoms, then we cannot use a claim about the protein as an individual to 
secure the existence of the protein-level cause over and above the atom-level causes.   
&is circularity objection can be motivated from a second perspective.  &e appeal to 
higher-level composites faces the very mereological conjunction and perspectival problems 
that it is meant to avoid.  For any two really existing causal capacities, there will be a third 
thing that is the conjunction of those capacities.  &is will be true even if the third thing is a 
gerrymandered composite.  &e only way to avoid the gerrymandered composite capacity is to 
take recourse to pre-existing beliefs about where the individuals are and tie capacities to that 
level.  Take the grass-munching goat.  &e neurotransmitter activity, on the one hand, and the 
musculo-skeletal reaction, on the other, really exist separately.  &eir conjunction, too, exists.  
But this is okay because we think the conjunction really does exist and we call this ‘eating 
grass’.  We can understand the two disconnected phenomena as a single phenomenon when 
predicated not of neurons and muscle tissue but of a whole goat.  Now think of a 
gerrymandered conjunction.  Take the chewing of the grass and the running away of the 
nearby ants.  Both really exist and so does their conjunction.  While we might grant that these 
two sets of causal capacities are connected in some way, the moderate compositionalist does 
not want to say that they form some single larger causal capacity.  &is is because that single 
larger capacity would be a capacity belonging to a bizarre combination of goat-jaw-muscle 
and ant neurophysiology.  &e only way to save our ontology from these Franken-individuals 
is to appeal to pre-existing notions of what the individuals really are and to then predicate our 
causal capacities of those individuals.  &at would beg the question. 
One further option remains, but it is not particularly attractive.  In order to address the 
moderate compositionalist intuition, the causal node view may hold that there is some feature 
present at the protein level that is not present at the lower level, and that this feature, whatever 
it is, ensures that some type of causation obtaining at that level is unique to that level such that 
the higher-level cause is not merely ‘the sum of its parts’.   &is claim is a statement of non-
reductive physicalism.  Perhaps there are cases that motivate a rejection of reductive 
physicalism—some hold out hope that mental activities necessitate a re-thinking of that 
position—but even if these cases exist, the cases at issue in biological individuality do not 
seem to be among them.  
Surely most philosophers of science are reductive physicalists116, believing that phenomena 
at (e.g.) the protein level are ultimately the product of the atoms and interactions at the level 
of component atoms, their bonds, and their environment.  &e ability of a protein to catalyse a 
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116 It is extremely important that reductive physicalism is understood as an ontological claim and not a 
claim about explanatory or methodological reduction.  These three forms of reduction are too often 
conflated.  See (Brigandt & Love 2012, van Riel & Van Gulick 2014) 
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certain reaction is not magic; it is a matter of certain atoms with certain properties in a certain 
spatial relation under certain conditions.  In this sense, then, the capacities of the protein very 
much are the collective dispositional properties of the atoms of which it is composed.  &e 
causal node theorist has to deny this, believing that there is something to the protein that is 
not just its components.  It is very di1cult to imagine what this amounts to. 
Even if we grant that there is a thing that is the protein (as a composite object), it would 
still be the case that the protein is entirely inert, causally irrelevant to the catalysation.117  All 
of the catalytic actions are performed by the constituent atoms alone.  If we had all of the 
constituents of the protein in the right organisation and context then we would achieve 
catalysis.  Adding one additional abject that is ‘the protein’ does not change a thing.  It cannot 
be the case that the protein is a joint cause of the catalysation along with its constituents, for if 
that were the case then we would have to deny that the mere presence and spatial 
arrangement of the constituents was su1cient for the catalysation e$ect.  For this to be true 
the protein as an additional object would need to play a non-physical role in the catalysation 
(non-physical because its physicality just is the physical constituents that are apparently 
insu1cient).  &is strikes me as absurdity. 
3. Merit Badges for Kindness 
Philosophers who discharge notions of individuality to agency or causality do so for good 
reason.  What they recognize is that we can talk about individuals with friends and family 
without problem, but that among philosophers the common sense concept becomes 
complicated.  &e simple, easy to apply everyday concept of ‘individual’ is, upon closer 
inspection, neither simple nor easy to apply—as is so o*en the case when we probe common 
sense too deeply.  &e causal node view is helpful because it happens to run roughly parallel to 
the common sense application of the term ‘individual’ and because it ,ts with biologists’ 
appeal to higher-level composites in scienti,c explanations.   But it cannot do much more 
work than that—it cannot play a role in biological ontology.  In these ,nal sections, I will 
argue that in fact no new account of biological individuality needs to do this ontological work.  
We already have a tool for the job: Kind Historicism.  I will also claim that the Kind 
Historicism approach to biological individuality is compatible with Ellen Clarke’s (2013) 
account. 
Guiding both the case for the causal node view and the objections against that view as an 
ontological guarantor are intuitions about the status of ‘genuine’ biological individuals like 
organisms and proteins.   While I share the compositionalist intuition, I think that awarding 
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117 A good run-through of these overdeterminer style arguments can be found in Trenton Merricks’ 
Objects and Persons, (2001 chs. 2 & 3). 
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ontological merit badges for individuality is the wrong move.  What we want is to say that 
Ellie is an individual that does not include any architectural features of Paris, or that a cell is 
an individual in a way that the cell and a stray amino acid are not.  &ere must be a tool that 
tells us that some collections of biological matter form wholes.  And there is: Some collections 
of matter are such that they form particulars that are members of biological kinds.  Ellie and 
the cell are each clumps of matter that are the present result of long-run historical processes.  
&at is the source of their ontological merit.   
3.1 Individuals as Targets for Selection 
Clarke (2013) has identi,ed a workable, consistent, and universal de,nition of biological 
individuality, by focussing on the two mechanisms required for selection to operate at a given 
level of organisation.  Some mechanisms must (i) limit an object’s capacity for within object 
selection; and (ii) increase its capacity to undergo between object selection.  At ,rst pass, there 
are serious di$erences between Clarke’s theory of individuals and my own account of 
individuals qua members of kinds.  At a deeper level, however, the views share a core insight: 
that if anything performs composition, it is the historical process of selection. 
&e novelty in Clarke’s approach consists in the recognition that individuation 
mechanisms are multiply-realisable.  &is explains the plurality of individuality concepts in 
use—each attach to a set of selection supporting mechanisms speci,c to one realm of biology 
or another.  Any collection of biological matter at a given level of organisation is an individual 
i! it possesses some mechanisms that satisfy the conditions for the possibility of selection at 
that level.  Because conditions su1cient for selection can still be insu1cient for selection only 
at that level, individuality can exist in multiple levels of individuals for the same set of things.  
Clarke’s account shares a central insight with my theory of biological kinds: that the 
composition of biological objects is tied to their involvement in natural selection.  Yet we look 
in di$erent directions.  In the previous chapter I stressed the role of historical trajectory 
through time in shaping biological objects.  For Clarke, the focus is on biological objects that 
will alter the make-up of populations of future such objects.  While I emphasize the existence 
of change and stability over time, Clarke has a practical interest in identifying the present 
sources of future change.  I face backward and Clarke faces forward, owing to our very 
di$erent goals. 
&e practical epistemic orientation of Clarke’s project creates a second di$erence: a focus 
only on things that are selected.  Not even all common-sense organisms will count as 
individuals, on Clarke’s account, since it is possible that an organism could lose one of its 
individuating mechanisms.  We can imagine an organism that moves from sexual 
reproduction to asexual parthenogenesis (this is common in plants and insects) constituting a 
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loss of the mechanism providing for between-object selection.118  &e individual will have 
moved up one level, to the clonal group.  &e former individuals are still part of selection, just 
not a direct part.  &ey still reproduce, of course, and their current form will still be a product 
of past selection at various levels.  But they are rightly overlooked by Clarke’s theory because 
they are overlooked by selection, moving forward.  On a practical approach, the causal 
relationship between the current generation and the next in non-selected objects is 
unimportant.  It still exists, but is overlooked.  It is overlooked because it is irrelevant to 
selection.  Changes in the current generation would yield changes in the future generation, if 
they existed; it is simply that there are no such changes.  &e next generation will be the same 
as the current—or at least as similar as genetic homogeneity allows.  So stasis in the ,rst 
generation yields stasis in the next.  &e relationship is present, but inactive.  Inactive causal 
relations maintaining stability can be overlooked by a model of evolution, since stability is the 
default assumption.119 
Biomolecules o$er additional cases of non-selected but reliably recurring biological 
objects.  &ey are complex integrated composites that have persisted through time as 
composites and whose current forms are functions of their histories.  Some of these 
biomolecules will have participated in selection events at the level of their vehicles.  Cells, 
tissues, organisms and other objects acted on by selection will bring whatever population of 
biomolecules they contain along for the ride.  We may also grant that at least some 
biomolecules will participate in selection at their own level.  Even still, most will exist in a 
form that is more accidental than selected—that is, most will not exist at a level of selection.  
Like the hypothetical parthenogenesis case, changes in the world population of biomolecules 
is not usually a result of selection between biomolecules of di$erent ,tness, but is rather the 
result of the selection of an entire population of biomolecules—either the reproduction of an 
organic body in which those molecules are contained, or a population of bodies containing a 
population of molecules.  An epistemic forward-looking tool for conceptualizing evolution 
can overlook these biomolecules since their fate is controlled at a higher level.  
Clarke shares the central insight that composition of biological objects is tied to natural 
selection, and her neglect of the historical nature of this relationship and of the status of non-
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118 Sexual reproduction guarantees genetic variance, which provides a basis for selection between 
organisms at that level.  Asexual parthenogenesis results in genetic clones, removing the basis for 
selection at that level.  Selection then moves up to the level of populations of clones, rather than the 
organisms making up that population.  From the standpoint of selection, all clones are ‘one’ organism.  
Parthenogenic organisms were at the heart of Janzen’s (1977) classic paper, which in many ways 
initiated the contemporary debate about these issues.  
119 Brandon and McShae (2010) claim that the default assumption of evolutionary theorizing is not 
stasis but a tendency toward growth and complexification.  This is true only insofar as the starting 
point is heritable variance.  The situation I describe has heritability but lacks variance.  The default 
assumption here is thus (relative) stability. 
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selected but recurring biological objects is a re%ection of the epistemic demands of 
evolutionary biology.  It is therefore not the case that her account di$ers importantly from 
mine.  To the contrary, for understanding ontology there are good reasons for focussing 
backward and for including non-selected biological objects; for modelling selection there are 
good reasons to look to the present sources of future change.  If we must award badges of 
ontological merit, satisfying the moderate compositionalist intuition, there are compelling 
reasons to focus on the lumps of matter that are united by selection.  When we do so, we 
arrive at Kind Historicism. 
When we claim that a given biological object is an individual, grounding its compositional 
structure through biological conservation, we do not necessarily mean that that object is a 
conserved individual.  It may well have no o$spring.  It may be sterile.  It may fail to 
participate in the individuating mechanisms characteristic of its group.  Any number of 
accidents may prevent that particular from being a target of selection or a subject of 
conservation.  What we really mean when we say that a given object is an individual is that it 
is a member of a kind of object that is selected or conserved or has the right kinds of 
individuating mechanisms or what have you.  &e kind membership is doing all of the work.  
Notice however that this does not necessarily work for any view of individuality.  Many of the 
conceptions of biological individuality cited earlier in this chapter focus on the possession of 
particular structures or tendencies or abilities that are possessed by the particular, not the 
kind.   
&ere is a plausible objection to my extension and ‘ontologizing’ of Clarke’s theory.  &e 
persistence of non-selected composites as composites is rather accidental.  &ey simply hitch a 
ride on some selected creature’s back.  Because selective forces are not acting on any feature of 
these composites, but rather on features of other composites to which they are attached, it 
might be objected that things like biomolecules do not deserve to count as having been 
compositionally guaranteed by historical selective forces.  &ere is nothing about the 
molecules themselves that ensures their stabilized recurrence as composites.  &ere are no 
facts about the molecules even that ensure their compositions.  &is is provided by their hosts, 
the recurrence of which stabilises the composition over time.  
Were this objection to stand, not only would individuality be limited to selection-apt 
organisms, it would be limited to a sub-set of that class.  Many populations that posses 
individuating mechanisms do not possess them intrinsically.  &e mechanisms may be a 
feature of the environment.  Clarke (2013) acknowledges this in a footnote:  
I remain agnostic, at this stage, about whether individuals must possess 
individuating mechanisms intrinsically –within their own skins, so to speak. 
Perhaps it is su1cient, especially in the early stages of a transition, for the 
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mechanisms to exist in the environment, so long as they are stable enough that their 
e$ect is heritable. (p. 427) 
As an example, it may be that the mechanism preventing within-object selection is simply a 
reliable feature of the environment that renders within-object di$erences ,tness-irrelevant.  A 
new environment can mean that existing features of individuals now do or do not confer 
,tness, where previously the opposite was true.  Surely such objects are being selected 
‘accidentally’ if any are, for the features that permit selection are not features of the object at 
all.  Yet it would be odd to start sorting individuals by determining which were su1ciently 
responsible for their own selection.  Insofar as Darwinian forces are blind to selective 
culpability, so too for theories of individuals and natural kinds.  
In sum, the theory I have described ties individuality to selection, such that particulars are 
individuals to whatever compositional level is the present result of past selection, or will be 
the future result of present selection.  &is should seriously change existing conceptions of the 
sorts of individuals we expect to ,nd.  First, this approach will not yield static or unchanging 
individuals.  &e pieces of (e.g.) organisms that are replicated from one generation to the next 
are constantly changing.  Individuals therefore feature ever-changing lists of parts.  Second, 
there will not be a singular privileged level of individuality.  We will not ,nd, for instance, that 
the individual is the microbe, or the cell, or the human.  All of these things are individuals, 
inside of and around each other.  &ere are individuals full of individuals, ,lling yet additional 
individuals.  Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Kind Historicist approach to individuals 
will not provide a workable system for science.  We simply will not know what pieces of 
biological individuals have/will participate in sub-sequent generations.  &e precise 
compositional content of biological individuals, on this view, is therefore both dynamic and 
(generally) epistemically inaccessible. 
5. Conclusion: A Bombshell in Two Bullets 
&is chapter has focussed on biological kinds at the expense of physico-chemical kinds.  
&is is largely because there is not a strong chemistry or physics analogue to the biological 
and philosophical focus on biological individuality.  Compositional problems arise equally 
strongly with chemical molecules, but these are generally addressed by mereologists and 
ontologists, not philosophers of science and chemists. But the moderate compositionalist 
intuition is surely as strong with chemical molecules as anywhere.  We want to say that the Hs 
and the Os in a water molecule really go together, but those Hs and the Os really do not go 
with the Fe molecules in the Ei$el Tower.  Compositional problems in physics and chemistry 
are the standard compositional problems of the SCQ.   
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&e account I present here will not work outside of biology, tied as it is to Darwinian 
processes.  I mentioned at the beginning that there is no consensus answer to SCQ, and that 
remains true.  Historical individuality will not provide a generalized solution to that problem.  
Nevertheless, one might think that the form of the answer is generalizable.  Why not ground 
physico-chemical composites in their kinds?  Perhaps there are two categories of individuals, 
just as there are two categories of kinds.  But this type of solution will not do.  
Microstructuralist theories of kinds do not support claims of individuality.   
In the biological case, the boundary problems that appear from the individual perspective 
disappear on the natural kinds perspective.  &e physical composition of a particular in a kind 
is whatever composition has evolved.120  &e account is one of demarcation and individuation 
through historical process.  For physico-chemical objects, however, boundary problems 
remain even on the natural kinds perspective.  Recall that for physico-chemical kinds I have 
adopted the received view: microstructural essentialism.  &is account makes sense of the fact 
that an individual atom can come together with other atoms to form molecules, but that these 
atoms are simultaneously parts and wholes in their own right.  &e view provides nested 
layers of individuality.  Even when a molecule is part of some much larger composite (like an 
organism) the molecule nonetheless still exists as a genuine individual molecule, owing to its 
microstructure.  But this claim that some microphysical properties are essential for kind 
membership does not in itself help draw boundaries.  Boundaries around individuals will be 
boundaries around microstructures, but neither come to us pre-delineated.  A molecule has a 
microstructure, but so too does that molecule and its local environment.  A lone hydrogen 
atom has a microstructure, but so too does the composite that is the hydrogen plus the Ei$el 
Tower.  &e microstructuralist account of natural kinds has no in-built demarcation 
mechanism.  
&e microstructuralist has two options, but neither are particularly favourable.  One might 
,rst supplement microstructuralism with a mechanism for demarcation.  &e obvious choice 
would feature an appeal to physical boundaries.  A sceptic might press this reply, however, 
noting that physical connection is at best a statistical notion at the molecular level since weak 
forces obtain between one atom and any others within certain physical proximity.   Perhaps 
this is a bullet the microstructuralist is willing to bite. A second option is for the 
microstructuralist to bite the bullet on the demarcation problem, surrendering to universal 
compositionalism.  On this view, the natural physico-chemical kinds are all things—and their 
combinations.  &is would mean that the only badge-deserving sub-set of the class of 
universal compositions would be the biological kinds! 
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120 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the epistemic inaccessibility of Kind Historicist ontology. 
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&e ,rst bullet will be preferable for many, but I suspect that the second is more defensible.  
A de,nitive account on this matter requires a far richer account of atomic constitution than I 
am equipped to give.  &e problem is interesting because it turns the tables on our thinking 
about kinds.  Where formerly the standard examples were chemical and the biological were 
thought the outliers, it may be that the class of chemical kinds is unwieldy and the biological 
kinds are neat, tidy, and discrete by comparison!  
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6 
Looking for (Scienti"c) Answers in all the Wrong 
(Philosophical) Places 
In the previous chapter, one of the minor messages was an advised caution during quests 
to award ‘badges of ontological merit’.  When it comes to biological individuality, a pragmatic 
approach is better suited to the contexts in which questions of individuality arise.  #ere is a 
common assumption that there is a link between ontological status and scienti$c utility.  #is 
assumption leads philosophers (and scientists) to expend philosophical e%ort seeking to 
determine what things are, in a rich ontological sense, in the hopes of aiding scienti$c 
understanding and manifest ontology.121  #ese enquiries are as misguided as the assumption 
on which they are based.  #is assumption and these enquiries are the topic of this chapter.  
Instead of focusing on individuality, I here examine two cases where classi$cation is at issue, 
where authors trade arguments about the status of certain classes.  #ose classes are, $rst, 
human races and, second, evolved cognitive modules.  During the development of Kind 
Historicism, in PART I, I explained why historical kinds reveal the gap between an ontology of 
natural kinds and scienti$c classi$cations leveraging induction-supporting kinds.  In keeping 
with that message, I now advocate shi&ing focus away from determining the status of classes 
and toward focussing on their robustness, objectivity, and ability to support scienti$c 
prediction and explanation.   
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#e overarching goal of these two di%erent discussions is the same: I hope to show why 
ontological status is irrelevant to each debate, motivating a focus on induction-supporting 
kinds.  #e particular motivations for each discussion, however, di%er slightly, and thus 
warrant brief outline.  In the case of human races, discussion of natural kinds has recently 
given way to discussion of ‘biological meaningfulness’.  I want to show why this is little more 
than a change of language, and that focussing on ontological status, in any guise, is a mistake.  
I wish to move the debate in a more productive direction by focussing on supporting 
induction rather than meeting unmotivated a priori ideals.  I will not long linger on the 
question of races as natural kinds because the question is irrelevant.  In the case of cognitive 
modules, on the other hand, I wish to guard against a misapplication of Kind Historicism.  I 
will thus argue at length that cognitive modules are not natural kinds, with reference to the 
complicated relationship between cognition and the neural architecture by which it is 
supported.  #erea&er I will explain why cognitive modules may yet be good kinds for 
science.  I will conclude each case with a discussion of the possible motivations behind 
seeking scienti$c answers in philosophical ontology. 
1. Race 
Racial classi$cation is perhaps the most impactful classi$cation of humans in modern 
times, and so it is unsurprising that scholars have wondered about the nature of racial groups.  
Like any biological kind, intrinsic heterogeneity precludes races as traditional structural 
kinds.  #is has been documented at length (e.g. Root 2003, Zack 1993, cf. Gannett 2010, 
Spencer 2012).  In light of the disrepute of natural kinds in biology and the overwhelming 
evidence against races as structural natural kinds, debate has shi&ed to a new concept: 
‘biological meaningfulness’. 122   But this shi& is lateral, not progressive.  Biological 
meaningfulness attempts to establish ontological status in a new guise.  In this short 
discussion, I would like to focus on this concept as it occurs in one recent exchange 
(Hochman 2013a, 2013b, 2014, Sesardic 2010, 2013, Spencer 2012, 2014) in which ‘biological 
meaningfulness’ is functioning as an unhelpful ontological merit badge, distracting attention 
from more relevant scienti$c questions about the robustness of racial classi$cation and more 
interesting socio-ethical questions about the use of racial classi$cations.  
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122 Some philosophers still defend races as natural kinds, but their view of kinds is what I would call 
‘induction-supporting’ kinds.  E.g. (Andreasen 1998, Kitcher 1999, cf. Kitcher 2007).  The latter work 
by Kitcher modifies his earlier view, building socio-ethical concerns into a conception of ‘natural’ 
(induction-supporting) kinds.  
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#e race debates are huge, and I will not attempt a survey here.123  Instead, I focus on this 
recent debate, which culminated in a heated exchange in the pages of Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biology and the Biomedical Sciences (Sesardic 2013, Hochman 2013b, 2014, 
Spencer 2014).  At the forefront of these debates is Adam Hochman, who defends the claim 
that races are not biologically meaningful.  Sesardic and Spencer call attention to the 
opaqueness of this notion.  Building on their views, I will show that the ‘meaningfulness’ 
Hochman critiques is not tracking induction-supporting kinds, nor is it akin to objectivity.  
For Hochman, meaningfulness is doing some ontological work, carving nature’s joints.  #ere 
are thus three issues.124  #e $rst concerns the status of ‘race’ as an induction-supporting kind.  
#e second concerns the biological objectivity of races.  #e third concerns the ontological 
status of races.  #e current debate is a mess of all three.  Races are demonstrably meaningful 
as induction-supporting kinds in science at present.  #ese kinds support inductions because 
they have some objective basis in biology, making them meaningful in this second sense, too.  
I will argue that these two senses of ‘meaningfulness’ are the two that matter for the present 
concerns of biologists and philosophers.  Whether races are natural kinds, or individuals, or 
species, or subspecies or any other badge-deserving set should not keep us up at night.  I will 
conclude with some speculations on the appeal of ontological merit badges. 
As a $nal note, there are so many nuances to this issue that I must ignore.  I cannot discuss 
for instance the relationship between ‘common sense’ racial groups and more robust racial 
groups, the non-biological (social) forces that link certain races and certain traits, the best way 
to de$ne races for scienti$c purposes, and the many social and ethical implications of using 
racial categories in science.  #ese are all important issues that warrant attention.  In this 
discussion, when I claim that worries about ontological status are a distraction in the race 
debate, it is these sorts of issues from which I believe enquiry is being distracted. 
1.1 "e Meaning of Biological Meaningfulness 
Hochman (2013b, 2013a, 2014) claims that races are not biologically meaningful.  He 
claims that for races to be biologically meaningful they would have to meet the criteria for 
subspecies.  Before examining the unusual claim about sub-species, it is helpful to ask what 
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123 For comprehensive analysis of the race debates concerning kinds, meaningfulness, and all manner of 
ontological and scientific categories, see (Gannett 2010, Spencer 2012), both of whom urge a move 
away from ontological worries and toward pragmatic focus on objective likeness relations (also, in the 
case of Gannett, socio-political issues divorced entirely from classification and kinds). 
124 Quayshawn Spencer (2014) imposes a helpful distinction into the ongoing debates, which partially 
maps to the three-part distinction I use here.  He identifies ‘the philosophical race debate’, which is 
about the nature and reality of common races, and distinguishes this from ‘the biomedical race 
debates’, which are about whether races are useful categories for biomedical and genetics research.  The 
former is related to the naturalness and metaphysical takes on race.  The latter is a specific instance of 
the induction-supporting kinds take on races.  
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‘biological meaningfulness’ ought to mean.  #ere are two possible senses of ‘biology’.  Either 
races are meaningful to biological science, or they are meaningful to the biological world.  I 
will interpret the former as a matter of investigative utility (induction-supporting kinds) and 
the latter in terms of having some objective basis in the biological world.  Races are 
meaningful in both senses.  Hochman would not view these interpretations as meaningful 
enough, insisting that they meet his a priori ideals.  
Scientists demonstrably $nd racial classi$cation to be informative.  Racial categories are 
useful as both conceptual and communicative tools in many branches of science.  When 
members of a race reliably share some speci$c set of trait and properties, they meet the 
conditions for induction-supporting kinds.  #is means that racial classi$cation can provide 
information about members of that race.  And it does.  #ere is a reason that anthropological 
understanding o&en begins with race.  In biomedical science, too, races are used as proxies for 
deeper physiological di%erences (see Risch et al. 2002).  Pigliucci and Kaplan (2003) identify a 
number of ways in which human racial sub-groups are speci$ed that $nd uses in di%erent 
sciences.  We know for instance that people of east-Asian descent are very likely (~80%) to 
have polymorphism(s) in the enzyme(s) responsible for alcohol metabolism, which result in a 
general intolerance for alcohol. 125  When assessing risk for cardiovascular diseases and 
endocrine disorders, family doctors are taught to begin patient histories with gender and race, 
since these are excellent predictors of risk.  Races are meaningful in the same way that many 
other classes can be.  Medicine uses generalizations about tall people, fat people, people with 
habit x or condition y.  #ese are all kinds that support inductions.  #is is not racism or 
prejudice; it’s science—statistics, generally.  
Yet we $nd claims such as the following, quoted here disapprovingly in Sesardic (2013): 
Consider typical statements made repeatedly by leading racial constructionists that 
race is biologically ‘meaning- less’ (AAA, 1994; Fish, 2002, p. 138; Gould, 1996, p. 
379; Marshall, 1998, p. 654; Rose, 2002; Schwartz, 2001), that ‘race as biology is 
$ction’ (Smedley & Smedley, 2005), that ‘race is the phlogiston of our time’ 
(Montagu, 1964, p. xii; similarly Hirschfeld, 1998, p. 36), that ‘race’ is a concept like 
unicorn (Fish, 2002, p. 138), that ‘the reality of human races is [. . .] destined to 
follow the 0at Earth into oblivion’ (Diamond, 1994).  (p. 287, citations in original) 
#ese cannot be claims about the usefulness of race.  #ese authors are presumably not 
ignorant of the use of racial groups in modern biomedical and anthropological research.  
#ese must be claims about the reality or objectivity of races.  #is is the second possible 
meaning of ‘biologically meaningful’, which in these debates is called ‘racial naturalism’. 
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125 There are a number of variants to the enzyme, which are variously and compoundly shared by 
persons of Asian descent.  The alcohol dehydrogenase enzyme variants convert alcohol into the toxic 
acetaldehyde, resulting in a variety of unpleasant side-effects (Li et al. 2009, Peng et al. 2010). 
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Racial naturalism is the claim that races have some basis in the way the world is, rather 
than the way we perceive it.  #is goes hand-in-hand with the scienti$c utility of race.  Racial 
categories are able to support inductions in several contemporary sciences because they are 
reliable indicators of certain properties.  #ey are reliable (when they are) because races 
exhibit a reliable and measurable stability with regard to speci$c sets of properties.  #is is at 
least partly because the sorts of ancestral relations that races are intended to track will, in 
certain cases, support some measure of restricted phenotypic similarity. 126  It need not 
support widespread or universal similarity, only reliable similarity in the respects germane to 
the generalisations in which it features.  We know that people of east-Asian descent are 
reliably similar in some set of ways tied to the metabolism of alcohol.  We know that Black 
men are more o&en than not similar in some set of ways tied to prostate cancer.127  A number 
of accurate generalisations can be made about a number of races, grounded in objective 
features of the world. Insofar as race is a tried and tested scienti$c tool, racial naturalism is 
vindicated.   
As a matter of clari$cation, racial naturalism and scienti$c utility do not require perfect 
uniformity among members with respect to the trait(s) over which predictions range.  Rather, 
they require only that the trait(s) be shared with a su1ciently high frequency.  So long as that 
frequency is better than chance, and absent better predictors of the trait(s), race will $nd use 
in science as a category predictive of the trait(s).  In this regard it is important to notice that, 
when races are used to support predictions, those predictions are statistical.  #e modal 
relations between classes and the traits predicted of them is one of statistical likelihood, not 
necessity.  #is is as true of racial categories as it is of any induction-supporting kind in the 
biomedical sciences. 
Perhaps racial naturalism, though useful and objective, is not ‘biologically meaningful’ 
enough.  It puts races on the same plane as categories like ‘brunette’ or ‘mesomorph’ or ‘tall 
person’.  Perhaps members of races have a few more properties in common than these groups, 
but all represent groups whose members non-accidentally share some number of properties 
beyond the property in virtue of which they are grouped.  A critic might insist that biological 
meaningfulness requires that races are some extra special type of category.  Following 
criticism (Sesardic 2013) this is the line pursued by Hochman (e.g. 2013b, p.285).  A&er 
rejecting the type of naturalism and objectivity I have just outlined, he goes on to explain that, 
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126 Sometimes these generalizations will be stable for reasons not connected to biology.  It may be that 
relations between a race and a trait are stabilized by social forces, as in cases where racial categories 
track socio-economic class.  Even still, notice that this stability is still objective (it’s merely contingent 
on social rather than biological factors) making the class suitable for induction. 
127 Though some of this increased risk has to do with social and economic factors, at least some also 
owes to inherited genetic factors common to sub-Saharan African descent (Batai et al. 2012). 
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barring a stronger level of meaningfulness, racial groupings are not ‘good categories to do 
science with’.  #is $nal claim is strange.  It is at odds with all of the science that uses races 
reliably, none of which are discussed by Hochman.  Perhaps races are bad scienti$c categories 
for social or ethical reasons, but Hochman’s argument is thoroughly scienti$c and 
metaphysical, not ethical. 
Hochman has set the bar high for races.  He asks that they ful$l the criteria for sub-species 
membership—which, he demonstrates, they do not.  Having ruled-out Hochman’s interest in 
either utility or objectivity, I must conclude that he believes that vindication of racial 
categories requires that they achieve some higher ontological status, and that sub-species is a 
stand-in for this status.128  Before asking about these motivations, I will brie0y digress to 
review the cases for races as natural kinds.  
1.2 Races as Ontologically-Privileged Classes 
Races are not structural kinds, for the same reason that any biological class is unlikely to be 
a structural kind: there will be no shared morphological, phenotypic, or genetic structure that 
binds races together.  #is point has been made by Root (2003) and Zack (1993).129  Since my 
goal in this section is to claim that ontological status is irrelevant here, I will allow only brief 
digression into the topic of races as historical kinds.   
Recall from Chapter 3 that, for Kind Historicism, historical kinds are relational.  Two 
particulars can share large swaths of evolutionary history, diverging only recently, or they may 
share little history, diverging millennia ago.  In cases like species and proteins this still leaves 
us with recognizable (if o&en epistemically inaccessible) groups, since speciation events are 
rare and, post speciation, particulars cannot (generally) re-breed into kinds to which their 
descendants formerly belonged.  Races are not so hospitable.  At the very least, widespread 
interbreeding rules-out any notion of the few canonical races as genuine natural kinds.  Kind 
Historicism suggests things will be much more complicated than that.  
#e point of Kind Historicism is not to innumerate the actual kinds, but to emphasise the 
way in which biological particulars are historically rather than structurally related, how 
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128 One might think that Hochman merely views ‘subspecies’ as establishing an appropriate level of 
objectivity relative to the explanatory demands placed on them.  If that were the case, however, then we 
would expect a discussion of the uses of race in science that shows why a certain level of objectivity or 
robustness is required and why (only) subspecies status provides that level.  No such pragmatic worries 
are in evidence in his account. 
129 Genetic identity within races is impossible; but some high degree of genetic similarity might be 
thought to constitute a shared essential genetic microstructure.  Absent some baseline for genetic 
relatedness, however, it is hard to determine what degree of similarity is similarity enough.  Hochman 
(2013a) attempts to stipulate the amount of similarity but, as Sesardic (2013) comments, this smacks of 
arbitrariness.  At any rate this is entirely incommensurate with standard approaches to structural 
kinds. 
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historical relations do not provide the relative homogeneity enjoyed by structurally related 
particulars, how historical kinds will o&en be unknowable, and why all of this precludes the 
use of historical kinds in science.  With race this message becomes all the more important.  In 
addition to the normal problem of intrinsic heterogeneity, interbreeding builds in further 
variance.  #e massive and widespread interbreeding of di%erent populations also means that 
historical relations between and among races will be too complicated to track.  Races as 
natural kinds is not a helpful topic of discussion. 
Is this a problem for Kind Historicism?  I think not.  First, this $nding re-enforces the 
point that natural kinds (particularly historical kinds) are poor tools for scienti$c 
investigation.  Second, the messiness of race on the Kind Historicist account accords with 
contemporary biologists’ general expectations of races.  We expect racial histories to be messy, 
interweaving, and complex.  Finally, this account of race helps explain why racial categories 
have not found greater use in science.  #ey work well for certain predictions, but the number 
is very few given the number of traits humans possess.   
1.3 On the Motivations for Awarding Merit Badges 
Returning now to the Studies debate, Hochman has asked whether races meet the criteria 
for ‘subspecies’, claiming that this is the only condition under which races are biologically 
meaningful.130  #is utterly bizarre assumption has been critiqued by Quayshawn Spencer 
(2014) and Nevin Sesardic (2013) on the grounds that nobody defends the view that races are 
subspecies (most defend/critique racial naturalism).131  One further comment is worth adding.  
Hochman’s move is bizarre not only because the connection between ‘race’ and ‘subspecies’ 
are di1cult to motivate, but also because ‘subspecies’ is a practical conceptual tool of 
biological science, not a principled metaphysical concept and not a measure of realism or 
objectivity.  Subspecies pick out a speci$c type of cluster that is useful for (a small number of) 
modes of biological understanding.132  #at it is useful for understanding guarantees some 
objective similarity, but this cannot be the reason that Hochman focuses on it, for then he 
would have to concede that any use of races in science vindicate their naturalness.  Why only 
subspecies?  His response, that any other view is ‘not substantive’ or ‘not natural’ enough, fails 
to convince (Hochman 2014).  
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130 Hochman calls this view racial naturalism.  Sesardic and Spencer call it a straw person. 
131 Darwin (1859) had thought that races might be subspecies, but debate has moved on since then.  
Andreason (1998) has an account of the epistemic utility of racial categories that appeals to cladistics 
and species/subspecies membership.  Unlike Hochman she is explicitly pragmatic. 
132 As Mayr explains, in his ‘Of what use are subspecies?’:  ‘subspecies [is] not a concept of evolutionary 
biology but simply a handle of convenience for the clerical work of the museum curator’ (Mayr 1982b, 
p.594).  Along the same lines, David Hull (1998) explicitly argues that it does not matter whether races 
are subspecies because subspecies is an out-of-date pragmatic concept, not one that tells us anything of 
importance about the groups classified. 
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None of Hochman’s critics seriously engage his claim about subspecies.  I too will abstain.  
It is more fruitful to stay at the metaphilosophical level and ask why he thinks that some 
extra-strong criterion of meaningfulness is appropriate.  We are limited here to speculation, 
but from the context it seems clear that Hochman imagines some connection between a 
highly biologically meaningful category and the appropriateness of that category for scienti$c 
research.  Had Hochman concluded that, because races fail to meet the criteria for subspecies 
they are therefore not subspecies, there would be no issue and likely no response from Sesardic, 
Spencer, or myself.  But Hochman thinks he has proved much more than this.  He claims to 
have shown that races are not ‘good categories to do science with’ (2013b, p.285), that they are 
not ‘scienti$cally respectable’ categories (2013a, p.331), and are not ‘biologically meaningful’.  
Given this, and because Hochman is demonstrably uninterested in scienti$c utility or 
biological objectivity, the only remaining option is to interpret him as holding race to an 
ontological-pragmatic standard, believing that subspecies status somehow establishes that 
races are su1ciently real to vindicate their use.133 
As Lisa Gannett has lamented, this tendency to be unsatis$ed with biological objectivity 
and to seek answers in ontology runs throughout the race debates: 
You might say that while scientists are about the ‘real,’ we philosophers are about the 
‘really real.’  We assume we best contribute to debates about genetics and race by 
providing or withholding assent to the legitimacy of biological race concepts by 
metaphysical appeal to what is ‘really real’. (2010, pp.364–5) 
Gannett is here complaining about enquiries focussed on natural kinds, but I think in light of 
the arguments presented here, it is fair to apply her point to ‘biological meaningfulness’, as 
well.  She continues, speculating on the motivation behind these approaches: 
Attempting to capture basic motivations, we might say that theorizing about race as 
a natural kind is associated with the expectation—an expectation nonscientists share 
with scientists—that race as a category of classi$cation furnishes an authoritative 
taxonomy, a taxonomy that by depicting fundamental divisions in nature is 
conducive to ful$lling far-ranging explanatory aims. (2010, p.376) 
I think this is right, and it is this type of taxonomic authority that Hochman wishes to deny to 
racial categories. 
In Chapters 1 & 2, I discussed several unmotivated assumptions about the role of natural 
kinds in scienti$c enquiry.  #ese stem principally from supposed links between essences and 
characteristic properties of kinds and supposed levels of homogeneity in outward properties 
of kinds.  Gannett (2010) explicitly chastises several discussions of race and natural kinds as 
inappropriately appealing to these types of assumptions.  Her point is that there are more 
important issues to address.  I agree, and would add that if scienti$c utility is the goal then 
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133 Spencer (2012) discusses a number of older discussions of race (pro and contra) that share this 
belief. 
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natural kinds are the wrong focus.  #inking about the present debate, concerning 
‘meaningfulness’, appeal to ontological status is even more confusing.  For, unlike kinds, there 
is no tradition in philosophy assuming a link between ‘meaningfulness’ and utility (erroneous 
or otherwise!).  Here I think we see a deeper motivation, what Gannett calls ‘appeal to what is 
really real’’.  Hochman demonstrates the philosophical pre-occupation with determining what 
certain categories really are, under the assumption that this will tell us something about their 
scienti$c use.   
In sum, future race debates should more carefully consider the purpose of debating the 
status of races, whatever that status might be.  If the goal is to understand the use and role of 
racial categories in science, then we need a detailed analysis of the sorts of enquiries in which 
race features.  Only then might we come to understand how much objective similarity races 
must exhibit to ful$l that role.  Until such time as a requisite degree of objectivity, or 
similarity, or ‘meaningfulness’, has been established, we cannot stipulate the conditions 
required for racial categories to feature in science.  Under no circumstances does it make 
sense to stipulate a priori what those conditions might be.  If, on the other hand, the goal is to 
determine what type of category racial categories represent, then by all means we may ask 
whether races are natural kinds, species, sub-species, breeding populations, individuals, sets, 
universals, particulars, types, or tropes.  But these enquiries should not be thought to have any 
implications for scienti$c classi$cation (or ethics!) absent some compelling further argument 
linking ontological status to scienti$c validity. 
I turn now to the second topic: evolved cognitive modules.  #ere, too, philosophers and 
scientists have appealed to natural kinds as partial vindication of scienti$c utility. 
 
2. Cognitive Modules 
Does human cognition come in natural kinds?  #e human brain certainly does (it is full of 
chemicals, for instance).  But what about cognitive processes?134  Here the evidence is not so 
clear.  Classes of cognitive phenomena are o&en classi$ed functionally, like object recognition, 
choice, speech, or sensory perception.  Functional kinds are useful for science, but will not 
survive metaphysical scrutiny.  Yet we are also told that certain of these cognitive abilities have 
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134 There is an interesting overlap here with certain treatments of ‘ontology’.  Interesting philosophical 
and (later) psychological work has been done to determine which categories the human mind requires 
in order to make sense of the world.  Though this tradition appears in Aristotle, contemporary versions 
date from Kant (1781), who offered the following categories: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.  
Kantian skepticism entails that these are necessary features of understanding rather than fundamental 
features of the world.  However later ontologists, like Chisholm (1996), offer similar projects but claim 
to escape the conceptualism that plagued Kant, describing the real ontology of world by transcending 
human understanding.  See (Thomasson 2013). 
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evolved.  It is a cornerstone of Evolutionary Psychology (EP) that the contemporary human 
mind is composed of cognitive processes that date to our Pleistocene ancestors.  Arguments in 
favour of these evolved cognitive ‘modules’ appeal to evolutionary conservation in a manner 
reminiscent of Kind Historicism.  #e claim is that the theory of evolution, applied to human 
psychology, yields the inescapable conclusion that our modern minds are comprised of pieces 
of minds past, which had very di%erent ancestral functions in much the same way that 
modern organs (like eye lenses) are built from pieces of organs past (like digestive enzymes), 
which had very di%erent ancestral functions.  
As if anticipating Kind Historicism, the founders of EP describe modules as ‘kinds 
invented by natural selection during the species’ evolutionary history to produce adaptive 
ends in the species’ natural environment’ (Tooby & Cosmides 1995, p.xiii).  Elsewhere they tie 
the scienti$c value of cognitive modules to the fact that they ‘carve nature at its joints’ 
(Cosmides & Tooby 1997).  Other philosophers and cognitive scientists have also suggested 
that the scienti$c usefulness of cognitive modules derive in some way from their status as 
natural kinds (Fodor 1983, Gray 2001).135  A hopeful proponent of EP might encounter Kind 
Historicism and think it an apt account for justifying the natural kind status (and utility), of 
cognitive modules.  Of particular interest is the way in which historical essences are thought 
to have practical utility for EP; something I have argued is not the case with protein 
molecules, or, for that matter, with historical kinds in general. 
In what follows, I will introduce cognitive modules and critically examine claims to their 
historical pedigree, arguing that they fail to be historical natural kinds.  I will then show why 
cognitive modules need not possess this badge of ontological merit to justify a role in 
psychological science.  Even if cognitive modules had no Darwinian histories at all, they could 
still be scienti$c kinds so long as they are robust and empirically identi$able.  #is entails 
however that we must leave the ‘evolutionary’ part of Evolutionary Psychology behind.  
Again, there is much that must be bracketed in this discussion.  I cannot discuss the 
dubious assumptions about human genetics used in EP (see Dupré 2008), the role of 
contemporary stereotypes in EP explanations (Fehr 2012), the problem of alternative 
explanations, and various criticisms that engage the non-evolutionary content of EP (Buller 
2005 o%ers a comprehensive critique); and I will discuss only brie0y the epistemic limitations 
EP faces. 
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135 For Fodor, natural kinds are those categories that can be bound variables in proper laws.  As a result, 
he wonders whether all modules are a natural kind—which is not exactly the question I pursue here.  
See his (1974).  Gray (2001) examines Fodor’s (1983) claim, focusing on the shared properties of 
modules.  Other philosophers have looked to the evolutionary construction argument to support 
claims about modular homologies (morphological similarities) as natural kinds (e.g.) Wagner (1996). I 
restrict my discussion to the natural kind aspirations of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the founders 
of Evolutionary Psychology. 
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2.1 "e Case for Evolved (Cognitive) Modules 
Several recent traditions in philosophy and psychology identify ‘modules’ in the mind and 
brain (Carruthers 2004, 2006, Cosmides & Tooby 1987, 1992, 2013, Fodor 1983), where 
‘modules’ are isolable components.136  I might have a decision-making module, a face-
recognition module, a language acquisition module, and a geometric module.  #ese modules 
will themselves consist of sub-routine modules, and may also be part of larger modules.  On 
certain accounts, known as ‘massive modularity’ hypotheses, the mind is nothing but an 
enormous system of nested modules (Carruthers 2006, Pinker 1997, Cosmides & Tooby 
1992).   
#e main philosophical argument for the existence of modules appeals to the piecemeal 
nature of evolutionary conservation.137   Since evolution builds things by recycling and 
reissuing whatever parts are available, the argument goes, modern minds will likely have been 
compiled out of functional parts of old minds.  #ese are the modules.  #e modular 
construction process is the same one that builds organisms out of bits of physiology developed 
for earlier organisms, or biochemicals using genes for other biochemicals.138  #is very general 
argument could be run for any evolved biological object.  Evolution always works by 
modifying and re-arranging bits of all shapes and sizes, and when it comes to the mind or 
brain, we call (certain of) these ‘modules’.  #e proponent of modularity imagines a mind 
built in much the same way as, for instance, the eye.  Just as the lens of the human eye was 
fashioned from an older protein used in digestion and heat-shock response, so too is the 
cognitive system tasked with searching for my iPhone fashioned from older cognitive powers 
used in (e.g.) foraging and predator detection. 
No movement is more closely associated with the evolutionary argument for modularity 
than EP.  For EP, the mind is a massive set of conserved modules.   EP starts with the claim 
that our Pleistocene ancestors, like humans of today, faced a set of reliably-recurring problem 
situations: 
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136 This tradition emerged with Jerry Fodor (1983), but there are now as many definitions of ‘module’ 
as there are module theorists.  This diversity is not of present interest.   
137 There are also empirical arguments for their existence.  Neurophysiologists may claim that neural 
architecture is set up in discrete isolated systems.  Psychologists may claim that certain cognitive 
processes are isolated from others.  Neither of these establishes the evolutionary nature of modules, 
only their contemporary existence.  There are two additional a priori arguments for modularity.  First 
is the claim that it is evolutionarily advantageous to construct minds out of modules rather than try to 
construct giant general-purpose algorithms.  Second is the similar claim that it is computationally 
intractable to use one problem-solving strategy to solve multiple problems in real time (see Cosmides 
& Tooby 1987). 
138 A very good, if overlooked, account of the evolutionary argument for modularity can be found in 
(Clark 1987).  Clark compares the inelegant process of evolutionary construction to overworked 
computer engineers, who ‘kludge’ together functional but inelegant solutions to the problems they face 
using whatever bits of code happen to be lying around. 
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Our hunter-gatherer ancestors were, in e%ect, on a camping trip that lasted a 
lifetime, and they had to solve many di%erent kinds of problems well to survive and 
reproduce under those conditions: hunting, evaluating plant resources, cooperating 
with others, avoiding predators, dividing resources among kin, selecting fertile 
mates, deterring sexual rivals, avoiding infectious diseases, detecting alliances, 
avoiding incest, learning grammar, negotiating dominance hierarchies, and 
managing aggression, for example. (Cosmides & Tooby 2013, p.203) 
#ese problem situations are diverse.  Citing this diversity and leveraging a computational 
tractability argument, EP theorists argue that no single problem-solving strategy would have 
suited all of the tasks involved in caveman life—or at least no single strategy will have done so 
well enough to avoid extinction.  It is much more likely that early humans developed 
problem-speci$c cognitive strategies.  #ese are the modular building blocks of contemporary 
minds.   
Evolutionary psychologists therefore expect (and $nd) that the human mind 
contains a large number of information-processing devices that are functionally 
specialized and therefore domain speci$c, with di%erent devices activated by 
di%erent kinds of content (snakes versus smiles, food versus mates, cues of social 
exchange versus cues of aggression). (Cosmides & Tooby 2013, p.204) 
#ese modules are picked-up reordered and put to new uses in new situations, such that our 
present cognitive abilities are fashioned out of the original set of Pleistocene modules. 
EP builds its research methodology on this foundation, claiming that we can gain insight 
into present cognitive processes by modelling them on the processes ancestors must have 
possessed to solve problems in the Pleistocene.  Since it is from Pleistocene modules that our 
present cognitive processes are constructed, we should study cognition by de-constructing it 
into component modules—by carving it at nature’s (and history’s) joints.   
Within EP the evolutionary argument is presented as pertaining to cognitive modules.  #e 
memorable claims of this $eld concern mechanisms like mate-choice, kin-detection, or object 
recognition.  Less o&en do we read about conserved neurological structures.  Yet EP must 
require commitment to neurobiological modules too since these are the vehicles for the 
evolution of cognition (Cosmides & Tooby 1992, see also Fodor 1983).  #e resulting view is 
of cognitive modules that supervene on neurobiological modules.  #is supervenience relation 
is our entry-point to a critique of cognitive modules as natural kinds. 
Before discussing the link between cognition and the brain, a bit of terminology is in 
order.  In what follows, I use the common metaphorical language of ‘wiring’ and ‘networking’ 
of the brain.  Similarly, I will talk about cognition as ‘programs’ or ‘algorithms’ that ‘run’ on 
the brain.  #ese computer metaphors are controversial, and rightfully so.  #ey can mislead 
(see Carello et al. 1984).  Here, however, it is convenient shorthand, which communicates the 
distinction between cognition and neurophysiology in (what I believe to be) a non-
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problematic way.139  Neurophysiology is the wet-ware.  It is partly inherited.  It is physical.  
Cognition is the so&ware.  If it is at all inherited then it is inherited to some degree via 
neurophysiology.  It is not physical.  It ‘runs’ on the neurophysiology.  Sticking with this 
language emphasises the way in which cognition must be enacted through neurophysiology.   
2.2 Neural Plasticity and the Evolution of Cognition 
What does the argument from piecemeal design prove?  According to modularity 
theorists, it proves that bits and pieces of early modules will be recycled into present day 
modules.  Bits of what, exactly?  According to EP, it proves that cognitive bits and pieces will 
be recycled.  It is not immediately clear that this is true.  #e argument from design certainly 
suggests that bits of brain structure get used and re-used, but whether those bits support bits 
of cognition is a big question.  Evolution does not work directly at the non-physical cognitive 
level.  #is makes the claim about cognitive modules a more di1cult one to prove. 
Like proteins and organisms, brains will be composed of many historical kinds.  #ere will 
be molecular historical kinds, like neurotransmitters; there will be cellular historical kinds, 
like neurons.  Neurophysiologists also describe conserved aggregates of these.  #e brain is a 
nested hierarchy of historical kinds.  All of these will be used as parts from which to build new 
adaptations at higher levels.  #ough the module theorist may claim that whatever pieces get 
reused and recycled are ‘modules’, this view strips ‘module’ of its meaning—they would not 
want neurons, cells, or proteins to count as ‘modules’.  Nevertheless this line of reasoning 
supports the claim that the brain may contain some neurobiological things of the size and 
scale described by philosophers and neuroscientists under the label ‘modules’.  If so, then 
those physical modules would be historical natural kinds.  But these are not the cognitive 
kinds required by EP. 
Nowhere in the brain will we see conserved cognitive modules.  Cognitive algorithms only 
emerge when the brain interacts with the world.  Yet, assuming physicalism about mental 
events, we would still want to say that cognitive algorithms are (at least partly) in the brain.  
What then would it mean for a cognitive algorithm to be Darwinian?  Early EP assumed that 
the evolution of a neurobiological module just was the evolution of an associated cognitive 
module (Cosmides & Tooby 1992) but the widespread phenomena of neural plasticity 
complicates this assumption.140  I will now explain why neural plasticity precludes cognitive 
modules as historical kinds.  
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139 In other work, I have used this distinction between levels of description in cognitive science to 
highlight the empirical gulf between cognition and neurophysiology.  If the reader doubts the analytic 
utility of separating cognitive algorithms from neurobiological realizers, see (Bartol & Linquist 2015) 
140 Some authors have been overzealous in taking plasticity to disprove EP and modularity hypotheses.  
According to Buller and Hardcastle (2000), developmental plasticity is the brain’s general-purpose 
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Neural plasticity is the widespread and well-supported claim that the architecture of the 
brain changes during the life of an organism in response to various stimuli.  Plasticity comes 
in a variety of shapes and sizes.  Some occurs at the cellular level, as new synaptic connections 
are formed in response to learning.  Some occurs at the level of individual cortices, as areas 
are enlarged in response to excessive stimuli.  Some occurs at the whole-brain level, as entire 
systems are disconnected and re-wired.  A few examples should su1ce.   
Much of the work on plasticity comes from cases of injury, where the loss of certain bodily 
functions can have a profound and lasting impact on our neural architecture.  Perhaps none 
so noticeable as the e%ect of motor control on the brain.  Repeat stimulation of particular 
motor regions ultimately leads to enlargement of those areas.  But loss of stimulation is even 
more interesting.  When the motor region controlling a particular part of the body loses its 
signal (say from amputation) that region very quickly quiets down.  Remarkably, however, it 
soon begins to function anew, receiving stimulus from other nearby regions of the body.  In 
monkeys, it was found that cortical regions associated with the motor control of an amputated 
digit quickly re-emerged, receiving input from areas associated with intact adjacent digits 
(Kaas 1991).   
Plasticity is also responsible for alteration in the way in which certain tasks are performed.  
A much-publicised research project recently found that heavy users of marijuana engage an 
atypical pattern of brain systems in order to complete working memory tasks (Kanayama et al. 
2004).  It is well known that marijuana use impairs synaptic activity in brain regions 
associated with spatial reasoning and working memory.141  It appears that heavy users of 
marijuana eventually ‘re-route’ these tasks to other areas of the brain in order to supplement 
the impaired regions.  #ey perform working memory tasks equally well as controls but do so 
using a di%erent neurophysiological strategy.142   
#ese and other $ndings show that the cortical regions were always ‘wired’ to receive a 
range of di%erent signals and perform a range of di%erent tasks.  #ose regions simply do not 
perform many such tasks until needed.  #e presumption is that conditioning ‘assigns’ certain 
regions to certain functions, but that functions can be subsequently re-assigned to any 
quali$ed bit of neural anatomy—and most of your neural anatomy is overquali$ed.  In this 
regard, neural plasticity is frequently associated with neurological development.  #e 
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problem solver, and so plasticity fashions neural regions on-the-fly during development, obviating the 
need for conserved modules.  This line of attack, though popular, misses the mark.  A ‘general purpose 
problem solver’, like plasticity, does not eliminate the possibility of specialised cognitive modules.  Like 
a good operations manager, plasticity might ‘wire in’ one of many possible specialist cognitive 
modules. See (Dellarosa Cummins & Cummins 1999). 
141 The prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate. 
142 Investigators did not seek to determine whether the cognitive process engaged in the task changed 
as the neurophysiological strategy changed. 
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developing brain in children can be viewed as a plastic system that gradually builds functional 
neuro-anatomy in response to stimuli.  #ere are many di%erent ways in which brains control 
bodies and execute cognitive functions.  Which ways our brains do this is partly a matter of 
conditioning.   
Plasticity shows that the link between biological modules and cognitive algorithms is 
complex.  Functionally equivalent cognitive algorithms can supervene on di%erent biological 
systems.  Cognitive demands can alter biological systems.  #e environment can bring about 
changes in biological mechanisms via cognitive ones, or it can alter cognitive algorithms 
without changing their biological realizers.  #ere is no simple characterization of the 
relationship between the cognitive and the biological.  #is is precisely the issue.  Present-day 
cognitive algorithms will supervene on various bits of neurophysiological machinery, but 
these bits are cobbled together by plastic cognitive procedures, not by evolution.  #ere is no 
reason to suspect that cognitive algorithms will respect the borders of any conserved 
neurobiology, or that a given module will always support the same cognitive function.143 
To say that cavemen had cognitive systems that we have re-purposed is misleading.  
Cavemen had certain brain structures that developed during their lifetimes in response to 
local and developmental stimuli, simultaneously shaping and being shaped by cognitive 
procedures suited to the problem scenarios of caveman life.  Contemporary ‘descendants’ of 
those brain structures are further modi$ed during our lifetimes, shaping and being shaped by 
cognitive procedures suited to the problem scenarios of contemporary life.144  As philosopher 
Chuck Ward (2012) explains, ‘the functional architecture of our brains (and so our minds) is 
in signi$cant part a product of fairly recent cultural development, [and so] those features are 
not adaptations to the environment of our Pleistocene ancestors’ (p.21).  
We can think of cognition and neurophysiology the same way we think of molecular-
physiological function and the biochemicals, collections of structures, etc., that execute that 
function.  In Chapter 4, we learned that structurally and historically di%erent proteins can 
carry out the same functions, just as structurally and historically kindred proteins can carry 
out distinct functions.  #ere is no necessary link between structural or historical similarity 
(or identity) and function.  Functions were described as dispositional properties of kinds, the 
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143 The criticism I am offering is compatible with that offered by Dupré (2008), who appeals to the 
developmental plasticity of human beings in order to criticize the notion that our brains are directly 
inherited from Pleistocene brains.  Dupré’s point is that contemporary understanding of molecular 
evolution (and heredity) suggests that our physiology is in larger part a response to recent development 
than Evolutionary Psychologists suggest.  The molecular mechanisms Dupré discusses are among those 
thought to lie behind intra-generational neural plasticity. 
144 In fact, it is more complicated even than that.  Brain structures are not inherited, the genes partly 
specifying them are.  Enter all of the complications surrounding genetic expression (Dupré 2008).  I 
have simplified the matter here in a way that shortens the prose, but should not harm my point.  
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realization of which is highly contingent on context and development.  Functions thus do not 
demarcate natural kinds, nor are they necessary properties of natural kinds; function and kind 
membership are independent.  #is account works for modules, too.  Plasticity tells us that the 
same bits of human brain can sub-serve di%erent cognitive functions, just as two di%erent bits 
of human brain can subserve the same cognitive function.  Cognitive algorithms are 
properties of vast networks of neurobiological assemblies.  #ese properties arise only for 
speci$c network arrangements, though not for singularly speci$c network arrangements.  
#ey are contingent not only on the presence of the arrangement by which they are enacted, 
but also on the developmental and environmental contexts that occasion the arrangement in 
the $rst place, via plasticity.  Cognitive so&ware and neurobiological hardware develop 
together during the lifetime of the organism.  #ey are no more natural kinds than any 
developed property of an individual is a natural kind.   
2.3 "e Fate of Evolutionary Psychology 
A lot hangs on claims about cavemen.  #ough some EP theorists are more interested in 
the idea that the mind contains isolatable components, and so make less reference to the 
Pleistocene (e.g. Carruthers 2004), all EP theorists rely heavily on the evolutionary argument. 
Cavemen claims are only supported by the evolutionary argument145, and so it is these claims 
that have to go.  Where does this leave EP?  Modularity theorists must give up the idea that 
cognitive algorithms are the historically conserved pieces from which present minds are 
constructed.  However this does not entail that cognition cannot be carved up into isolatable 
pieces and grouped according to functional equivalence.  Natural kinds are o% the table, but 
induction-supporting kinds are not.  In this $nal section, I will sketch an argument for the 
possibility of cognitive modules as induction-supporting kinds. 
#e fact that cognitive algorithms are not natural kinds does not tell us anything about 
their usefulness.  It is hard not to notice that, in spite of plasticity and variance, cognitive 
algorithms in the population do exhibit a certain clumpiness. #is is no accident.  #e 
problem-solving environment faced by contemporary humans presents certain reliable 
problems, which admit of a varied but $nite number of solutions.  If the solutions are $nite 
and if their number is manageable, then cognitive algorithms may well form useful similarity-
based groupings, or ‘induction-supporting’ kinds, of the sort described in Chapter 1.   
What I am describing here is a form of ‘canalisation’ applied to cognition.  Canalisation 
refers to the way in which certain phenotypes exhibit robustness in the face of genotypic and 
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145 Other claims about modules, such as being isolable and domain specific, draw support from 
additional empirical evidence.  
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developmental variation.146  #e variety of possible starting conditions and developmental 
events behind phenotypes are not necessarily re0ected in an equal variety of end points.  #e 
same phenotype can result from a number of developmental origins. 
We can expect canalisation of cognition for two reasons, or because of two constraints.  
First, a cognitive algorithm must be able to execute whatever task it is for.  #ough many 
possible algorithms can solve a given problem, that number is still $nite.  Second, an 
algorithm must run on a human brain.  Powerful though our brains are, these physical 
systems impose an obvious constraint: We cannot run a cognitive program for which we lack 
compatible wet-ware.   
Consider a simple example of the $rst constraint.  Here is how I perform multiplication 
involving the number nine: 
9n=((n-1)*10) +  (10-n) 
I do not know why I do it this way, but I do; and it works.  #is is how I started multiplying by 
nine as a child, and I have never grown out of it, in spite of the knowledge that there are easier 
ways to do it.  My algorithm does not work particularly e1ciently, especially once the 
numbers get higher than ten, but it is reliable enough to have survived.  Few of my friends 
perform the operation this way.  Most have memorized the multiplication tables up to a point 
and perform a simple recall.  Others use a more intuitive combination of multiplication and 
subtraction [(n*10)-n].  #ese are the only options; everyone will use one of these processes.  
As long as the algorithm must solve the problem of multiplication by nine, it is limited to a 
few possible forms.147  #e same is true of any cognitive process; it can take only as many 
di%erent forms as will reliably execute its function.  
#ese teleological constraints imposed on algorithmic operations are a logical imposition, 
and there is a biological analogue to these constraints, which is more in line with traditional 
applications of the term ‘canalisation’.  #ere are only so many possible organic structures that 
will address certain adaptive challenges.  Limbs, body plans, and sensory organs each evolved 
multiple times separately, with minor variations, because these are good solutions to certain 
adaptive challenges, and, for many phylogenetic groups, they are the only options available 
given inherited biology.  We can apply this same thought to the functional set-up of the brain.  
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146 The concept of canalisation comes from Waddington (1942).  He used the concept to describe the 
apparent robustness of certain phenotypes against environmental and genetic perturbation.  For 
Waddington, canalisation is a result of selection.  I am here stretching the initial concept, which is 
entirely biological, to add the teleological algorithmic constraint. 
147 On a fine enough grain the number of possible strategies might be much larger.  The simple process 
of [(n*10)-n] might break down further, since it does not actually eliminate multiplication.  ‘(n*10)’ 
might become (10+10+10…), and so on.  This does not seem to matter for the creation of similarity-
based groups, since most of the generalizations that hold for the compact algorithm also hold for the 
broken-down algorithm.  But it is an interesting question how much of this type of variation might 
exist within cognitive algorithms and the degree to which it matters for psychology. 
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Applied to a plastic brain, there are only so many ‘wiring’ set-ups that will support the sorts of 
cognition that the environment demands of us.  Plasticity may be able to route cognition via 
many channels, but not just any channels.  #is means that not only will cognitive algorithms 
be limited to those that can execute the requisite function, but that set is further limited to 
those that can run on available (or possible) neurophysiology. 
Combined, the algorithmic and biological constrains make the case for a sort of 
canalisation of cognitive processes.148  Canalisation of traits positively correlates with selection 
pressure.  So we might expect the number of possible cognitive processes for at least some 
problem-scenarios to be rather small.  #ere are only so many processes by which to spot kin, 
identify faces, or represent geometry.  And some further sub-set of these possible processes is 
such that a given human mind can execute it.  #e possible workable and reasonably e1cient 
‘modules’ are likely few enough to permit some recurrence of cognitive strategies in the 
population and recurring cognitive strategies are excellent categories for scienti$c enquiry. 
To be clear, the possibility of robust similarity-based groupings is not challenged by 
neurobiological variation underneath cognitive equivalence.  Canalisation is a measure of 
robustness against variation, including variation in neural hardware.  Even if equivalent 
cognitive algorithms run using di%erent neurophysiological strategies, this should not prevent 
researchers from lumping those cognitive algorithms together for the purpose of explanations 
and generalizations at the level of cognition.  Canalisation predicts classes of functional 
equivalence, not physical identicalness.  Functional equivalence is not enough to establish 
historical kinds or other natural kinds, but it certainly is enough to support induction and 
explanation.149 
#is explains some of the empirical success claimed by EP without vindicating any of the 
claims about cavemen.150  On the received approach, EP successfully identi$es cognitive 
algorithms in the modern population and uses this $nding to vindicate the central EP belief in 
cavemen cognitive modules.  #at belief justi$es the search for those algorithms in the $rst 
place and in turn frames Panglossian explanations about why an algorithm happens to run 
this way or that.  On the canalisation and similarity-based kinds view just proposed, the 
cavemen claims of EP are justifying things that do not require justi$cation and explaining 
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148 Notice that this is very different from Ariew’s (2006) attempt to identify innateness with 
canalization.  He describes innate psychological traits as the realization of canalized neurophysiology.  
This is only the biological constraint, not the algorithmic.  Also, I make no claims about ‘innateness’ as 
I view the concept as unhelpful.  See (Griffiths & Machery 2008) on Ariew and (Linquist et al. 2011) on 
the concept of innateness.   
149 Mistakes enter the frame only when scientists attempt to make generalisations about neural 
architecture using groupings of cognitive algorithms, for then we would hide neurobiological variation 
underneath cognitive similarity.  So long as 1:1 reduction from cognitive algorithm to neurobiological 
realiser is resisted, such mistakes will be avoided. 
150 See Cosmides & Tooby 2013 for a list of EP success stories 
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things that do not require explanation.  Why does the algorithm exist?  Because there is a 
problem in the world that it addresses or solves.  Why does it take the form that it takes?  
Because it settled within a space of possibilities imposed by the problem it solves and the 
biology by which it is executed.  If a further story needs to be told then we can appeal to the 
history of the agent in question to explain why the algorithm settled on a particular solution 
within that constrained space of possibilities—but this story is going to be practically 
inaccessible and has nothing whatsoever to do with the Pleistocene.  #e same can be said of 
appeals to cognitive modules as natural kinds.  Scienti$c success with modules does not entail 
that they represent joints of nature enduring from humans past; they need only to be robustly 
and objectively similar.  
How then does the EP theorist generate hypotheses about candidate modules?  Cognition 
is terribly messy.  It is di1cult to pull cognition apart into isolatable chunks in such a way that 
does not do violence to the cognitive phenomena being described.  EP methodology suggests 
a way to circumvent this problem.  Rather than starting with present-day cognition, they 
think about what simple adaptive problems might have been faced by our ancestors and then 
search for those mechanisms in present-day human minds.  #is methodology is untenable in 
view of the arguments o%ered here.  A new mode of hypothesis generation must be found.  In 
replacement I can o%er only old-fashioned empirical cognitive psychology, aimed at pulling 
apart problem-solving operations into their component parts. 
3. Final $oughts on Races, Cognition, and Induction 
In this chapter I have discussed two cases in science, which, prima facie, are hospitable to a 
Kind Historicist account of natural kinds.  My goal was to forestall such applications of my 
theory not because I believe races and cognitive modules are not natural kinds, but because I 
think that natural kind status is irrelevant in these cases.  I hope to have shown how worries 
about the ontological status of scienti$c classi$cations can lead astray.  To avoid this, 
philosophers and scientists must critically evaluate the ontological status they seek, be it 
‘natural’, ‘meaningful’, ‘individual’, ‘natural kind’, etc., and ask a&er links between that status 
and scienti$c utility.  If no such link exists, then it is time to re-evaluate our philosophical 
projects.  Another way to phrase this message is this: ‘What follows from the fact that thing X 
has (or lacks) status N?  O&en, the only claim such a discovery licences is the claim that ‘X is 
(or is not) N’.  If we want to pass moral or scienti$c judgement on X, we need some link from 
N to science or ethics.  Such links are not easily found. 
A naturalised metaphysics of biology is not helpful in providing kinds for scienti$c 
investigation.  For certain philosophers of science, this may appear to invalidate my project 
altogether.  But that would be hasty.  A naturalised metaphysics of biological kinds is helpful 
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for understanding philosophical observations such as intrinsic heterogeneity, theoretical 
pluralism, and the general inapplicability of standard metaphysics of science to biology.  And 
so it is to these philosophical issues—o&en called ‘biological exceptionalism’—to which I now 
turn in my concluding discussion. 
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Conclusion 
 
I promised at the outset that Kind Historicism would shed some light on biological 
exceptionalism.  It is now time to deliver on that promise.  Doing so should serve as a helpful 
recapitulation of my position while also pointing toward future work and highlighting 
implications for philosophy of biology and metaphysics, yet unexpounded.  A secondary goal 
of this discussion is to leverage my position, Kind Historicism, over a family of broadly 
pluralist approaches to biological kinds—versions of which appeared in Chapters 1, 3, and 4— 
by showing how Kind Historicism provides a superior account of biological exceptionalism 
(henceforth simply ‘exceptionalism’). 
It was talk of exceptionalism that %rst piqued my interest in the metaphysics and ontology 
of biology151, however I must confess that, at the time, I had only a vague sense of what the 
term meant.  I was perhaps not alone.  Little has been written about exceptionalism.152  &e 
term is used in connection with the natural kind problem, intrinsic heterogeneity, theoretical 
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151 During my MA at the University of Guelph, (which until then was supposed to be all about political 
philosophy) in a room full of philosophers and biologists, there was a sense that biology was somehow 
different from the other sciences.  This sense grew as the semester wore on, fuelled by the frequent 
juxtaposition of biological and non-biological treatments of kinds, classification, laws, and causation.  
After a project on the gene and its causal powers (see Bartol 2013a) I began the present investigation 
into kinds.   
152 A Google N-gram of ‘Biological Exceptionalism’ returns no results (searching books between 1800-
2015).  A JSTOR search returns a handful of results mentioning ‘exceptionalism’ in legal or moral 
contexts.  An informal survey of colleagues supports the interpretation I use here. 
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pluralism, and the problem of laws in biology.  Now, when colleagues mention 
‘exceptionalism’, I take them to refer broadly to the fact that biology is somehow interestingly 
and importantly di!erent from non-biology.153   I submit that Kind Historicism and the 
conceptual framework introduced to support it constitute a vindication of this sentiment.  
&ere are thus two tasks required of my account.  &e %rst (and simpler) task is to explain 
what the word ‘biology’ means in this statement of exceptionalism.  ‘Biology’ might be 
sciences; it might be the world; it might be both.  &e second task is more di*cult; it involves 
explaining what it might mean for biology to be ‘interestingly and importantly di+erent’.   
To begin, I will interpret the ‘biology’ in exceptionalism as both the biological world and 
the sciences that study it.  &ere are exceptional elements to both, and they should now be 
familiar.  On the side of the biological world is intrinsic heterogeneity.  &is thesis has 
discussed at length the ways in which biological objects are broadly heterogeneous, and the 
problems this causes for certain metaphysical enquiries.  Classes of non-biological objects are 
not so troublesome.  On the side of the sciences is theoretical pluralism.  It is certainly an 
unusual feature of biology that scientists are so overtly pluralistic with their theories of 
classi%cation.  I have not yet discussed the way in which biologists are pluralistic about causal 
claims and generalisations but this, too, is a form of theoretical pluralism and thus a fact to be 
accounted for as part of exceptionalism. &eoretical pluralism and intrinsic heterogeneity 
describe ways in which biology is interestingly and importantly di+erent from non-biology. 
Kind Historicism predicts intrinsic heterogeneity as an empirical consequence of the 
metaphysics of biological kinds.  Intrinsic heterogeneity in turn precludes the use of biological 
kinds as induction-supporting kinds.  &is necessitates theoretical pluralism.  I will make this 
argument %rst in the context of kinds and classi%cation before suggesting how the argument 
might be extended to laws and generalisations.   
&is thesis has been about the metaphysics and ontology of biology, not biological practice.  
I have discussed natural kinds at the expense of induction-supporting kinds and I have 
investigated intrinsic heterogeneity at the expense of theoretical pluralism.  It is now time to 
bring together insights from around the thesis in order to situate Kind Historicism, a thesis 
about the metaphysics of biological kinds, relative to biological exceptionalism, theoretical 
pluralism, and the induction-supporting kinds of the biological sciences.   
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153 Exceptionalism has an ethical version, according to which things made from biology (e.g. cells) are 
on a different moral plane than things made from non-biology (e.g. chemicals).  This is not what I 
mean, here. 
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1. Biological Exceptionalism 
&e term ‘biology’ in biological exceptionalism might refer either to a slice of the world or 
to the sciences that study that slice.  To determine which of these meanings is best suited to 
exceptionalism, we should ask whether any deeply interesting or important di+erences might 
be picked out by exceptionalism under each possibility.  Many use ‘biology’ in the latter sense, 
referring to the collected biological sciences.  Not only are these di+erent from the chemical 
or physical sciences, they are also di+erent from one another.  An observer might even 
wonder what connects the biological sciences at all, given their diverse subject matter, 
methods, and aims.  If exceptionalism uses ‘biology’ in this sense, then it either identi%es 
exceptional practices as interesting in their own right, perhaps for sociological reasons, or it 
identi%es exceptional practices as interesting because they re,ect exceptional features of the 
world with which biological scientists must grapple.  If it is only the former then 
exceptionalism is philosophically uninteresting.  &e latter is more promising.  An account of 
exceptionalism should illuminate exceptional practices by showing how they relate to 
exceptional features of the biological world.   
Biologists do many things di+erently—from the rest of science and from each other.  We 
have seen already how biological classi%cation and taxonomy vary internally and are di+erent 
from classi%cation and individuation in the physical sciences.  &is is ‘theoretical pluralism’.  
Philosophers of biology have also noted the ways in which causal claims (or ascriptions of 
laws) are di+erent in biological contexts (Brandon 1997, Hamilton 2007, Haufe 2013, Mitchell 
2000, Woodward 2001); this is a theoretical pluralism of a di+erent stripe, which I will discuss 
shortly.  &ese practices are ‘exceptional’, in the literal sense of the word, but there must be 
more to exceptionalism than this.  For suppose that biologists are just bad at taxonomizing, 
individuating, and %nding causes.  If they were doing this poorly compared to physical 
scientists, then focussing on these di+erences would not be subject matter for a philosopher, 
but a psychologist or sociologist.154  Many would claim, of course, that biologists are not 
wrong, merely di+erent.  Perhaps the epistemic culture of biology has channelled the practices 
in one direction while the epistemic cultures of the physical sciences have gone a di+erent 
route.  One might talk about the types of people that go into these sciences, or about the 
relatively late popularity of biology as a science, or about the perception of biology as a ‘so/er’ 
science than physics or chemistry.  &ere are many facts that might have led biologists to 
develop unique ways of doing things.  Again, however, if it is only these sorts of facts that 
make up exceptionalism then exceptionalism is not a topic for philosophy of science.  It may 
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154 Branches of philosophy such as social epistemology might have something to say about this.  My 
point here is simply that philosophers of science interested in biological exceptionalism would be 
wrong to look primarily at practices for this reason. 
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be interesting to sociologists of science, psychologists, and even to social epistemologists, but 
this version of exceptionalism does not help us understand the unique challenges the 
biological world poses to those who study it.  I suspect there are more to these di+erences 
than socio-historical factors.   
Exceptional biological practices are necessary features of any biological science, not just 
contingent features of the current epistemic and social landscape of present biological science.  
Biological practices must be exceptional because the biological world demands it.  Exceptional 
practices re,ect an exceptional world.  &e point of this concluding discussion is to outline 
how biological kinds make the metaphysics of the biological world exceptional, and how that 
exceptionality demands theoretical pluralism as a feature of biological science.  I begin with 
the biological world before discussing its scienti%c investigation. 
1.1 Intrinsic Heterogeneity and Kind Historicism 
Philosophers of biology have obsessed over classi%cation and kinds in the biological world. 
One thing is nearly-universally agreed: &e natural kind approaches from physico-chemical 
kinds do not work for biology.  &ese approaches anchor kindhood in shared physical 
properties, but biological objects lack such properties.  &is is intrinsic heterogeneity.  It is a 
major reason why we think biology is exceptional.  
In this section I will consider two responses to this state of a+airs.  First is a broadly 
pluralist approach to biological kinds; second is Kind Historicism. While both putative 
accounts point to a metaphysical di+erence between the biological and non-biological 
sciences, kind historicism has the additional virtue of explaining the intrinsic heterogeneity of 
biological classes.   
Most discussions of natural kinds assume that particulars are kindred in virtue of shared 
physical properties, called essences.  While traditional ontological treatments of kinds do 
indeed require shared essences, the idea that those essences must be physical properties 
intrinsic to the particulars is unmotivated.  As I suggested in Chapter 2, the intrinsic physical 
essence is perhaps a coincidental feature of the stock examples of natural kinds: physico-
chemical kinds.  Simple chemical kinds, like gold, and simple physical kinds, like electrons, 
have shared physical structures in virtue of which certain atoms are gold atoms and certain 
particles are electron particles.  &is view is o/en called ‘microstructuralism’, or 
‘microstructural essentialism’.  But microstructural essentialism is not the only essentialism.  
&e kind historicist recognizes that essences need not be physical.  According to Kind 
Historicism, particulars can be members of kinds in virtue of historical essences.   
I have discussed at length the widespread heterogeneity in the biological world.  Within-
class heterogeneity among the properties of biological particulars has led philosophers of 
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biology to all-but abandon hope for a microstructuralist account of biological kinds.  All 
physical properties of biological things are liable to vary, and therefore no set of essential 
physical properties will be found to unify kinds.  &is is how microstructural essentialism fails 
in biology.  &ere are two responses to this failure.155  First, we might adopt some brand of 
pluralism about biological kinds, %nding inspiration in the plurality of taxonomic systems 
developed by biologists in the face of heterogeneity.  &e second option is Kind Historicism.156  
&ere are many pluralist options that fall within the scope of the %rst response.  What they 
have in common is a general appeal to the many objective and non-arbitrary taxonomic 
systems in biology as possible natural kinds.  Call these all ‘biological pluralist’ accounts.  
Responses within this tradition will always be categorically pluralist, supporting multiple 
types of kind category.  Any of the diverse approaches to taxonomizing species, for instance, 
are seen by the biological pluralist to o+er (potentially) unique kind categories.  Responses 
within this tradition may also be taxonomically pluralist, believing that self-same biological 
particulars are members of distinct kinds.  One might believe that a single organism is a 
member of one kind because of interbreeding abilities, another because of morphological 
similarity, and yet another because of genetic similarity.  Biological pluralism is a metaphysics 
of biology that interprets the disunity manifest in theoretical pluralism as a metaphysical 
disunity. 
One virtue of biological pluralism is that it points to a metaphysical di+erence between the 
biological and non-biological world. Where the non-biological kinds admit of category and 
taxonomy monism, the biological kinds admit of category and (on some views) taxonomy 
pluralism.  But we should not take this to be an account of biological exceptionalism.  I have 
argued that approaches within this tradition should be viewed as o+ering realist induction-
supporting kinds, not natural kinds (Chapter 1).  &is should so/en the temptation to view 
biological pluralism as a su*ciently ‘deep’ metaphysical account of exceptionalism.  Here I 
o+er a separate point for consideration: &e biological pluralist accommodates intrinsic 
heterogeneity but does not explain it and, as a result, o+ers a comparatively weaker account of 
biological exceptionalism. 
Heterogeneity is not a consequence of the biological pluralist view, it is a feature of the 
biological world with which the view fails to con,ict.  Biologists have found ways around 
intrinsic heterogeneity, identifying shared features and properties of organisms that provide 
workable taxonomic distinctions.  But these properties work as handles for taxonomy (and 
thus for kinds) only for circumscribed sub-sets of the sum total of biological particulars.  &e 
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155 Setting to one side nihilist and constuctivist responses. 
156 Kind Historicism is also pluralist, of course, but it is pluralist across biological and non-biological.  
Within biology Kind Historicism is monist, whereas this broadly pluralist option is not. 
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biological pluralist endorses some or all of these as natural kinds, and in so doing 
accommodates intrinsic heterogeneity.  &at is not the same as accounting for it, which would 
require that heterogeneity is an excepted outcome of the position.  Suppose we asked why 
biology is characterised by intrinsic heterogeneity.  At best, the biological pluralist can say that 
the biological world is heterogeneous because its kinds are heterogeneous.  &is is an 
embodiment of heterogeneity, not an account of it. Consider by contrast the following 
account of how intrinsic heterogeneity is a consequence of Kind Historicism. 
Kind Historicism predicts heterogeneity as a consequence of the nature of biological kinds.  
When kindred particulars share a history, they do not instantiate the same property.  Rather, 
they bear a set of relations to one another.  &ey cannot instantiate the same property because 
the nature of individual histories precludes co-instantiation.  &e history of one particular will 
necessarily be di+erent from the history of any other, for to have the exact same history is to 
be the same token particular, rather than a kindred pair thereof.  For any set of historically 
related particulars, there will be some divergence in individual history, even if only moments 
before conception/synthesis/mitosis/etc.  &ese di+erences in history underpin di+erences in 
particulars.  In Chapter 3 I developed this point with reference to lemons.  Kindred 
particulars will, at the very least, develop separately.  Individual developmental di+erences will 
result in di+erent properties.  &ink of identical twins, whose history diverges only from 
conception onward.  Genetic and epigenetic di+erences at conception compounded by 
environmental and developmental di+erences over their lifetimes result in organisms that 
have many unique properties, in spite of being closely historically related.  Most kindred 
particulars will diverge further back in their histories, measured in generations.  Divergence 
over generations also results in di+erences in properties.  &us members of the same branch 
of a family di+er immensely.  In each instance, the nature of the biological kind category 
predicts heterogeneity.  Insofar as biological kinds are fundamentally historical, they are 
necessarily heterogeneous.157 
  Notice that the same type of account also explains why widespread heterogeneity is not a 
feature of non-biological kinds.  In microstructural kinds, kindhood is anchored by a static 
physical property (or set).  Physical properties, unlike historical relations, can be instantiated 
by multiple particulars.  Since the causal relationships in which physical properties are 
engaged are governed by invariant physical laws, identical essences will participate in identical 
causal interactions yielding identical properties.  Even if the causal features of the essence are 
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157 Some may think ‘necessity’ is too strong.  One might imagine a possible world in which natural 
genetic variation is absent, as is variation in the environment.  In such a world biological kinds would 
be homogenous.  But that world is not our own; nor is it one containing biology in the first place, since 
it lacks the conditions for evolution. 
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dispositional, the fact that the essence itself does not change means that it will reliably support 
the same e+ects in the same conditions.158  So, just as an account of the features of biological 
kinds predicts intrinsic biological heterogeneity, that same type of account predicts the 
relative homogeneity of physico-chemical kinds.  
I submit that this explanation o+ered by Kind Historicism is more substantive than that 
o+ered by the biological pluralist.  While Kind Historicism predicts intrinsic heterogeneity, 
the pluralist can only cite heterogeneity as a feature of her view.  &e pluralist observes 
heterogeneity as empirical reality and builds a view around it, believing that intrinsic 
heterogeneity indicates a (metaphysical) heterogeneity of biological kinds.  &e Kind 
Historicist, by contrast, o+ers an account of kinds that predicts heterogeneity in biological 
properties.  &is link from Kind Historicism to intrinsic heterogeneity extends through to 
theoretical pluralism, since theoretical pluralism is a response to intrinsic heterogeneity.  &e 
biological pluralist might think that it is a virtue of her account that it aligns with the kinds 
used in biological practice, re,ecting theoretical pluralism.  However this is no place for 
natural kinds; induction-supporting kinds are the appropriate tool.  I have said little about 
how induction-supporting kinds actually arise in biology, so this next section will sketch just 
such an account. 
1.2 #eoretical Pluralism and Kind Historicism 
&e motivation behind biologists’ pluralistic approach to taxonomy is not metaphysical; 
biologists are not o+ering an implicit metaphysical thesis about the unity or disunity of 
biological kinds. &ey have little interest in addressing issues of metaphysical monism or 
pluralism, whether categorical or taxonomic.  Rather, biologists are pragmatically pluralist 
about their classi%cations because that is the best way to get stable groups over which 
inductions and generalisations can range.  Historical kinds cannot do this; enter pragmatically 
tailored induction-supporting kinds.  
I noted in Chapter 3 that microstructural kinds provide chemistry with induction-
supporting kinds.  For reasons just outlined, simple microstructural kinds are highly-similar 
under similar conditions.  &is makes them ideal candidates for inductions and explanations, 
and so the chemical elements lie at the heart of chemical classi%cation.  &e same is not true of 
historical kinds and so biologists need to %nd ways of erecting kinds that support their 
inductions.  But how?  At %rst blush, we might think that scientists should simply group 
particulars using whatever properties they want their inductions to engage.  If we want to talk 
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158 It is still possible for non-biological kinds to differ.  Any ‘accidental’ properties not related to the 
microstructural essence may vary.  We tend to forget this since most examples of microstructural kinds 
are described such that all of their obvious properties are direct results of their essential microstructure, 
lacking any ‘accidental’ properties.   
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about body plans then make groups based on body plans.  If we want to talk about locomotive 
strategies then make groups based on mechanisms of locomotion.  If we want to talk about 
ecological niches then make groups based on niche.  &is approach quickly falls apart.  &ere 
would be a combinatorial explosion of non-translatable kind classi%cations, equal to the 
number of properties mentioned in inductions.  Claims about biological kinds would always 
be relative to a classi%cation system in which they were made, in which claims of only that 
type (e.g. morphological, phylogenetic) hold true.  &is would not facilitate understanding of 
the biological world.  As Hacking (1993) has argued, taxonomic systems relativized to very 
speci%c enquiries would result in Kuhnian incommensurability.  Knowledge about the kinds 
would not be gained because there would be no way of translating knowledge from one 
enquiry, using its taxonomy, into the taxonomic system of another enquiry.159   
Instead of adopting taxonomies for each shared property, scientists seek a smaller number 
of classi%cations that work in slightly broader investigative contexts.  &ese classi%cations are 
based on proxies.  By ‘proxy’ I mean some single property or property set that stands in as a 
good guarantor of other shared properties of scienti%c interest.  In Chapter 3 I discussed how 
Millikan (1999a) and Gri*ths (1999) make a compelling case for using phylogeny as a proxy 
for the classi%cation of organisms.  Interbreeding, too, provides a good proxy for other 
similarities between organisms, as does morphology.  &ese properties, when shared, tend to 
indicate the presence of other shared properties over which generalizations might range.  
However the %delity with which their presence indicates other shared features depends on the 
organism, environment, and supporting conditions in question.  Genetic similarity may 
guarantee morphological similarity in some contexts but not all.  Interbreeding ability may 
guarantee certain genetic similarities in some types of organism but not others.  It all depends 
on the details.  Di+erent proxies will better suit di+erent investigations and di+erent groups of 
biological particulars. 160  &us biologists studying plants, algae, and fungi tend to use a 
di+erent taxonomic approach from those engaged in zoological classi%cation.  Part of the task 
of biological taxonomy is determining the scope of applicability (or usefulness) of any given 
scheme.  
&is pluralistic and selective use of proximate classi%cation systems is a ‘theoretical 
pluralism’ regarding taxonomy.  Multiple distinct representations of the taxonomy are 
required to capture all of the similarity/dissimilarity relations in which biologists might be 
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159 Hacking is attempting to prove here that taxonomies of natural kinds must be hierarchical.  I have 
reservations about his argument.  We should notice that in many sciences, non-translatable 
taxonomies are still such that investigators can transfer knowledge, since there are sufficient overlaps.  
Hacking seems to imagine radically distinct taxonomic systems, rather than the partially distinct 
systems of (e.g.) species classifications.  See Khalidi (1998) for discussion. 
160 It is an interesting sociological and psychological question as to how scientists navigate knowledge 
transfer from one system to another.  They nevertheless seem to do just that. 
 159 
interested.  Kind Historicism explains why this is necessary (see above); but why does it work?  
Why do certain proxy handles for taxonomy reliably indicate the presence of other properties?   
It is here that the utility of a robust theory of induction-supporting kinds comes to the 
foreground.  Consider HPC theory, introduced in Chapter 1.  According to HPC, these 
proximate kinds work, when they do, because the proxy property is a reliable indicator of 
certain stable causal structures in the world that give rise to some set of shared properties.  
Following Gri*ths (1999) and Millikan (1999a), for example, we can explain that phylogeny 
works as a system of induction-supporting kinds because evolutionary relatedness guarantees 
the presence of certain causal mechanisms, which ensure some measure of similarity among 
kindred particulars.  &is is Gri*ths’ ‘phylogenetic inertia’ (see Chapter 3).   
Notice that this account says nothing about natural kinds.  Kind Historicism has nothing 
to say about why pluralistic induction-supporting kinds work, because these kinds operate 
independently of whatever the natural kinds are.  One might think it a virtue of the pluralist 
account of natural kinds that it endorses (some) of these induction-supporting kinds as 
natural kinds.  Quite apart from worries about the meaning of ‘natural kind’ (Chapter 1), we 
can ask whether this endorsement amounts to an explanation of inductive success.  It does 
not.  At best, the biological pluralist can claim that certain kinds from biological science 
support induction because they are natural kinds, but then we are le/ wondering why these 
kinds do not always support inductions.  If that worry is answered with reference to the 
imperfect likeness relations among biological kinds, then we are back at intrinsic 
heterogeneity, of which the pluralist has no internal account.  A better account of induction 
makes reference to the relatively stable features of the world that support inductions and the 
connection between the proxy classi%cation and those causal structures.  In this regard I think 
the HPC approach is most helpful. 
As a %nal point, we should not forget that supplementary classi%cations exist outside of 
biology, too.  Chemists rely on supplementary classi%cations to represent likeness relations 
not captured by the elemental classi%cation.  Some of these build upon the elemental 
classi%cations, such as metal, non-metal, and metalloid.  Others are independent of the 
elemental classi%cations and operate at a higher level of organisation, like acid and base.  Yet 
others are relativized to realms of enquiry, like poison.  Pluralistic taxonomic systems are a 
must for scienti%c enquiry.  What makes biology di+erent is that its ‘fundamental’ natural 
kind classi%cation is not capable of being nearly as fundamental as that of chemistry. 
1.3 Laws and Kind Historicism 
&eoretical pluralism about biological classi%cation is just one corner of theoretical 
pluralism in biology.  Just as biologists develop alternative taxonomic systems, testing their 
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scope and applicability, so too do biologists develop biological rules or generalizations and 
attempt to determine the scope of their applicability.  Biology journals are full of ‘relative 
signi%cance controversies’ (Beatty 1995), cases where biologists seek to determine the ‘extent 
of applicability’ of biological generalizations.  Common examples include the Krebs cycle, 
which most but not all aerobic organisms use for the metabolism of carbohydrates, or the lac 
operon model of gene regulation, which appears to be only one of many mechanisms that 
organic systems use to regulate genetic expression.  In each of these debates, generalisations 
initially believed to apply to the whole of biology have had their scope gradually eroded, until 
they fall in status from law to imperfect generalisation.   
A number of philosophers have argued that there will never be any distinctively biological 
laws (Beatty 1995, Fodor 1974, Millikan 1999a, Mayr 1982a, Smart 1963, cf. Ruse 1973, Sober 
1997).161  &is lack of laws in biology is yet another feature that marks biology as somehow 
importantly di+erent from (e.g.) physics or chemistry, which feature a number of perfectly 
invariant generalisations.  Although the discussion is ostensibly about biological practices of 
generalisation, the suspicion is that something about the biological world lies behind this state 
of a+airs.  &e suspicion is that generalisations are not applicable to biology.  In the case of 
theoretical pluralism regarding classi%cation, I argued that plurality in scienti%c practice 
should be seen as a necessary result of the historical nature of biological kinds.  I shall now 
extend this argument to the problem of laws and generalisations in biology.   
A ‘law’ in this context is an exceptionless generalisation that is counterfactual supporting.  
&e %rst condition ensures that the law applies to all cases, the second condition ensures that 
the truth of the law is not contingent upon local facts and would therefore hold across all 
possible changes in environment.  Biology is inhospitable to both conditions.  First, all 
generalisations in biology appear to admit of exceptions.  Second, even an exceptionless 
generalisation (if such a thing obtained) would fail to be counterfactual-supporting.  
Any student of biology will tell you that biology contains generalisations.  &ey will tell 
you how gametes always segregate in 50/50 ratios, how certain genes x cause phenotypes P, or 
how sex ratios will always reach equilibrium.  &e biology student will also tell you, however, 
that these generalisations are not perfectly general.  Exceptions to each abound.  But this 
should not be surprising; the existence of at best imperfect biological generalisations is an 
expected outcome of evolutionary processes.   
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161 I say ‘law-like generalisation’ to focus attention on cases where a generalization ranges over some 
specified set(s) of kinds.  Brandon and McShae (2010) have proposed a law of biology that does not fit 
this picture.  Pace Beatty (1995), there is room to argue that this is not a law of biology.  It may be a 
mathematic generalization that, in this instance, applies to biological objects that instantiate its 
requisite pre-conditions.  At any rate, my concern in this section is the idea that perfect generalisations 
do not generalize over biological classes. 
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Sometimes, evolutionary forces tend to favour the predominance of certain states of a+airs, 
such as the three mentioned above.  Perhaps selection acts against organisms that segregate 
genes irregularly, that have gene x but lack phenotype P, or whose populations have a 
predominance of one sex over the other.  In these cases, evolutionary outcomes give rise to 
stable causal regularities, which biologists capture with causal generalisations.  However just 
as easily as evolution makes these regularities, it can break them.  Changes to a biological 
system, whether in the form of mutation or adaptation or environmental change, can 
interrupt otherwise stable causal relationships.  An organism may develop a mutation leading 
to 30/70 meiotic division.  A mutation may introduce gene z, which mutes x’s power to 
produce P.  A population may lack free competition among individuals, permitting an 
unbalanced sex ratio.  None of these cases will necessarily result in decreased %tness, and at 
any rate their very occurrence (never mind prevalence) is enough to weaken the scope of 
relevant generalisations.  &is is how evolutionary forces can both bring about generalisations 
and introduce exceptions that limit them.  For this reason, even if an exceptionless 
generalisation did obtain, it could not be a law.  Suppose it really was the case that all 
organisms with gene x had phenotype P.  &is fact and its corresponding generalisation would 
be contingent on whatever features of the world brought it into being, such as a supportive 
environment and a lack of genes z.  Since it is possible that those features of the world will 
change, introducing exceptions, the exceptionless generalisation is not necessarily 
exceptionless, only contingently so.  It is therefore not a law.   
John Beatty (1995) makes precisely this point in his classic argument against laws in 
biology.  His focus is on the contingent nature of biological generalisations, explaining why 
any biological regularity is contingent on evolutionary outcomes.   
[T]he conditions that lead to the evolutionary predominance of a particular trait 
within a particular group may change, so that the predominance of the trait 
declines. Somewhat more colloquially: what the agents of evolution [dri/, selection, 
mutation, etc.] render general, they may later render rare. Two sources of this kind 
of contingency are mutation, and natural selection in changing environments. 
Suppose that relative hairlessness owes its prevalence to the fact that it was favored 
under particular circumstances by natural selection—relative hairiness being 
selected against… Is there anything naturally necessary about the circumstances 
under which relative hairlessness was favored—something that could not change? 
(222) 
&e answer to his (rhetorical) question is: ‘of course not!’.  Whatever conditions brought about 
relative hairlessness in humans could just have easily changed, bringing about relative 
hairiness.  &ere is nothing necessary about those conditions or their e+ects; they are 
contingent features of the evolutionary landscape.  &is contingency does not prevent us from 
making generalisations about relative hairlessness, which does a/er all obtain in most human 
populations; but these generalisations are imperfect.  &ey do not constitute laws, since they 
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could have been false (they will not support counterfactuals concerning changes in conditions 
of selection) and they will likely not be exceptionless generalisations, since even in a world that 
has tended to favour relative hairlessness, hairy mutants will crop-up (e.g. hypertrichosis). 
In their most basic form, scienti%c generalisations are statements ranging over kinds and 
operating on properties possessed by members of those kinds.  &e example from Beatty is a 
claim about the kind ‘human’ and the property ‘relative hairlessness’.  Generalisations of this 
form are confronted with the problem of intrinsic heterogeneity.  For reasons outlined above, 
it is possible that any member of ‘human’ might lack the property of being relatively hairless.  
But what about laws?  Suppose all of the hypertrichosis patients in the world died, making ‘all 
humans are relatively hairless’ an exceptionless generalisation.  Is it a law?  No.  It is an 
exceptionless generalisation at present, given the present humans that make up the kind 
‘human’, but humans of the future will necessarily have di+erent historical essences from both 
one another and from humans of present.  It is possible that some of those histories may 
include an interchromosomal insertion at Xq27.1, resulting in extreme hair growth.  &e very 
possibility of exception precludes laws. 
&e possibility of exceptions is grounded in, %rst, physical possibility and, second, 
historical essentialism.  First, cases where particulars that lack certain properties, like 
hairlessness, are physically possible; they are permitted by whatever physico-chemical laws 
govern genetic mutation/insertion.  Second, historical essences are collections of events, and 
any possible event is liable to be part of that history.  Putting these together, any biological 
change that is within the realm of physical possibility for a biological particular is therefore 
capable of entering into the historical essence of that particular.  &is fact precludes laws and 
renders exceptionless generalizations unlikely for any biological property for which change is 
possible.  Insofar as philosophers of biology appear to agree that all properties of biological 
objects are liable to change (see anti-essentialist consensus, Chapter 2), this reasoning 
precludes all biological laws and renders unlikely all generalizations to the extent that those 
laws/generalizations invoke shared properties of biological objects.  &is is how Kind 
Historicism relates to the problem of laws in biology. 
Notice that not all generalisations range over natural kinds.  &e example of the Krebs’ 
cycle, above, is one such case.  It ranges over the class of all aerobic organisms.  In physics and 
chemistry we can think of many generalisations that range over higher-level groups, such as 
the claim that all metals are conductive.  &is generalisation ranges over the higher-level kind, 
‘metal’.  &ese may not be ‘laws’, but it is nevertheless o/en observed that physics and 
chemistry o+er stronger (more broadly invariant) such generalisations than biology.  Can 
Kind Historicism shed any light on these cases?  Generalisations such as these, in spite of 
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ranging over induction-supporting kinds, still bear some relations to the features of the type 
of kind category of their particulars (microstructural or historical) even though those 
particulars will belong to an assortment of natural kinds.  &is is easier to see with the non-
biological generalisations.  &e class ‘metal’ is made up of a selection of natural kinds a, b, c, 
… n.  Each kind, a…n, contains particulars co-instantiating a microstructure.  It is therefore 
possible that microstructures of kinds a…n share some property (or properties) P.  In the case 
of metals, these microstructures share certain properties (to do with numbers of free 
electrons) that support the causal disposition to conduct electricity.162  &e possibility of 
strong generalisations ranging over non-kinds is therefore grounded in the invariant 
multiply-instantiated essences of non-biological kinds.   Since biological kinds lack invariant 
multiply-instantiated essences, they are less hospitable to such generalisations.  &e class 
‘aerobic organism’ spans many biological natural kinds.  Within any one of those natural 
kinds are diverse essences yielding diverse organisms. Compounding within-kind variation 
across a class made up of multiple kinds renders shared essential properties unlikely.  
Moreover, for reasons outlined above, any similarities that do arise will be contingent, not 
necessary.   
2. Final #oughts 
Contemporary philosophy of biology has not been hospitable to metaphysics and 
ontology.  A general anti-metaphysical attitude in our %eld is evidenced by a recent survey of 
philosophical opinion (Bourget & Chalmers 2014), which reveals that philosophers of biology 
are far less metaphysically-inclined than their peers.163  I hope to have shown that some of the 
anti-metaphysical attitude, particularly that directed toward essentialism and natural kinds, is 
based on misunderstandings of those positions.  I have also shown that, contrary to popular 
opinion, a categorically monistic account of biological kinds is possible, and that such an 
account need not con,ict with Darwinian biological theory.  To the contrary, my Kind 
Historicism ,ows straightforwardly from a Darwinian view of the biological world.  It is a 
Darwinian metaphysic. 
My account also clari%es the role of natural kind (and individuality) enquiries relative to 
scienti%c investigation.  When it comes to doing science, these are the wrong tools for the job.  
&e right tools are induction-supporting kinds, which I have discussed sparingly.  If 
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162 I am choosing to ignore the complication that this generalization toggles between claims about 
atoms and claims about pure substances formed of those atoms.  This is not a serious complication; but 
would make the explanation unnecessarily complicated. 
163 On a priori knowledge, and on the existence of abstract objects, Philosophers of Biology were far 
more bullish than their peers in Philosophy of the Physical Sciences, General Philosophers of Science, 
and All Philosophers.  For example, only 9.1% of Philosophers of Biology support Platonism about 
abstract objects, whereas general philosophical opinion puts the number at 31.5%.  
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philosophers of biology want to aid scienti%c classi%cation and individuation, they ought to 
forget about natural kinds and instead determine the virtuous and vicious features of 
induction-supporting kinds.  So too with individuation.  Searching for ‘"e’ individuals is 
fraught.  It is better to seek an account of individuation that ties scienti%c investigation to 
whatever features of the world are relevant to those investigations.  In both classi%cation and 
individuation, seeking to award badges of ontological merit will only lead philosophers astray.  
&is is not because accounts of natural kinds and individuation do not apply to the biological 
world, but because such metaphysical investigations are divorced from the practical reasoning 
of science.   
Some further questions in this line of enquiry remain.  First, some philosophers take 
certain moral facts to ,ow from metaphysical facts (about kinds or individuals).  In debates 
about abortion, for instance, philosophers have appealed to Aristotelian individuation criteria 
to determine when a foetus is part of or distinct from the mother (e.g. Smith & Brogaard 
2003).  Such uses of biological ontology are not covered by my argument against natural kinds 
in scienti%c reasoning.  Future work might examine an extension of my pragmatic attitude 
toward classi%cation to cover these metaphysically-informed scienti%c ethics.   Second, my 
discussion of laws and generalisations in biology is but a sketch.  A full treatment of the issue 
should be more %rmly grounded in the actual generalisations of the biological sciences, 
examining the classes used.  
Additionally, accounts such as this one must reckon with the ‘structuralist tendency’ 
(French 2011) emerging in the philosophy of science.  In debates about realism, taking their 
lead from the metaphysical implications of quantum physics, structuralists eschew the 
existence of objects in favour of structures.  &e precise understanding of ‘structure’ 
notwithstanding, it is di*cult to square the potential non-existence of objects with the views 
presented here.  It has been suggested, for instance, that structural realisms o+er a solution to 
the problem of biological individuality (French 2011, 2013), taking focus away from questions 
about the precise composition of biological individuals and toward questions about the 
relevant causal and relational structures that maintain/generate (what appear to us to be) 
those individuals.  &e emphasis on the processes in which individuals participate is 
commensurate with my focus on individuals as evolutionarily composed.  However the 
general rejection of objects challenges any claims whatsoever to biological natural kinds—
insofar as the particulars that form kinds are objects.  &ough Steve French has made several 
appeals for an application of structural realism to biology (French 2011, 2013), exactly what 
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this ontological eliminativism means for both biology and its metaphysics remains to be 
seen.164 
A %nal metaphilosophical point remains, concerning the worth of explanations in 
scienti%c metaphysics.  Kind Historicism is a part of a recent broad trend, called ‘scienti%c 
metaphysics’, which attempts to bring metaphysical/ontological theory in alignment with 
scienti%c knowledge.  As an evolutionary metaphysics, Kind Historicism %ts the bill.  It 
preserves the historical way of thinking about biology developed since Darwin, and thus does 
not change fundamentally how we think of the biological world.  Instead, it provides 
metaphysical accounts of certain features of the biological world.  As scienti%c metaphysics 
grows, perhaps eventually developing some shared methods or tools, many such accounts will 
emerge.  When and as this happens, we must be prepared to ask a/er their utility.  I have 
established that the metaphysics of natural kinds has no practical scienti%c utility, but I have 
not asked about the explanatory utility of my account.  I believe this account is philosophically 
important, and timely, for reasons o+ered throughout, particularly Chapters 1 and 2; and I 
can say the same for much of the work that goes on in scienti%c metaphysics.  But 
philosophical importance is not everything.  &e explanatory worth of these accounts should 
not be overshadowed by their philosophical timeliness.  We should ask whether these 
scienti%c metaphysical accounts explain anything.  We should ask for instance whether Kind 
Historicism explains anything that Darwinian theory does not.  For now, at least, my account 
is on the table—a table increasingly crowded with other such metaphysical accounts.  Soon, 
when we have established by preponderance of cases that science and metaphysics can be 
brought into alignment, we must sit at that table and begin to digest.   
 
 
 
  

164 I am confident that structural realism helps make sense of the ever-changing notion of the gene in 
biology.  French’s semantic articulation of ontic structural realism is compatible with the evolution of 
the gene concept I presented in Bartol (2011, Ch 2).   
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